Renaud v. Sigma-Aldrich Corp.

• Decision Date: 10 August 1995
• Docket Number: SIGMA-ALDRICH,No. 93-688-M,93-688-M
• Citation: 662 A.2d 711
• Parties: Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,324 Sharon R. RENAUD v.CORPORATION et al. P.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 711

662 A.2d 711

Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,324

Sharon R. RENAUD v. SIGMA-ALDRICH CORPORATION et al.

No. 93-688-M.P.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Aug. 10, 1995.

Kathleen A. Golini, Ronald J. Resmini, Providence, for plaintiff.

Gerald C. DeMaria, Rajaram Suryanarayan, Patrick B. Landers, Higgins, Cavanagh & Cooney, Providence, for defendant.

OPINION

WEISBERGER, Chief Justice.

This case comes before us on a petition for certiorari wherein defendant Fisher Scientific Company (Fisher), seeks review of the Superior Court's denial of its motion to dismiss. Fisher moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint (with respect to Fisher) on the ground that it was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. We grant the petition and quash the order of the Superior Court. The facts insofar as pertinent to this petition are as follows.

On February 3, 1988, plaintiff, Sharon R. Renaud, was injured as a result of inhaling fumes from acetic acid that had spilled at her place of employment, Landmark Medical Center (Landmark). Within hours of her exposure to the acid fumes, she began to feel dizzy and nauseated and experienced breathing difficulty. Later that afternoon and the following day plaintiff sought treatment at the Woonsocket Hospital Emergency Room and on February 5, 1988 she was admitted to the hospital.

On January 30, 1991, plaintiff initiated a product-liability action against Sigma-Aldrich Corporation (Sigma-Aldrich). The complaint alleged that Sigma-Aldrich had manufactured and supplied to Landmark the container holding the acetic acid involved in the incident wherein plaintiff was injured. The complaint alleged that Sigma-Aldrich was negligent in designing, constructing, inspecting, marketing, assembling, and distributing the container. It also alleged that Sigma-Aldrich breached its implied warranty of marketability, that it knew or should have known that the container was dangerous and defective, and that it negligently failed to warn plaintiff of the dangerous condition. There was no allegation that the acetic acid itself was defective in any manner.

During discovery, plaintiff learned that Sigma Chemical Company (Sigma Chemical) was a subsidiary of the parent company Sigma-Aldrich. The plaintiff thereafter moved to amend the complaint to add Sigma Chemical as a party defendant. The motion was granted, and an amended complaint was filed on September 12, 1992, naming Sigma Chemical as a party defendant.

On July 28, 1992, almost four and one-half years after the acid spill that precipitated this lawsuit, defendant Sigma-Aldrich deposed the keeper of records of Landmark's purchasing department. Pursuant to a defense subpoena, she produced invoices of Landmark's purchase orders of acetic acid. These records revealed that Fisher, and not Sigma-Aldrich or Sigma Chemical, had supplied the container of acetic acid that is the subject of this litigation. It was at this time that plaintiff first learned that Fisher had manufactured and supplied the container of acetic acid. Approximately five and one-half months later, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint a second time, this time adding Fisher as a defendant. The motion was granted, and a second amended complaint was filed in February 1993 adding Fisher as a party defendant.

On April 15, 1993, Fisher filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. ¹ Fisher claimed that the three-year statute of limitations had already expired prior to its being added as a party defendant. The motion justice agreed with Fisher that the applicable statute of limitations was the three-year period set forth in G.L.1956 (1985 Reenactment) § 9-1-14(b), which provides that "[a]ctions for injuries to the person shall be commenced and sued within three (3) years next after the cause of action shall accrue, and not after." He held, however, that the reasonableness of plaintiff's diligence in investigating potentially liable parties was a question of fact that was not properly determinable by the court on a motion to dismiss. In addition, the motion justice held that even if the court were to find that plaintiff did not exercise reasonable diligence in her investigation, she should nevertheless be permitted to join Fisher as a necessary party pursuant to Rule 19(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. Fisher's motion to dismiss was therefore denied. Fisher thereafter filed this petition for certiorari, seeking review of the denial of its motion to dismiss. Additional facts will be supplied as needed to deal with specific issues.

Initially we note that the motion justice was correct in determining that the three-year limitation period set forth in § 9-1-14(b) for commencing actions for "injuries to the person" is the applicable statute of limitations. See Pirri v. Toledo Scale Corp., 619 A.2d 429, 430-31 (R.I.1993) (product-liability suit alleging breach of implied warranty of fitness and merchantability; negligent design, manufacture, and installation; and failure to warn governed by § 9-1-14(b) statute of limitations). ² The plaintiff does not appear to contest the applicability of § 9-1-14(b) to the instant action, although she does challenge its constitutionality.

I

The plaintiff asserts that she exercised reasonable diligence in her efforts to identify the party that manufactured and supplied the container holding the acetic acid to Landmark. She alleges, however, that her efforts to identify the manufacturer/supplier were frustrated by, inter alia, Landmark employees, who told her that the manufacturer of the container was Sigma Chemical; employees of Landmark's purchasing department, who told her that invoices for the acetic acid were unavailable; and Landmark's workers' compensation insurance carrier, who sent a subrogation notice to Sigma Chemical. Although certain of these contentions were disputed by the Sigma defendants, plaintiff nevertheless claims that she reasonably and detrimentally relied on information obtained from her employer, which misled her into believing Sigma Chemical to be the proper defendant. The plaintiff further suggests that Landmark employees and the two Sigma defendants may have even intentionally concealed the identity of the supplier of the container.

Even if we accept each of plaintiff's allegations as true, they provide no basis for tolling the statute of limitations on a cause of action against Fisher. In order to toll the running of the statute of limitations with respect to Fisher, there would have to be a showing that Fisher, the party asserting the statute-of-limitations defense, attempted by fraud or misrepresentation to conceal the existence of the cause of action. See § 9-1-20; ³ Benner v. J.H. Lynch & Sons, Inc., 641 A.2d 332, 337-38 (R.I.1994). The plaintiff does not allege that Fisher in any way attempted to conceal the existence of the cause of action against it. Her claims of concealment are directed at only Landmark and possibly the two Sigma defendants. Consequently plaintiff's allegations, even if accepted as true, cannot serve to toll the statute of limitations on a cause of action against Fisher.

Although plaintiff and the motion justice each focused on whether plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in her efforts to identify the manufacturer/supplier of the container of acetic acid, their concentration on this issue was misplaced. Whether plaintiff had in fact exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to identify the proper defendant was irrelevant to the disposition of Fisher's motion to dismiss. Even if plaintiff had exercised reasonable diligence, no basis existed for tolling the statute of limitations.

Generally, "the time of accrual of a cause of action in product-liability cases against a manufacturer is the same as in a negligence action, that is, the time of injury." Plouffe v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 118 R.I. 288, 293, 373 A.2d 492, 495 (1977); see also Romano v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 114 R.I. 451, 459-60, 336 A.2d 555, 560 (1975). However, in certain narrowly circumscribed factual situations, this court has held that a statute of limitations will not begin to run until an injury or some wrongful conduct should have, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, been discovered. See, e.g., Anthony v. Abbott Laboratories, 490 A.2d 43 (R.I.1985); Lee v. Morin, 469 A.2d 358 (R.I.1983); Wilkinson v. Harrington, 104 R.I. 224, 243 A.2d 745 (1968). None of the circumstances in which we have adopted a reasonable-diligence standard, nor the policy reasons for adopting such a standard, are applicable to the instant case.

In Wilkinson this court held that a medical-malpractice cause of action accrues when the plaintiff discovers or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered that he or she has been injured as a result of the physician's negligent treatment. This so-called discovery rule was later codified as § 9-1-14.1(b). In commenting on the then-existing statute of limitations applicable to medical-malpractice actions, this court stated:

"[T]o construe the statute narrowly so as to preclude a person from obtaining a remedy simply because the wrong of which he was the victim did not manifest itself for at least two years from the time of the negligent conduct, is clearly inconsistent with the concept of fundamental justice. To require a man to seek a remedy before he knows of his rights, is palpably unjust." Wilkinson, 104 R.I. at 238, 243 A.2d at 753.

Similarly in Lee we applied this principle to improvements to real property. There we held that the statute of limitations begins to run "when the evidence of injury to property, resulting from the negligent act upon which the action is based, is sufficiently significant to alert the injured party to the possibility of a defect." Lee, 469 A.2d at 360.

In Anthony v. Abbott Laboratories, we considered § 9-1-14(b)'s application to a drug product-liability...