Reed v. Dep't of Pub. Safety
| Decision Date | 09 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | 110401 |
| Citation | 2021 Ohio 4314 |
| Parties | WALTER REED, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case No CV-19-914983
Huey Defense Firm and Blaise Katter, for appellant.
David Yost, Ohio Attorney General, and Brian R. Honen and Natasha Natale, Assistant Attorneys General, Executive Agencies Section, for appellee.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant Walter Reed appeals an order of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas affirming the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles ("BMV") Registrar's disqualification of Reed's commercial driver's license ("CDL"). Reed raises one assignment of error:
The trial court erred by concluding that the BMV's disqualification of Reed's CDL was in accordance with the law.
{¶ 2} Finding no merit in Reed's sole assignment of error, we affirm the judgment of the common pleas court.
{¶ 3} On October 1, 2018, a Public Utilities Commission of Ohio ("PUCO" or "Commission") officer stopped Reed, who was driving a commercial motor vehicle ("CMV") for Mars Trucking, Inc. on Ohio Interstate 77. The PUCO officer cited Reed for an alleged violation of 49 C.F.R. 392.82(a)(1), which prohibits a driver from using a handheld mobile telephone while driving a CMV. On October 4 2018, pursuant to Ohio Adm.Code 4901:2-7-09, the Commission sent Reed a combined Notice of Apparent Violation and Notice of Intent to Assess Forfeiture in the amount of $250.00 and informed Reed that he could request a conference to contest the violation and assessment. On December 20, 2018, Reed paid the assessed forfeiture, and the Commission notified the BMV that Reed was "convicted" of a "CW" offense, prohibiting use of a "handheld mobile telephone," as defined by the Ohio Revised Code Offense & Conviction Code List. A "CW" offense is equivalent to RC. 4511.204, which prohibits texting while driving.
{¶ 4} On December 11, 2018, a Southgate, Michigan police officer cited Reed for "IMP LANE USE," for which Reed was convicted in Michigan's 28th Judicial District Court the following day. The state of Michigan reported the conviction to the Ohio BMV as ABD Offense Code: M42, "IMP LANE CH" or "improper or erratic (unsafe) lane changes," as defined by the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators. The Michigan reporting agency designated the offense a violation of Code 2840, "improper lane use," a violation of Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. 257.642(1) as defined by the Michigan Department of State's Offense Code Index for Traffic Violations.
{¶ 5} On January 4, 2019, the Ohio BMV sent Reed a Notice of Disqualification and Opportunity for Hearing, advising him that pursuant to R.C. 4506.16, he would be disqualified from driving a CMV for 60 days from February 8, 2019, to April 9, 2019, because he had "2 serious violations in 3 years." Reed timely requested a hearing. The hearing was originally scheduled for January 29, 2019, and, after two continuances, held on March 13, 2019, in Columbus. Following the hearing, the hearing examiner issued a report and recommendation. The hearing examiner recommended that Reed's disqualification be terminated and deleted from his record, finding that the Commission had no authority to convict Reed. The report also distinguished a PUCO "forfeiture" from a traffic "fine." In addition, the hearing examiner found that Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. 257.642(1) was not "substantially similar" to R.C. 4511.33 so that Reed's violation of 257.642(1) did not constitute a "serious traffic violation" under R.C. 4506.01(II).
{¶ 6} The Registrar rejected the hearing examiner's recommendation, finding that Reed's citation for use of a handheld mobile telephone while driving a CMV constituted a "conviction" under 49 C.F.R. 383.5 and R.C. 4506.01(F). The Registrar observed that 49 C.F.R. 392.82 and RC. 4511.204 prohibited the use of a handheld mobile telephone while driving a CMV, and R.C. 4923.04 authorized the Commission to find the use of a handheld mobile telephone a violation of law and assess a forfeiture for this violation. The Registrar also found that despite "minor differences," Mich.Comp.Laws Ann. 257.642(1) and R.C. 4511.33 are substantially similar in that both statutes prohibit driving a vehicle in the center lane of a roadway divided into three lanes and providing for two-way movement of traffic, except when overtaking and passing another vehicle. The Registrar noted Reed's admission that he was driving in the center lane when he was stopped and cited. The Registrar issued these findings, ordered disqualification of Reed's CDL, and advised Reed of his right to appeal the order pursuant to R.C. 119.12.
{¶ 7} Reed timely appealed to the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, which reviewed the parties' briefs and heard oral argument on October 1, 2019. The common pleas court affirmed the Registrar's order disqualifying Reed's CDL as supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and in accordance with the law.
{¶ 8} Reed appeals this judgment.
{¶ 9} In his sole assignment of error, Reed argues that the common pleas court erred by concluding that the BMV's disqualification of Reed's CDL was in accordance with the law.[1] When a common pleas court reviews an administrative order revoking a license, R.C. 119.12 provides the standard of review. Capital Care Network of Toledo v. Ohio Dept. of Health, 153 Ohio St.3d 362, 2018-Ohio-440, 106 N.E.3d 1209, ¶ 24.
{¶ 10} R.C. 119.12 provides in relevant part:
The court may affirm the order of the agency complained of in the appeal if it finds, upon consideration of the entire record and any additional evidence the court has admitted, that the order is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law. In the absence of this finding, it may reverse, vacate, or modify the order or make such other ruling as is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in accordance with law.
{¶ 11} "R.C. 119.12 requires a reviewing common pleas court to conduct two inquiries: a hybrid factual/legal inquiry and a purely legal inquiry." Bartchy v. State Bd. of Edn., 120 Ohio St.3d 205, 2008-Ohio-4826, 897 N.E.2d 1096, ¶ 37. When conducting the factual inquiry, the common pleas court must give deference to the administrative agency's findings. Univ. of Cincinnati v. Conrad, 63 Ohio St.2d 108, 111, 407 N.E.2d 1265 (1980).
{¶ 12} When conducting the legal inquiry, the common pleas court "must construe the law on its own." Id.; see VFW Post 8586 v. Ohio Liquor Control Comm., 83 Ohio St.3d 79, 81, 697 N.E.2d 655 (1998) (). If the agency's decision is supported by sufficient evidence and the law, the common pleas court may not review the agency's exercise of discretion. Capital Care Network of Toledo, 153 Ohio St.3d 362, 2018-Ohio-440, 106 N.E.3d 1209, at ¶ 25.
{¶ 13} An appellate court reviews purely legal questions de novo and may substitute its own judgment for that of common pleas court when determining whether the administrative order comports with the law. Bartchy at ¶ 43, citing Univ. Hosp., Univ. of Cincinnati College of Medicine v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 63 Ohio St.3d 339, 343, 587 N.E.2d 835 (1992).
{¶ 14} Reed argues that the common pleas court erred by affirming the Registrar's disqualification of Reed's CDL because Reed was not convicted of two serious traffic violations within a three-year period under R.C. 4506.16(D)(5)(a). A "conviction" and a "serious traffic violation" are defined terms.
{¶ 15} Reed contends that his December 2018 payment of the civil forfeiture that the PUCO assessed for his October 2018 use of a handheld mobile telephone while operating a CMV was not a "conviction" because (1) the Commission's rules differ from state law; (2) the Commission assesses civil forfeitures, not fines, for rule violations; and (3) payment of a civil forfeiture constitutes neither a conviction nor an admission of guilt. RC. 4506.01 defines "conviction" as follows:
"Conviction" means unvacated adjudication of guilt or a determination that a person has violated or failed to comply with the law in a court of original jurisdiction or an authorized administrative tribunal, an unvacated forfeiture of bail or collateral deposited to secure the person's appearance in court, a plea of guilty or nolo contendere accepted by the court, the payment of a fine or court cost, or violation of a condition of release without bail, regardless of whether or not the penalty is rebated, suspended, or probated.
{¶ 16} Reed does not dispute that the Commission is statutorily authorized to promulgate and enforce administrative rules. Rather, he initially argues that violation of an administrative rule differs from a violation of state law. The state argues that any rule issued by the Commission has the same force and effect as Ohio law. We agree. R.C. 4506.01(F) provides for "a determination that a person has violated * * * the law in * * * an authorized administrative tribunal." "An administrative regulation issued pursuant to statutory authority has the force and effect of law." State ex rel Cordray v. Midway Motor Sales, Inc., 122 Ohio St.3d 234, 2009-Ohio-2610, 910 N.E.2d 432, ¶ 23; Doyle, 51 Ohio St.3d 46, 554 N.E.2d 97 (1990), paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶ 17} Pursuant to R.C. 4923.04, the Commission regulates motor vehicle transportation of persons and property in Ohio and "has adopted certain...
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