Redfield v. Iowa State Highway Commission
| Decision Date | 17 November 1959 |
| Docket Number | No. 49774,49774 |
| Parties | , 85 A.L.R.2d 96 Harry M. REDFIELD and Margaret H. Redfield, Appellants, v. IOWA STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION, Appellee. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Robert E. Dreher, Charles F. Wennerstrum and George A. Wilson, Des Moines, for appellants.
Keith E. McWilliams, Mitchell & Beving, Des Moines, and James E. Thomson, C. J. Lyman, Ames, for appellee.
In February, 1956 plaintiffs-appellants purchased 97.2 acres of land near the north edge of Des Moines for contemplated development as a residential sub-division. In November, 1957 the State Highway Commission filed notice of proceedings to condemn the north 77.2 acres of said land in connection with the construction of limited access interstate highway number 80. On December 10, 1958 the condemnation commission filed its report fixing plaintiffs' damages at $70,000. On December 26, 1957 the highway commission took possession of said condemned property and proceeded to complete the construction of said highway.
Within the proper time plaintiffs filed suit in the district court seeking damages in the amount of $198,925. The case was tried to a jury which gave plaintiffs a verdict for $60,000. They, being dissatisfied, have appealed to this court.
The land involved may be more particularly described as 97.2 acres abutting Merle Hay Road on the west, approximately one and one-fourth miles north of the intersection of Merle Hay Road and Douglas Avenue in Des Moines.
I. Appellants' first assigned error is that the trial court erred in excluding certified copies of certain deeds and contract identified as exhibits 14 to 22 inclusive in the cross-examination of appellee's witness Froning, and striking the testimony on direct examination of appellants' witness Ashby as to the price paid in a sale he used in forming his opinion. 'Every instrument in writing affecting real estate, * * * which is acknowledged or proved and certified as required, may be read in evidence without further proof.' Sec. 622.36 Code of Iowa, 1954, I.C.A. An authenticated copy of any duly recorded instrument is competent evidence when the original is shown to be lost or not within the control of the party wishing to use it. See Sec. 622.37.
To support their claim that the excluded exhibits were admissible as a part of the cross-examination of appellee's witness, Herman D. Froning, appellants cite: Watkins v. Wabash Railroad Co., 137 Iowa 441, 113 N.W. 924; Hubbell v. City of Des Moines, 166 Iowa 581, 147 N.W. 908; Winklemans v. Des Moines Northwestern Railway Co., 62 Iowa 11, 17 N.W. 82; Stotts v. Fairfield, 163 Iowa 726, 145 N.W. 61.
Froning, qualified as an expert on real estate values in Polk County, and, as such expert, fixed the value of appellants 97.2 acres at $66,000 before condemnation and the value of the 20 acres left after condemnation at $10,000.
Appellants' four witnesses testified to values as follows:
Before After Difference
Redfield $195,000. $20,000. $175.000
Ashby 179,500. 20,000. 159,500
Holden 143,000. 20,000. 123,000
Neal 169,750. 20,000. 149,750
Appellee's witnesses testified to values as follows:
Froning 66,000. 10,000. 56,000.
Donahoe 80,000. 8,000. 72,000.
Brandt 76,050. 11,550. 64,500.
It is enlightening to observe the extreme differences between the values placed on the subject property by the witnesses for the respective sides. All witnesses on value showed outstanding training and experience but when experts differ so widely on a proposition they profess to know all about, it lends force to appellants' claim that the actual records of sales of comparable properties from which the witnesses gained their knowledge are more reliable evidence than mere opinions of the experts.
Appellants, on cross-examination questioned appellee's witness Froning about the properties described in the deeds and contract evidenced by the exhibits 14 to 22 inclusive. He was asked if he considered these properties and the prices for which they sold in arriving at the valuation he placed on appellants' property. With the exception of four of the properties he said in substance regarding each property, 'I did not consider it as comparable and I didn't use it.' Appellants complain that the court accepted as a verity the testimony of Froning as to which recent sales were comparable and which were not and repudiated the testimony of appellants' witnesses in so far as that testimony differed from Froning's. The exhibits were offered to test Froning's knowledge and his competency as a witness as to the value of appellants' property, or in other words for impeachment purposes. All of the exhibits in question represented sales of land adjacent to Des Moines within three or four years prior to the instant appraisement and all purchases were for the purpose of improving said properties as residential and business additions to the city.
According to the exhibits:
No. 14 conveyed 70 acres for $98,000.
No. 15 conveyed 12 1/2 acres for 50,000.
No. 16 conveyed 42 acres for 85,000.
No. 17 conveyed 10 acres for 22,500.
No. 18 conveyed 47 acres for 531,000.
No. 19 conveyed 39 acres for 23,500
No. 20 conveyed 8 acres for 19,000.
No. 21 conveyed 40 acres for 80,000
No. 22 conveyed 5 acres for 20,000.
Appellants should concede No. 18 involved a highly improved church property and it should not be used as a comparable property. Exhibit 22 represented a 5 acre property which appears to have been sold for $4,000 per acre. This was hardly comparable to appellants larger and more remote tract. They were all, however, tracts which the experts recognized as being recently bought for the same purpose, i. e. to plat and improve for residential purposes, with some portions suitable for commercial uses, and all for resale. It was shown the trend is for Des Moines to expand to the north and west and that the city limits were soon to embrace a considerable portion of the property involved here. Appellants' witnesses all described said properties and each property was, by one or more, considered sufficiently similar to be accepted as showing the trend of the market and as having some influence thereon. From a study of the record we are convinced the properties represented by exhibits No. 18 and No. 22 should not have been considered as sufficiently similar to appellants to justify admission into evidence, over proper objection, of their sale prices and such evidence and the exhibits describing them were properly rejected. We are equally of the belief, however, that the opinions of appellants' experts as to other rejected properties should have had favorable consideration, that the evidence offered regarding them, including the relevant exhibits should have been admitted on cross-examination and under proper court instructions, and the jury should have been given an opportunity to determine the weight and value of such evidence. The refusal of the court to admit such relevant and competent evidence on cross-examination for the purpose of testing the knowledge and credibility of the witness was an abuse of judicial discretion and was prejudicial error. For this reason we must reverse.
If, as we now hold, such evidence was admissible as substantive evidence of value, the error is not cured by its later later admissions for the limited purpose of impeachment.
The fact appellants purchased the property involved here in 1956 for $60,000 and now claim it was, without physical improvement, worth a much larger figure is claimed by the witnesses to be justified by the building trend, the new four-lane Merle Hay highway, the then proposed Younkers-Sears trading center and other conditions causing a demand heretofore unprecedented.
It has been the rule in this state that testimony of experts as to the sale prices of other similar properties in the vicinity may be received on cross-examination to test the knowledge and competency of such experts, and the weight and value of their opinions. Maxwell v. Iowa State Highway Comm., 223 Iowa 159, 165, 271 N.W. 883, 118 A.L.R. 862, 867, and citations, Annotation 118 A.L.R. 869, 906, 907; Watkins v. Wabash Railroad Co., 137 Iowa 441, 442, 113 N.W. 924; Hubbell v. City of Des Moines, 166 Iowa 581, 595, 147 N.W. 908; Winklemans v. Des Moines Northwestern Railway Co., 62 Iowa 11, 16, 17 N.W. 82; Stotts v. Fairfield, 163 Iowa 726, 738, 739, 145 N.W. 61; Lehman v. Iowa State Highway Comm., Iowa, 99 N.W.2d 404.
We have also held that if requested to do so, the court should instruct the jury that the evidence of the prices paid for other properties in the vicinity offered to test the knowledge and competency of witnesses as valuation experts should be considered only for that purpose and should not be considered as substantive proof of the value of the property in litigation. Maxwell v. Iowa State Highway Comm., supra; Lehman v. Iowa State Highway Comm., supra.
II. Appellants assign as error the striking of the testimony of their witness Ashby on direct examination regarding the price paid in a sale he used in arriving at his opinion of the value of appellants' property. This assignment has reference to a tract referred to as follows: property. After describing other sales he said,
It appeared at that stage the court would continue to rule against the admission on direct examination of evidence of the prices paid...
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