Reeves v. State
| Decision Date | 02 December 1999 |
| Docket Number | 98-872 |
| Citation | 5 S.W.3d 41 |
| Parties | Emma REEVES v. STATE of Arkansas CR 98-872 ___ S.W.3d ___ Opinion delivered |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Lonoke Circuit Court; Lance Hanshaw, Judge; reversed and remanded.
1. Criminal procedure -- no appeal from plea of guilty or nolo contendere --general rule. -- Pursuant to Ark. R. App. P.--Crim. 1(a), there is no appeal from a plea of guilty or nolo contendere except as provided by Ark. R. Crim. P. 24.3(b).
2. Criminal procedure -- no appeal from plea of guilty or nolo contendere --first exception. -- The first exception to the general principle that there is no appeal from a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is the procedure for a conditional plea of guilty alluded to in Ark. R. App. P.--Crim. 1(a) [see Ark. R. Crim. P. 24.3(b)].
3. Criminal procedure -- no appeal from plea of guilty or nolo contendere --second exception. -- The second exception to the general principle that there is no appeal from a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is a statutory procedure for sentencing hearings before a jury following a guilty plea [see Ark. Code Ann. § 16-97-101(6) (Supp. 1999)]; the supreme court has permitted appeals relating to issues involving testimony and evidence that occurred after the guilty plea but during those sentencing hearings.
4. Criminal procedure -- no appeal from plea of guilty or nolo contendere --third exception. -- The third exception to the general principle that there is no appeal from a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is for postjudgment motions to amend incorrect or illegal sentences that follow guilty pleas.
5. Criminal procedure -- motion to modify illegal condition of probation --analogous to motion to correct illegal sentence. -- The supreme court views an order from a postjudgment motion to modify an illegal condition of probation pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-306(b) (Repl. 1997), after a guilty plea, as sufficiently analogous to cases dealing with postjudgment motions to correct illegal sentences; yet, in applying this authority to the case at hand, the court could not say that the exile condition for probation was not an integral part of the plea agreement; in fact, it appeared to have been a vital part of the probated sentence.
6. Criminal procedure -- motion to modify condition of probation -- legislative authority for appeal from denial of. -- The first reason why appellant's appeal was well taken was because the supreme court was dealing with a motion to correct a condition of probation, and probation often accompanies a guilty plea; it would be meaningless for the General Assembly to enact a procedure where a defendant could move to modify a condition of probation following a guilty plea but where there was no accompanying right to appeal from a denial of that motion; the supreme court does not construe acts of the General Assembly to be meaningless.
7. Criminal procedure -- motion to modify condition of probation -- trial court had authority to modify illegal condition. -- The second reason why appellant's appeal was well taken was that Arkansas statutes provide that a circuit court may correct an illegal sentence at any time [see Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-111(a) (Supp. 1999)]; because a person on probation is by definition not in custody, Rule 37 and its time requirements did not apply; the supreme court held that the trial court had the authority to modify the illegal condition of probation under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-90-111(a).
8. Criminal procedure -- order on motion to modify condition of probation --fell within exception to rule disallowing guilty pleas. -- The supreme court concluded that the order in this case fell within an acknowledged exception to the rule disallowing appeals from guilty pleas.
9. Constitutional law -- exile prohibited -- banishment defined. -- Article 2, section 21, of the Arkansas Constitution provides that no person, under any circumstances, shall be exiled from the state; banishment or exile has been defined as an order that compels a person to quit a city, place, or county for a specific period of time, or for life.
10. Constitutional law -- probation condition requiring exile void as matter of law -- order denying motion to modify condition reversed & remanded. --Where appellant was effectively exiled from the state for seven years; where, although she was permitted returns to the state twice a year for three consecutive days, such meager visits did not cure what was essentially probation conditioned on a court-ordered exile; and where exile was expressly forbidden by the state constitution, which rendered the condition requiring exile void as a matter of law, the supreme court reversed the order denying the motion to modify the illegal condition of probation and remanded the matter.
11. Criminal procedure -- modification of condition of probation -- trial court instructed to strike exile condition. -- Where one of three conditions attached to a valid sentence of seven years' probation was illegal, but where the others were proper, and where, the modification of a condition of probation being specifically contemplated under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-306(b), the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to strike the illegal condition; the supreme court remanded the matter with instructions to strike the exile condition of probation.
Jeff Rosenzweig, for appellant.
Mark Pryor, Att'y Gen., by: Vada Berger, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.
Appellant Emma Reeves appeals an order of the trial court denying her motion to modify a condition of her probation which, she contends, mandates that she be exiled from the state. We agree that the condition requires her exile, and we reverse the trial court's order and remand the matter for resentencing in accordance with this opinion.
On February 14, 1996, a criminal information was filed against Reeves charging her with stalking in the first degree in violation of Ark. Code Ann. § 5-71-229 (Repl. 1993). On April 9, 1996, she entered into a Guilty Plea Agreement relating to this charge. The punishment agreed to by Reeves and her attorney included seven years' supervised probation with probation conditioned on immediate entry into mental health counseling, a requirement that Reeves leave the state except for two specified return trips a year of three days each, and a requirement that she have no contact with the victim or members of his family either personally or by mail, telephone, fax, or electronically. The condition of probation contained in the agreement, which is the focal point of this case, reads as follows:
The defendant is to leave the State of Arkansas prior to April 13, 1996 and shall remain in the Lonoke County Jail until she leaves and is to remain outside the State of Arkansas until after the suspended imposition of sentence expires. (For a total period of seven years). The defendant may return to the State of Arkansas no more than two (2) times per calendar year and for no more than three (3) consecutive days per trip. Upon returning to Arkansas the defendant shall notify the Sheriff of Lonoke County that she is returning to the State of Arkansas and where she will be staying while in the State of Arkansas. Defendant shall give the Sheriff of Lonoke County at least 48 hours notice prior to returning to the State of Arkansas. Defendant shall also notify the Sheriff of Lonoke County when she is leaving the State of Arkansas. First return trip to the State of Arkansas shall be after April 15, 1997.
On that same date (April 9, 1996), a judgment and disposition order was entered sentencing her to seven years' probation for first-degree stalking, with probation conditioned in part upon her remaining out of the state of Arkansas unless permission was obtained from the probation officer to enter the state.1
Reeves then moved to Washington State, where she entered into court-ordered counseling. On August 19, 1997, Reeves filed a Motion to Modify Condition of Probation or Suspended Imposition of Sentence pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-306(b) (Repl. 1997). In that motion, she alleged that the condition requiring her to leave the state violated her federal and state constitutional rights against cruel and unusual punishment and due process of law. She further asserted that it violated Article 2, § 21 of the State Constitution, which prohibits exile from the state as a punishment. In the alternative, she requested a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that she was detained by being forced to live out of state.
The State responded that Reeves's request for relief fell within the scope of Rule 37 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, and because her petition was not timely, the court should reject the petition. The State also argued that habeas corpus was not applicable to this case because Reeves was not in custody, as the rule required. A hearing was held on the matter, and the trial court announced its decision in a letter to the parties:
The Court only carried out the sentence agreed to by and between the State and defendant, pursuant to a negotiated plea. This Court will not set aside a portion of the agreed sentence.
Additionally, I believe that [R]ule 37.2 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure prohibits this Court from entertaining motions for post conviction relief.
On April 13, 1998, a formal order was entered denying the motion.
The first issue in this case is whether this court has jurisdiction to hear the matter. Rule 1(a) of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure-Criminal states: "Except as provided by ARCrP 24.3(b) there shall be no appeal from a plea of guilty or nolo contendere." This principle has been endorsed by this court on many occasions. See, e.g., L.H. v. State, 333 Ark. 613, 973 S.W.2d 477 (1998); Hill v. State, 318 Ark. 408, 887 S.W.2d 275 (1994); State v. Sherman, 303 Ark. 284, 796 S.W.2d 339 (1990).
This court has, however, recognized certain exceptions to this...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Taylor v. State, 02-545.
... ... Before ending this opinion, I want to offer the bench and bar a caveat. Presently, there is a clear conflict between this court's Rule 37 and § 16-90-111(a). This court plainly stated in Reeves v. State, 339 Ark. 304, 5 S.W.3d 41 (1999), that § 16-90-111(a) has been superceded by the time limitations in Ark. R.Crim. P. Rules 37.1 and 37.2(b) and (c), which provide for postconviction relief when a defendant is in custody. Rule 37.2(b) provides that all grounds for postconviction relief ... ...
-
Goins v. State
... ... Brown, J., joins ... --------------- ... 1. Petitions to amend in correct or illegal sentences are an exception to Ark. R. Cr. P. 24.3(b), which states there shall be no appeal from a plea of guilty. E.g. Reeves v. State, 339 Ark. 304, 5 S.W.3d41 (1999) ... 2. Rule 37.1 does not supersede the authority of a trial court under § 16-90-111 to modify a condition of ... ...
-
Lenard v. State
... ... Sartin v. State , 2012 Ark. 155, 400 S.W.3d 694. We find no error and affirm the order. Arkansas Code Annotated section 1690111(a) provides authority for a trial court to correct an illegal sentence at any time. See Gilliland v. State , 2014 Ark. 149, 2014 WL 1344405 ( per curiam); Reeves v. State , 339 Ark. 304, 310, 5 S.W.3d 41, 44 (1999) ; Renshaw v. Norris , 337 Ark. 494, 500, 989 S.W.2d 515, 518 (1999). Sentencing in Arkansas is entirely a matter of statute. State v. Colvin , 2013 Ark. 203, 427 S.W.3d 635 ; Glaze v. State , 2011 Ark. 464, 385 S.W.3d 203. No sentence shall be ... ...
-
Atkins v. State
... ... Hobbs, 2011 Ark. 383, 2011 WL 4397020 (per curiam); see Culbertson v. State, 2012 Ark. 112, 2012 WL 745303 (per curiam). Arkansas Code Annotated section 1690111(a) provides authority to a trial court to correct an illegal sentence at any time. See Reeves v. State, 339 Ark. 304, 5 S.W.3d 41 (1999) ; Renshaw v. Norris, 337 Ark. 494, 989 S.W.2d 515 (1999). For that reason, the trial court had authority to grant relief under the statute if the sentence imposed on appellant was indeed illegal. Hodges v. State, 2013 Ark. 299, 2013 WL 3946080 (per ... ...
-
Anti-prostitution zones: justifications for abolition.
...371, 374 (9th Cir. 1988). (135) See Edison v. State, 709 P.2d 510 (1985). (136) See id. at 512. (137) See Reeves v. State of Arkansas, 5 S.W.3d 41 (Ark. (138) Id. at 45 (quoting State v. Young, 154 N.W.2d 699, 702 (Minn. 1967)). (139) See Meek, supra note 7. (140) Id. (141) See Spalding, su......