Reggep v. Lunder Shoe Products Co.
Citation | 241 A.2d 802 |
Parties | George REGGEP, Employee v. LUNDER SHOE PRODUCTS COMPANY, Employer and Utica Mutual Insurance Company, Insurance Carrier. |
Decision Date | 14 May 1968 |
Court | Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US) |
Robert M. York, Old Orchard Beach, for appellant.
Clement F. Richardson, and Edward T. Richardson, Jr., Portland, for appellee.
Before WILLIAMSON, C. J., and WEBBER, TAPLEY, MARDEN, and WEATHERBEE, JJ.
On appeal from a Pro Forma Decree of the Superior Court.
For several years prior to 1965 our statutes providing Workmen's Compensation for personal injuries computed compensation for all total incapacities on the basis of 2/3 of the employee's average weekly wages. 39 M.R.S.A. § 54. This included the so-called permanent total incapacities resulting from the most devastating injuries for which weekly compensation could be paid for as long as 500 weeks and the so-called presumed total incapacities resulting from less serious injuries where the law arbitrarily limited compensation to certain presumed periods (for example, in the case of the loss of an index finger incapacity was presumed to continue 32 weeks and compensation was limited to that period). 39 M.R.S.A. § 56.
In 1965 the Legislature enacted Chap. 408, § 5 of the Public Laws which repealed § 54, and substituted in its place:
* * *'(Emphasis added.)
Section 5 of the same chapter repealed the first paragraph of 39 M.R.S.A. § 56 and reads:
* * *'(Emphasis added.)
The language of these amendments would appear to require that compensation for a presumed total incapacity, such as the loss of an index finger, would be a lump sum equal to the employees weekly wage multiplied by an arbitrary figure while that for permanent total incapacity would still be a weekly compensation amounting to 2/3 of his weekly wage and still extending for an indefinite period of time.
These amendments went into effect on November 30, 1965. On January 20, 1966, the petitioner, an employee of defendant Lunder Shoe Products Company, whose insurance carrier was the other defendant, received a personal injury in his employment which resulted in an amputation of part of his index finger, amounting at law to the loss of the whole finger. After hearing, the Industrial Accident Commission found that the petitioner's average weekly wage was $109.75 and that petitioner was entitled to receive from defendants a lump sum payment amounting to $109.75 multiplied by 32 or $3,512.00, with credit for voluntary payments by defendants of $1,948.96. On defendants' appeal the Commissioner's order was embodied in a pro forma decree of a Justice of the Superior Court from which this appeal was taken.
When petitioner's injury occurred, the same Legislature which had last amended the reference statutes was in special session. Among other matters considered, it enacted as emergency legislation several changes in the Workmen's Compensation Act. The emergency preamble recited that 'certain provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act are subject to varying interpretations' and that the proposed amendments were 'vitally necessary to prevent confusion and hardship on both employers and employees.' These changes included further amendments of Sections 54 and 56 the effect of which was that compensation for permanent total disability and for presumed total disability shall both be computed on the basis of 2/3 of the employee's average weekly wage. The amendments became effective February 1, 1966.
It is not disputed that petitioner's right to compensation as a result of his injury became vested on January 20, 1966, the date of his injury, and cannot be reduced or enlarged by legislation enacted subsequent to that date. Gauthier's Case, 120 Me. 73, 113 A. 28 (1921). The sole issue for our determination is the interpretation of the relevant statute in effect January 20, 1966, particularly 39 M.R.S.A. § 56 Chapter 408, § 5 of the Public Laws of 1965.
That section states clearly that an injured employee in petitioner's situation 'shall receive a lump sum payment for said injury which shall be determined by multiplying the average weekly wage * * * by the period of presumed total incapacity herein set forth.' (Emphasis added.) The defendants concede that the language standing alone is plain and unambiguous. Defendants contend, however, that when the act is read in its entirety and especially when Section 5 is read in relation to the other amendments above discussed, it becomes evident that the Legislature did not intend compensation for a presumed total incapacity to be computed on a basis of total average weekly earnings.
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