Reeseman v. State

• Decision Date: 25 May 1910
• Parties: REESEMAN v. STATE.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

128 S.W. 1126

REESEMAN v. STATE.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 25, 1910.

Appeal from District Court, Bowie County; P. A. Turner, Judge.

Eddie Reeseman was convicted of forgery, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Hart, Mahaffey & Thomas, for appellant. John A. Mobley, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

RAMSEY, J.

On the 2d day of December, 1908, the grand jury of Bowie county returned into the district court of said county an indictment containing two counts against appellant, one charging him with forgery, and the other with attempting to pass as true a forged instrument. The last count was by the court on motion quashed, and the conviction was had on the first count, which is as follows: "That Eddie Reeseman, late of the county of Bowie, on the 2d day of November, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and eight, with force and arms, in the county of Bowie and state of Texas, did then and there unlawfully and willfully and fraudulently and without lawful authority, and with intent to injure, make a certain false instrument in writing purporting to be the act of another, which said instrument is to the tenor following: `Texarkana, Texas, Nov. 2, 1908. No.___. The City National Bank. Pay to S. M. Scott $15.00, fifteen dollars, 00 Dollars. Dr. G. A. Jamisom;' that by the name `Dr. G. A. Jamisom,' which the said Eddie Reeseman then and there signed to and placed upon the aforesaid instrument in writing, the said Eddie Reeseman then and there meant G. U. Jamison, whose name the said Eddie Reeseman then and there without lawful authority and with intent to injure and defraud, intended to sign to said instrument, and wrote `Dr. G. A. Jamisom' thereon instead"—his punishment being assessed at confinement in the penitentiary for a period of two years.

The facts in the case show that at and before the date of the alleged forgery one G. U. Jamison, a negro, resided in Texarkana, and that he was a physician, and that he had his office over what is called the "Stevens Drug Store," and was the only person at said drug store of that name, and was the only colored physician in Texarkana. It appears further from the testimony of Dr. Jamison that there was an S. M. Scott residing in Texarkana, but that he had never had any business with him except to pay him some dues for his wife accruing to the church to which they belonged. He also testified he did not sign the check in question, nor authorize any one else to sign his name to same; that he had not executed said check, and that same was executed without any authority whatever from him. He particularly denied that he had given same to appellant; that he did not know how appellant came into possession of same; and that he had never done any work for him. It appears further from the testimony that about November 2, 1908, appellant brought the check in question into the City National Bank of Texarkana and presented same for payment. It appears the cashier took the check in his hand and began to examine it, and that appellant was thereupon asked who gave him the check, to which he replied that Dr. Jamison had given it to him; that he was thereupon asked if it was the colored Dr. Jamison who had an office over Stevens drug store, to which he replied that it was, and that he had been at work for Dr. Jamison, and that Dr. Jamison had given him the check to pay him for his work; that thereupon Mr. Sain, one of the witnesses, remarked to Mr. Phenix, the cashier, in the presence of appellant, that Dr. Jamison's initials were "G. U." and not "G. A.," and that the signature of the check was not Dr. Jamison's; that Mr. Hughes, who was city marshal, was present at the time and took appellant into custody, and said he would go around to Dr. Jamison's office and investigate the matter, and that appellant left in charge of the city marshal. Mr. Hughes, who was introduced as a witness, confirmed most of this testimony, and particularly the fact that appellant said at the time his name was Scott. He also testified that when he and appellant reached the building where Dr. Jamison had his office and started upstairs, that appellant ran from him, going up the steps very fast, jumping three or four steps at a time, ran down the hallway, down the back stairs into a lot, and jumped over a six-foot fence, and got away from him; that he pursued him, however, and called to Mr. Anderson, a deputy constable, to arrest him, who did catch him and brought him back to the witness; that appellant's name was not Scott at the time he tried to pass the check and represented himself to be Scott. In addition to the production of the check, this was practically the state's case. Appellant introduced no testimony. The case was presented on oral argument on behalf of appellant, and is also supported by a brief on his behalf, which is very ingenious, but, we think, rather more plausible than sound. The motion for new trial as well as the brief raises a great number of questions, most of which we will consider.

1. Among other things, it is contended here, as it was contended in the court below that the indictment was insufficient in that it did not allege whether the City National Bank of Texarkana was a corporation, joint-stock company, or partnership, and in support of this contention we are referred to a number of cases. The more important of these and the ones claimed to be more directly in point are the cases of Nasets v. State, 32 S. W. 693, Lynch v. State, 41 Tex. Cr. R. 203, 53 S. W. 693, and White v. State, 24 Tex. App. 231, 5 S. W. 857, 5 Am. St. Rep. 879. These cases do not, we think, support the proposition. The case of Nasets v. State, supra, was a case in which an attempt was made to swindle the first National Bank of Goliad by obtaining money upon a draft presented to it. There the charge was for obtaining money of the bank, and the First National Bank of Goliad was the party swindled. The crime consisted of obtaining the money of the bank under a false pretense; it was the person injured. The crime was quite analogous to that of theft. Indeed, swindling is everywhere regarded as a form of theft, and that decision but followed the ordinary rule that, where property is stolen, the name of the owner must be alleged, and, if a corporation, that fact must be stated. The case of Lynch v. State, supra while a forgery case, was a case in which an existing receipt theretofore executed by the Mineral Wells Cotton Yard had been altered, and the offense in that case was one primarily against the Mineral Wells Cotton Yard, in that its existing obligation had been altered, and the act, if genuine, would have been the act of the Mineral Wells Cotton Yard. There the forgery was of the signature of Lynch and the offense primarily against him, and it was his check that was forged. The other case—White v. State, supra—was a case of theft proper of property belonging to a corporation, and is not, we think, in point, nor does it in principle sustain the contention here.

2. Again, it is contended that the indictment was insufficient in that it contains no allegation that Jamison had funds in said bank at the time of said alleged forgery, or that the bank had in its possession on deposit any money belonging to said Jamison, the purported maker of said check, or that said Jamison or said bank, or either of them, could have been injured in any manner. In support of this contention we are referred to the case of Belden v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. R. 565, 99 S. W. 563. Not only do we think it apparent that this case does not support appellant's contention, but it seems to us evident that the rule there stated is directly opposed to such contention. The instrument there considered was held not on its face to import an obligation, and, therefore, it was required to be shown by explanatory averments that Smith, the injured party, had a running account in the bank, and that the bank was instructed to pay this account to the party therein named. The following quotation states the rule: Referring to the Cagle Case, 39 Tex. Cr. R. 109, 44 S. W. 1097, the court say: "It was said that this was not that character of commercial instrument which imported an obligation on its face, and, while it might be the subject of forgery, the relation of the parties as landlord and tenant, etc., should have been set out by explanatory averments." Referring again to the case of Black v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. R. 585, 61 S. W. 478 the court say: "The doctrine announced in that case was to the effect that where an instrument does not clearly import a pecuniary obligation, but requires extrinsic proof in order to show it to be a legal obligation, the extrinsic averment must be made." We think the true rule is where, as in this case, the instrument on its face imports a pecuniary obligation, and where the person injured is the maker of such instrument, it is not necessary, in aid of such instrument, to allege whether the person on which it is drawn is a corporation, partnership, or joint-stock company. Lucas v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. R. 48, 44 S. W. 825; Webb v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. R. 534, 47 S. W. 356. That this instrument, if genuine, imported an unconditional obligation, is apparent. That Jamison could have been held by any person to whom this instrument was duly indorsed, for the amount of the check, is beyond question, and this, too, without reference to whether the bank was a corporation, partnership, or a joint-stock company, and whether in fact there was such a bank.

3. Again, it is complained that the...