Reedy v. Reedy, 2620--I

• Decision Date: 03 March 1975
• Docket Number: No. 2620--I,2620--I
• Citation: 12 Wn.App. 844,532 P.2d 626
• Parties: Joanne F. REEDY, Appellant, v. Robert G. REEDY, Respondent.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

Page 844

12 Wn.App. 844

532 P.2d 626

Joanne F. REEDY, Appellant, v. Robert G. REEDY, Respondent.

No. 2620--I.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1 March 3, 1975.

Lonnie Davis, Kent Millikan, Northwest Washington Legal Services, Everett, for appellant.

Julin, Fosso & Sage, James D. McBride, Seattle, for respondent.

SWANSON, Judge.

Joanne F. Reedy appeals from an order filed October 18, 1973, discharging the duty of her former husband, the respondent Robert G. Reedy, to make child support payments for their son Robert on the sole ground that Robert, having attained the age of 18 years, was emancipated as a matter of law notwithstanding the fact that at the time the decree of divorce was entered the legal age of majority was 21.

The agree statement of facts, submitted pursuant to CAROA 34(4), indicates that the parties were granted a divorce on December 11, 1970. Appellant was granted custody of the parties' four children and the respondent was directed to pay child support for the children 'until they reach the age of 21 years or are sooner emancipated or married, . . .' None of the specified conditions for the termination of child support have occurred in fact, but effective August 9, 1971, the legislature amended RCW 26.28.010, which previously had set the age of majority at 21, to provide, 'Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, all persons shall be deemed and taken to be of full age for all purposes at the age of Eighteen years.' Laws of 1971, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 292, § 1, p. 1603. In the latter part of June, 1973, the respondent ceased making child support payments for the parties' eldest child Robert who had then attained the age of 18. Robert resides with his mother, the appellant, is not married, and attends college on a full-time basis. In an order filed October 18, 1973, the trial court discharged the respondent's duty to make child support payments for Robert, and denied the appellant's motion to hold respondent in contempt for the failure to make such payments. This appeal follows.

The thrust of appellant's argument on appeal is that the decision of our state Supreme Court in Baker v. Baker, 80 Wash.2d 736, 498 P.2d 315 (1972), and the subsequent decisions of this court in Sproston v. Sproston, 8 Wash.App. 218, 505 P.2d 479 (1973) and Waymire v. Waymire, 10 Wash.App. 262, 517 P.2d 219 (1973), constitute the controlling authority in this case. We agree.

In Baker at page 739, of 80 Wash.2d, at page 318 of 498 P.2d, the divorce decree ordered the father of a minor daughter to pay child support until the daughter "shall reach the age of twenty-one years, becomes self-supporting or married . . ." The father argued that he should be relieved of such support obligation after his daughter became 18 because of the amendment to RCW 26.28.010, previously quoted herein, which lowered the age of majority from 21 to 18 years. In rejecting this contention, the court stated in Baker at pages 741--42, 498 P.2d at page 319:

It is the rule in this state that a legislative enactment is presumed to apply prospectively only, and will not be held to apply retrospectively unless such legislative intent is clearly expressed or to be implied. . . . Further, the legislature is without power to set aside, annul, or change the liability upon a judgment affecting solely the rights of private parties by the enactment of a general law. . . . We find nothing in the new legislation to indicate that it is intended to have retroactive application.

We hold that Laws of 1971, (1st) Ex.Sess., ch. 292, § 1, p. 1603, is not retroactive and does not apply to judgments entered in divorce decrees prior to August 9, 1971, the effective date of the enactment. Therefore, it was entirely within the authority of the trial court in this case to make provisions for the support and education of the child of the parties until the child reached the age of 21 years. (Citations omitted.)

In Baker at page 742, 498 P.2d 315, the court recognized the rule then applicable that a trial court is without jurisdiction to order child support extending beyond the child's age of majority, ¹ but essentially concluded that the age of majority is determined by the law in effect at the time of entry of the divorce decree, absent any showing that the legislature intended the subsequent amendment modifying the age of majority to be applied retroactively. See also Waymire v. Waymire, Supra, 10 Wash.App. at page 265, 517 P.2d 219.

Thus, in Sproston, 8 Wash.App. at page 218, 505 P.2d at page 480 this court reviewed language of a divorce decree virtually identical to that involved in the case at bar, providing for child support "until the child concerned shall have reached twenty-one years of age, marries, (or) becomes emancipated . . ." Relying primarily on Baker, we held that the fact that the legislature subsequently had changed the age of majority to 18 did not constitute a sufficient showing in and of itself to relieve the husband of his obligation to make child support payments until his child became 21 years old. Similarly, in Waymire, decided after the trial court's decision in this case, the husband was ordered to pay child support "until the children reach their majority or are sooner self-supporting." Waymire at 263, of 10 Wash.App., at 220 of 517 P.2d. This court affirmed a trial court holding based upon Baker that inasmuch as the decree in question was entered prior to the statutory amendment changing the age of majority from 21 to 18 years, the reference to 'majority' in the decree should be deemed to be a reference to the age of 21 years.

When the holdings of Baker, Sproston, and Waymire are considered in the context of the facts of this case, it is apparent that the trial court was in error when it discharged the respondent from his duty to pay child support for Robert until he reaches the age of 21. At the time of the trial court's order, Robert was under 21, unmarried, and unemancipated in fact. As to this latter point, the trial judge observed in his oral ruling, 'We are talking at the moment, however, about emancipation solely by operation of law, because we haven't any facts before the court at this point which would justify a finding of emancipation as a matter of fact.' The trial court subsequently noted that the language of the decree providing for support of the children 'until they reach the age of 21 years or are sooner emancipated or married' refers to emancipation in the general sense, without explicit limitation to emancipation in fact, and therefore concluded that such reference includes emancipation by the operation of the statutory amendment lowering...