Redmond v. City of Jackson

• Decision Date: 19 April 1926
• Docket Number: 25664
• Citation: 143 Miss. 114,108 So. 444
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: REDMOND v. CITY OF JACKSON. [*]

108 So. 444

143 Miss. 114

REDMOND v. CITY OF JACKSON. ^[*]

No. 25664

Supreme Court of Mississippi

April 19, 1926

Division B

Suggestion of Error Overruled May 24, 1926.

APPEAL from circuit court of Hinds county, First district, HON. W. H. POTTER, Judge.

S. D Redmond protested against a tax assessment by the city of Jackson, and, from an adverse judgment on his appeal to the circuit court, he appeals. Affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

Lamar F. Easterling, for appellant.

I. The burden of proof was on the city to show that the increased valuation by the council over the assessment made by the tax assessor was correct and we submit that the city failed to meet this burden throughout. Whittle v. City of Hattiesburg, 96 So. 741. Likewise the burden is upon the city to show that the city had obtained jurisdiction to make the raises or to increase the valuation by giving the requisite notice and passing the necessary ordinance to carry into operation section 3422, Hemingway's Code. See Ala. R. R. Co. v. Brennan, 69 Miss. 103; Biloxi v. Biloxi Real Estate Co., 94 Miss. 653, 48 So. 729; Herrick v. Pascagoula Street Ry. & Power Co., 97 Miss. 637, 54 So. 660; Whittle v. City of Hattiesburg, 96 So. 741.

We call the court's attention to section 4303, Code of 1906, requiring a county assessor, among other things, when he files his roll to publish notice thereof and the date of the meeting of the board to consider same. Cameron v. Whittington & McGehee, 82 So. 731.

The very reverse of this is true in the case now before the court. Under section 3422, Code of 1906, the duty is imposed upon the city council. And in the case of their failure to do so, we say, by analogy, any sale for taxes would likewise be void.

II. Instruction No. 1, given on behalf of the city, was erroneous in that it allows the jury to consider all the assessments together, which is not the law, as each separate item at a separate value is a separate transaction and is to be governed by equality of values in the immediate vicinity.

III. Instruction No. 2, granted for the city, was also erroneous. The theory of the counsel for the city throughout this trial seems to have been that the question involved was the actual value of this property, which is not the case, and the true value of the property is not the criterion. This instruction practically informed the jury that if they believed that the property was worth more than it was assessed, Redmond had no case. This instruction overlooks the most vital thing in all assessments under our constitution and law; that is, equality of value, and we submit that this error is fatal.

Morse & Scott, for appellee.

I. The assessment as made. We have no objection to find to the case of Whittle v. City of Hattiesburg, 96 So. 741. Under that decision the burden was on the city to establish the assessed valuation of the property. Section 112 of the Constitution provides that taxes shall be uniform and equal throughout the state; property shall be assessed in proportion to its value. Property shall be assessed for taxes under general laws and under uniform rules, according to its true value. But all such property shall be assessed at its true value and no county shall be denied the power to levy county and special taxes, etc.

It is held in Adams v. Miss. State Bank, 75 Miss. 701, 23 So. 395, and Adams v. Bank of Oxford, 78 Miss. 532, that municipal taxation is within the operation of the section above quoted. There is no question as to the valuation of the property. Every witness, except the defendant, Redmond, knew the value of the property and placed the value of the land per front foot from three hundred dollars to five hundred dollars. The defendant, Redmond, was shifty in his testimony and would never declare himself on any values.

Appellant raised an objection at this time to the fact that notice of the equalization was not introduced and proved by the city. The city showed that notice was published through the testimony of the mayor. The defendant waived the notice itself as he did not require its production. If he wanted it in the record, it was his duty to object to the mayor's testifying.

II. The instructions. The appellant objects to the instructions that were given the appellee in this case. When the case came on for hearing, we made a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the appeal bond attempted to cover each separate and distinct assessment. Appellant at that time very strenuously contended that the assessments should be considered as one case and one appeal, and the court ruled in his favor. We thought that was error and we gave notice of a cross-appeal, which is shown in the record. We decided not to prosecute our cross-appeal and we see no reason why he could complain of the entire case being tried as one case, as it was done at his instance and request.

If instruction No. 1, given the city, was erroneous, which we do not think is true, yet being construed with instruction given the appellant, each item appealed from is set forth; therefore, we think that there could be no error and that the jury could not have been mislead.

Appellant complains of instruction No. 2, given the city. We think this is without merit as the statute provides that property shall be assessed at its true value, and in determining its true value these elements were entered into. If there was any error in instructions Nos. 1 and 2, instruction No. 3 would cure any defect.

OPINION

ETHRIDGE, J.

The appellant, S.D. Redmond, owns a number of houses and lots in the city of Jackson, some of his property being residence property and some if it business property. This property was assessed by the assessor of the city of Jackson in the year 1924, and certain of the property in being equalized by the city commission was raised. Among the property raised by the city commission in equalizing the assessments was a business house and lot owned by Redmond involved herein. This property was a two-story brick...