Pirri v. Toledo Scale Corp.
| Citation | 619 A.2d 429 |
| Decision Date | 26 January 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 91-579-M,91-579-M |
| Parties | 20 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 192, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 13,407 Philip A. PIRRI, Jr. v. TOLEDO SCALE CORPORATION. P. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island |
Charles F. Reilly, Jr., John J. McConnell, Jr., Robert McConnell, Jr., Michael Marran, Richard Lessard, Providence, for plaintiff.
John G. Rallis, Providence, for defendant.
This case came before us on the petition of the defendant, Toledo Scale Corporation, for certiorari. The defendant seeks review of the trial justice's denial of a motion to dismiss. The motion was predicated upon a statute of limitations defense that would have been dispositive.
This matter arises out of a civil suit filed on April 25, 1991, by plaintiff, Philip A. Pirri, Jr. The plaintiff stated that on November 9, 1987, approximately three and one-half years earlier, he sustained an injury to his hand while operating a meat-cutting machine manufactured by defendant. Upon settling a workers' compensation claim with his employer, plaintiff filed a product-liability suit against defendant. The plaintiff's complaint stated three causes of action against defendant. The plaintiff stated that defendant had breached the implied warranty of fitness and merchantability. He alleged negligent design, manufacture, and installation of the machine. He also claimed that the machine was defective, was unreasonably dangerous, and lacked adequate safeguards and warnings.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, asserting that the action was not commenced within the period provided by the statute of limitations. The trial justice denied the motion on the grounds that plaintiff's action was not entirely within the three-year statute of limitations for personal injuries. It appears from the record that the trial justice was influenced more by the ability to divide the form of the action than by the nature of the injury alleged.
The defendant argues that plaintiff's damages were in the nature of a personal injury and the period of limitation is controlled by G.L.1956 (1985 Reenactment) § 9-1-14(b). Section 9-1-14 provides that actions to recover for personal injuries are barred after three years. 1
The plaintiff claims that his suit is preserved by two separate statutes. He contends that § 9-1-13 applies to all product-liability actions, including actions for personal injuries. 2 An amicus curiae brief was filed in support of plaintiff's argument. The plaintiff further asserts that breach of warranty claims between third-party beneficiaries and manufacturers are governed by the four-year statute of limitations in G.L.1956 (1992 Reenactment) § 6A-2-725.
In this appeal we must first decide whether the present tort action is subject to the statute of limitations set forth in § 9-1-13(a) or § 9-1-14(b). Our analysis of § 9-1-14(b) is controlled by Commerce Oil Refining Corp. v. Miner, 98 R.I. 14, 199 A.2d 606 (1964), wherein we construed the phrase "injuries to the person." We stated that the purpose of the phrase
Id. at 20-21, 199 A.2d at 610.
The court further noted that it is "the nature of the right invaded and not the elements of damage resulting therefrom that determines its character as an injury to the person." Id. at 21, 199 A.2d at 610.
The plaintiff seeks relief under strict liability and implied warranty theories, in addition to his negligence claim. However, the nature of his claim arises out of a personal injury for which he is entitled to relief "by reason of being a person in the eyes of the law." Id. at 20, 199 A.2d at 610. The plaintiff's physical injuries, pain and suffering, lost earning capacity, and diminished quality of life all stem from the injuries allegedly caused by defendant's machine. Our Legislature "intended that all actions containing a common element, that is, injury to the person, were to be subjected to [the same] period of limitation." Id. at 17, 199 A.2d at 608. There is no legal status, property right, or contractual relationship between the parties creating an alternative right upon which plaintiff might sue. Thus the limitation period set forth in § 9-1-14 for "injuries to the person" is the appropriate statute of limitations.
We next evaluate whether § 6A-2-725 of the Uniform Commercial Code is applicable to the implied warranty alleged by plaintiff. Even though we have disposed of plaintiff's suit, we entertain this issue to clarify the breadth of § 6A-2-725.
The plaintiff asserts that despite Rhode Island precedents holding that the four-year statute of limitations found in § 6A-2-725 is inapplicable to the issue before us, the title of the statute has since been extended to encompass a breach of warranty claim. The title had read, "Statute of limitations in contracts for sale." Section 6A-2-725, History of section. In 1985 the title of the statute was amended to read, "Statute of limitations--Contracts for sale--Breach of warranty." Id.
Selecting the proper statute of limitations for warranty actions has been a subject of much dispute in this and other jurisdictions. See Taylor v. Ford Motor Co., 185 W.Va. 518, 408 S.E.2d 270 (1991) (). The rationale underlying the distinction between the application of an implied warranty claim sounding in tort and one that sounds in contract helps to clarify this dispute.
In Romano v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 114 R.I. 451, 336 A.2d 555 (1975), we emphasized the distinct policies underlying tort law in our discussion of strict liability based on the Restatement (Second) Torts § 402A, comment m (1965). We found that strict liability in tort is "free of the restrictions surrounding an...
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...the action sounds in negligence, strict products liability, failure to warn, or any other theory of liability. See Pirri v. Toledo Scale Corp., 619 A.2d 429, 431 (R.I.1993) Under that section, all claims for personal injuries must be filed within three years of the accrual of the cause of a......
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...compels the conclusion that the product liability statute applies. See Fritchie, 931 F.Supp. at 672; see also Pirri v. Toledo Scale Corp., 619 A.2d 429, 431 (R.I.1993). We find additional support in Nebraska's broad definition of product liability actions. The Nebraska legislature defined p......
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...accorded by state law, applies to the intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress. See Pirri, v. Toledo Scale Corp., 619 A.2d 429, 431 (R.I. 1993) (limitations period of three years pursuant to R.I.G.L. § 9-1-14 applies to all “injuries to the person”). Under Rhode Island law, ......
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