Remaley v. Ta Operating LLC
| Decision Date | 28 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | NO. 14-16-00511-CV,14-16-00511-CV |
| Parties | RANDALL REMALEY, Appellant v. TA OPERATING LLC D/B/A TRAVELCENTERS OF AMERICA, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the 157th District Court Harris County, Texas
Randall Remaley challenges the trial court's grant of no-evidence and traditional summary judgment in favor of TA Operating LLC d/b/a TravelCenters of America on his employment-related claims for gender and age discrimination under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act ("TCHRA"). See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. §§ 21.001-.556 (Vernon 2015 & Supp. 2017).
To demonstrate a prima facie case of employment discrimination based on alleged disparate treatment arising from his disciplinary termination, Remaley had to proffer evidence that he was treated less favorably than similarly situated persons who were female or younger. Because he proffered no evidence on this essential element of his prima facie case, we affirm the trial court's grant of no-evidence summary judgment in favor of TA Operating.
This appeal arises from the termination of Remaley's employment as the general manager of a restaurant located at the Travel Centers of America site run by TA Operating in Baytown, Texas.
TA Operating employed Remaley for eight years until his supervisor, Field Manager Margie Swisher, fired him on March 10, 2014. Remaley was 55 years old when he was fired. Swisher replaced him with a 45-year-old female.
The parties sharply dispute the reason for Remaley's March 2014 termination.
According to Remaley, his termination was the culmination of a campaign against him that began when Swisher became his supervisor in late 2013. Remaley contends that, before Swisher's arrival, he ran a "relatively successful" restaurant and had a positive working relationship with the male field managers who preceded her. The positive working relationship ended upon Swisher's arrival. Remaley contends that he clashed frequently with Swisher because she "treated Remaley poorly," "often did not return Remaley's phone calls or emails," and "wanted to terminate Remaley when she was first introduced to him." Remaley further contends that TA Operating recruited his younger female replacement at least seven days before he was fired and offered his job to her three days before he was fired, which she accepted the same day the offer was made. The replacement's start date was March 13, 2014 — three days after Remaley was fired.
TA Operating contends it fired Remaley based on his treatment of a femaleserver at the restaurant on March 4, 2014, and subsequent events. According to TA Operating, Swisher called Remaley on March 4 after the server called Swisher to report that Remaley had threatened to fire her over a work schedule issue. TA Operating contends that Remaley "did not like that [the server] . . . had contacted Swisher, his boss, about his conduct." On March 5, 2014, Swisher received email notifications of two customer hotline complaints from the Baytown restaurant; two restaurant patrons reported that Remaley was "verbally abusing" the server and had caused her to cry in front of customers. Swisher interviewed one of the complaining customers in person on March 6 and contacted the other by phone; she also interviewed the server and the restaurant's assistant general manager, who both reported that Remaley yelled at the server for contacting Swisher a day earlier and physically blocked her from leaving his office until she said she would not contact Swisher in the future.
According to TA Operating, Swisher determined that Remaley's treatment of the server violated company policy and warranted immediate termination of his employment; she informed him of his firing on March 10. TA Operating contends that Swisher did not consider Remaley's gender or age in deciding to fire him. It also points to Swisher's testimony that no general manager under her supervision had acted in a similar manner towards a server, and that she never had received customer hotline complaints before about another general manager's treatment of a server.
Remaley responds that Swisher already had decided to interview his replacement as of March 4, and had scheduled the interview to occur two days later. He contends TA Operating "began creating an exculpatory paper trail" and relied on "after-the-fact" evidence to justify his firing based on false statements. He further contends that "Swisher terminated other male managers under questionablecircumstances" and "did not interview male candidates for Remaley's position."
Remaley filed his original petition in April 2015, alleging that TA Operating violated the TCHRA in connection with his termination because TA Operating discriminated against him on the basis of gender and age. According to Remaley's petition, Swisher falsely told him that he was fired because he "manages 'through intimidation.'" He alleges as follows: "For the roughly six years [he worked] as a Restaurant General Manager, Remaley never received any complaints about his management style." Remaley contends he was subjected to disparate treatment based on his gender and age in connection with his termination because "even if [his management style] . . . was a legitimate concern, Remaley could have been disciplined or counseled, just like other employees, instead of being fired."
Following discovery, TA Operating filed a traditional motion for summary judgment and a separate no-evidence motion for summary judgment. With respect to gender discrimination, in its no-evidence motion TA Operating asserted that Remaley had no evidence he was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees who were not in his protected class. With respect to age discrimination, TA Operating asserted in its no-evidence motion that Remaley had no evidence he was treated less favorably on account of his age than others for nearly identical conduct.
The trial court signed a single order in December 2016, in which it granted both the traditional and no-evidence summary judgment motions without specifying particular grounds. Remaley timely appealed.
Remaley contends the trial court erred by (1) granting no-evidence and traditional summary judgment in favor of TA Operating on his claims for gender andage discrimination; and (2) denying his motion to compel seeking documents pertaining to "adverse treatment of other male managers who were terminated and replaced by females." We address each issue in turn.
We review summary judgments de novo. Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150, 156 (Tex. 2004). When, as here, the trial court grants the judgment without specifying the grounds, we will affirm if any of the grounds presented are meritorious. FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868, 872 (Tex. 2000).
TA Operating moved for summary judgment on both traditional and no-evidence grounds. We resolve this case based on no-evidence grounds; therefore, we discuss only the standard of review pertinent to a no-evidence summary judgment motion.1
We take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts in the nonmovant's favor. See King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003).
The movant seeking a no-evidence summary judgment represents that there is no evidence of one or more of the essential elements of the claims for which the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i). We sustain a no-evidence summary judgment when (a) there is a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (b) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weightto the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (c) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla; or (d) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact. King Ranch, Inc., 118 S.W.3d at 751. "Less than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence is 'so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion' of a fact." Id. (quoting Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983)). More than a scintilla of evidence exists when reasonable and fair-minded people could differ in their conclusions based on the evidence. Id.
We apply this standard of review to the parties' contentions regarding Remaley's claims that TA Operating violated the TCHRA by discriminating against him on the basis of gender and age when TA Operating fired him.
An employer commits an unlawful employment practice under the TCHRA "if because of race, color, disability, religion, sex, national origin, or age the employer . . . discharges an individual . . . or discriminates in any other manner against an individual in connection with compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment . . . ." Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 21.051(1). The protected class for age discrimination claims consists of persons 40 and older. See id. § 21.101.
Remaley contends that TA Operating violated section 21.051(1) when it terminated his employment, and that his age and gender were impermissible motivating factors in his termination. See id. § 21.125.
The TCHRA "provide[s] for the execution of the policies of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and its subsequent amendments." Id. § 21.001(1). Texasstate courts look to analogous federal statutes and cases interpreting them to guide application of the TCHRA. See, e.g., Quantum Chem. Corp. v. Toennies, 47 S.W.3d 473, 476 (Tex. 2001) (citing NME Hosps., Inc. v. Rennels, 994 S.W.2d 142, 144 (Tex. 1999)); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Rincones, 520 S.W.3d 572, 583 (Tex. 2...
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