Univ. Hosp., Univ. of Cincinnati College of Medicine v. State Emp. Relations Bd.

• Decision Date: 01 April 1992
• Docket Number: No. 90-2286,90-2286
• Citation: 63 Ohio St.3d 339,587 N.E.2d 835
• Parties: , 140 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2187, 72 Ed. Law Rep. 1035 UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI COLLEGE OF MEDICINE, Appellee, v. STATE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD et al., Appellants.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 339

63 Ohio St.3d 339

587 N.E.2d 835, 140 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2187, 72 Ed. Law Rep. 1035

UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI COLLEGE OF MEDICINE, Appellee, v. STATE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD et al., Appellants.

No. 90-2286.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Dec. 3, 1991.

Decided April 1, 1992.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1. The conclusion by a court of common pleas that an order of the State Employment Relations Board is not supported by substantial evidence on the record is a legal determination fully reviewable by the court of appeals.

2. Physicians in the employ of a hospital constituting a "public employer" as defined by R.C. 4117.01(B) who have been awarded their medical degrees but whose provision of care to hospital patients is necessary to obtain state certification in a specialty or subspecialty in medicine are public employees for purpose § of R.C. Chapter 4117. Such employees are not "students" exempt from the operation of the Public Employees' Collective Bargaining Act pursuant to R.C. 4117. 01(C)(11).

Effective July 1, 1974, appellee, University Hospital of the University of Cincinnati College of Medicine ("the hospital"), and appellant-intervenor, House Staff Association ("the Association") of the hospital, executed an agreement creating a salary structure for employees of the hospital belonging to the Association. Beginning on July 1, 1975, appellee and the Association entered into a series of agreements governing wages and terms and conditions of employment for house officers. The house officers represented by the Association consist of medical doctors and osteopaths who have completed their degree requirements and who are pursuing a residency at the hospital to obtain certification in a specialty or subspecialty in medicine. ¹ The house officers are not registered as students with the university registrar, receive no grades or academic credit for their residency and pay no tuition. Rather, the officers are required to work approximately eighty hours per week, receive salaries (which in 1986 ranged from $19,708.32 to $31,724.04) and enjoy employment benefits including paid vacation, medical and dental coverage, disability income and life insurance and sick leave. At least seventy-five percent of a house officer's work time is devoted to patient care. ² Such residency programs are not unique to the appellee hospital. Similar programs exist in other hospitals irrespective of any affiliation between the hospital and a university.

The original agreement between the hospital and the Association was of a two-year duration and was renegotiated biennially from 1977 to 1985. Am.Sub.S.B. No. 133, which enacted R.C. Chapter 4117, the Public Employees' Collective Bargaining Act ("the Act"), contained uncodified Section 4(A). Section 4(A), effective October 6, 1983, provided as follows:

"Exclusive recognition through a written contract, agreement, or memorandum of understanding by a public employer to an employee organization whether specifically stated or through tradition, custom, practice, election, or negotiation [that] the employee organization has been the only employee organization representing all employees in the unit is protected subject to the time restriction in division (B) of section 4117.05 of the Revised Code. Notwithstanding any other provision of this act, an employee organization recognized as the exclusive representative shall be deemed certified until challenged by another employee organization under the provisions of this act and the State Employment Relations Board has certified an exclusive representative." (Emphasis added.) 140 Ohio Laws, Part I, 367.

On April 1, 1984, R.C. 4117.01(C) and (D) became effective. R.C. 4117.01(C)(11) provides in relevant part:

" 'Public employee' means any person holding a position by appointment or employment in the service of a public employer, including any person working pursuant to a contract between a public employer and a private employer and over whom the national labor relations board has declined jurisdiction on the basis that the involved employees are employees of a public employer, except:

" * * *

"(11) Students whose primary purpose is educational training, including graduate assistants or associates, residents, interns, or other students working as part-time public employees less than fifty per cent of the normal year in the employee's bargaining unit[.]" (Emphasis added.)

R.C. 4117.01(D) provides:

" 'Employee organization' means any labor or bona fide organization in which public employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with public employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, hours, terms and other conditions of employment."

On April 15, 1985, Dr. Roger R. Hesselbrock, on behalf of the Association, notified appellee of its desire to negotiate a successor collective bargaining agreement to replace the agreement scheduled to expire on June 30, 1985. On April 18, 1985, appellee notified the Association that it would not negotiate pending a determination by appellant, the State Employment Relations Board ("SERB"), that the Association constituted a valid bargaining unit.

On May 20, 1985, the Association filed an unfair labor practice charge with SERB against appellee alleging that appellee had refused to bargain in violation of the Act. Following a finding of probable cause, SERB issued a complaint against appellee. On July 16, 1986, a hearing on the complaint was commenced.

On February 5, 1987, the hearing officer for SERB issued proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The proposed order provided that appellee was to cease and desist from refusing to bargain collectively with the Association and directed the parties to engage in collective bargaining pursuant to R.C. 4117.08. On April 8, 1987, SERB adopted the recommendation of the hearing officer with a minor amendment and ordered that any collective bargaining agreement resulting from the negotiations be made retroactive to April 18, 1985.

This order was appealed to the Hamilton County Common Pleas Court which, on March 9, 1989, reversed the order of SERB. On October 3, 1990, the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County affirmed.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Wood & Lamping, Paul R. Berninger and Mark R. Fitch, Cincinnati, for appellee.

Lee I. Fisher, Atty. Gen., and Joseph M. Oser, Columbus, for appellant State Employment Relations Bd.

Lynch, Cox, Gilman & Mahan, and Susan J. Hauck, Louisville, Ky., for appellant House Staff Ass'n.

SWEENEY, Justice.

I

The hearing officer whose findings were adopted by SERB determined that the house officers were not students excluded from the operation of the Public Employees' Collective Bargaining Act pursuant to R.C. 4117.01(C)(11). A preliminary issue concerns the nature of this determination. The appellate court, while concluding that such determinations are questions of fact, nevertheless held that the trial court's reversal of the order did not constitute an abuse-of-discretion. Although conceding that SERB's order was supported by substantial evidence, the court concluded the abuse-of-discretion standard of review dictated affirmance of the judgment of the common pleas court.

R.C. 4117.13(D) governs appeals of SERB's orders to courts of common pleas. It provides in relevant part:

"Any person aggrieved by any final order of the board granting or denying, in whole or in part, the relief sought may appeal to the court of common pleas of any county where the unfair labor practice in question was alleged to have been engaged in, or where the person resides or transacts business, by filing in the court a notice of appeal setting forth the order appealed from and the grounds of appeal * * *.

"The court has exclusive jurisdiction to grant the temporary relief or restraining order it considers proper, and to make and enter a decree enforcing, modifying, and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the board. The findings of the board as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, are conclusive." (Emphasis added.)

In Lorain City Bd. of Edn. v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 257, 260, 533 N.E.2d 264, 266, this court described the extremely deferential standard of review applied to factual determinations of SERB pursuant to R.C. 4117.13(D). We observed therein that disputes as to conflicting evidence " * * * are properly determined by SERB, which was designated by the General Assembly to facilitate an amicable, comprehensive, effective labor-management relationship between public employees and employers. State, ex rel. Dayton Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 44, v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 1, 5, 22 OBR 1, 4, 488 N.E.2d 181, 184-185. As long as SERB's decision on such matters is supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed. Courts should not be required to intervene in every factual dispute between contesting parties."

When undertaking a review of an order of adjudication rendered by an administrative agency, a court of common pleas acts in a limited appellate capacity. See, generally, Andrews v. Bd. of Liquor Control (1955), 164 Ohio St. 275, 279-280, 58 O.O. 51, 53-54, 131 N.E.2d 390, 393-394.

Accordingly, while resolution of conflicting evidence is the province of SERB, the determination of whether the order of the agency can withstand the standard of review prescribed by R.C. 4117.13(D) is essentially a question of law for the court of common pleas. As such, a reviewing court which seeks to ascertain whether the common pleas court has applied the appropriate standard of review to SERB's factual findings is not compelled to adhere to the conclusion reached by the common pleas court. Rather, it is the prerogative and the responsibility of the court entertaining the...