Reno Club, Inc. v. Harrah

• Decision Date: 17 August 1953
• Docket Number: No. 3730,3730
• Parties: RENO CLUB, Inc. v. HARRAH et al.
• Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Page 304

260 P.2d 304

70 Nev. 125

RENO CLUB, Inc. v. HARRAH et al.

No. 3730.

Supreme Court of Nevada.

Aug. 17, 1953.

Sidney W. Robinson, and M. A. Diskin, Reno, for appellant.

Summerfield and Heward, Reno, for respondents.

MERRILL, Justice.

This is an action brought by the Reno Club as plaintiff to recover damages for wrongful detention by Harrah of real estate and personal property. Judgment in favor of Reno Club was rendered by the trial court upon one portion of its claim. Upon the remaining portion judgment was rendered in favor of Harrah. From the latter adverse portion of the judgment Reno Club has taken this appeal.

The principal defense of Harrah upon which the trial court relied in denying relief to Reno Club was res judicata: that recovery by Reno Club in an earlier suit barred recovery in the present action; that the assertion of its cause of action here constituted an attempt to split an indivisible cause of action. An examination of the earlier litigation therefore becomes necessary.

In 1942 Reno Club held a lease extending until 1948 upon certain business premises in Reno from the owner of those premises Young Investment Company. For certain reasons it became apparent that during the then state of war Reno Club would be unable to continue in its business. An agreement was reached whereby it surrendered its lease and possession of the premises subject to an option to have the lease reinstated at any time after one year from the date of the option. The premises were then leased by Young to Harrah for a term of one year, occupancy thereafter to be from month to month.

In March, 1946, Reno Club notified Young of its exercise of the option and demanded a lease to the premises for the balance of the original lease period. Young served notice on Harrah to vacate the premises on June 15, 1946, which Harrah failed and refused to do. Young, accordingly, failed to comply with Reno Club's demand. In August, 1946, Reno Club brought suit against Young for specific performance of the option.

In answer to the complaint of Reno Club, Young asserted two defenses: (1) that the option was prematurely exercised and that Reno Club accordingly had no right at that time to reinstatement of the lease; (2) that Harrah was rightfully in possession and with consent of Reno Club; that in effect, therefore, Reno Club was already in possession through its 'nominee', Harrah; that a granting of specific performance 'would be inequitable, unfair and unjust to an innocent third person,' namely Harrah.

Reno Club then moved the court to have Harrah made a party defendant and an order was made that Harrah be brought in as defendant for the reason that 'a complete determination of this controversy cannot be had without [his] presence.' Harrah then appeared, asserting by his answer the same defenses to Reno Club's complaint as had been asserted by Young.

Reno Club replied to Harrah's answer, praying in part for judgment 'that plaintiff be let into immediate possession of the premises described in plaintiff's amended complaint. That it be adjudged and decreed that William Harrah has no right, title or interest in or to the possession of said premises or any part thereof. That William Harrah be by judgment of this court commanded to immediately surrender possession of said premises to plaintiff.' There was no prayer for damages nor was any evidence of damage presented during the trial. Damage simply was not an issue in the suit.

After two appeals to this court, Reno Club v. Young Investment Co., 64 Nev. 312, 182 P.2d 1011, 173 A.L.R. 1145; Young Investment Co. v. Reno Club, 66 Nev. 216, 208 P.2d 297, Reno Club prevailed in its suit. Judgment was rendered against Young that it execute and deliver the lease demanded by Reno Club. Judgment was rendered against Harrah to the effect that he had no right, title or interest in or to the premises; that Reno Club recover possession from him and that he forthwith surrender possession to Reno Club. This decree Harrah has performed. Reno Club's claim against him in that suit, accordingly, has been satisfied. Judgment was rendered March 3, 1948. Harrah did not surrender possession until October 26, 1948. During the interim the second appeal was taken to this court and Harrah remained in possession under supersedeas bond.

In the instant case the trial court has granted to Reno Club damages for wrongful detention for the period from March 3, 1948, to October 26, 1948, and has denied relief for the period from June 15, 1946, to March 3, 1948. The question before us is whether the earlier suit, having proceeded to judgment and satisfaction, constitutes a bar to the present action under the principles of res judicata and the rule against splitting of causes of action. Under our statutes, claims for the recovery of specific real or personal property and for damages for the withholding thereof may be joined. Section 8595, N.C.L.1929, Supp.1931-41 (since superseded by Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure).

At the outset it must be recognized that the extent of the bar by earlier adjudication differs under two types of cases. In the first type of case the earlier judgment is offered as determining one particular point involved in the second litigation by what is termied collateral estoppel. See Restatement of the Law, Judgments, § 68. In this type of case it is immaterial that the causes of action in the two suits are different. McLeod v. Lee, 17 Nev. 103, 28 P. 124; Vickers v. Vickers, 45 Nev. 274, 284, 199 P. 76, 202 P. 31. It is essential, however, that the particular point involved actually constitute an issue in both suits. Sherman v. Dilley, 3 Nev. 21. In the second type of case the earlier judgment is offered as a bar to the entire action upon the ground that a determination of the identical controversy previously had been had between the parties. In this type of case it is essential that the causes of action be identical. The prior judgment, however, 'operates as a bar not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim, but as to every other matter which might, with propriety, have been litigated'. Wolford v. Wolford, 65 Nev. 710, 714, 200 P.2d 988, 990; Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 24 L.Ed. 195; comment note, 88 A.L.R. 574. This principle of res judicata has also found expression in the rule against splitting of causes of action, to the effect that 'a single cause of action or entire claim or demand cannot be split up or divided and separate suits maintained for the various parts thereof, * * *.' 1 C.J.S., Actions, § 102, page 1306. See Restatement of the Law, Judgments, § 62.

It is clear that the question of damages now before us was not litigated in the earlier suit between the parties and did not constitute an issue in that suit. The question therefore resolves itself to this: Is the cause of action (as that term is used in connection with the plea of res judicata) upon which the present action is based the identical cause of action which formed the basis of the former suit?

In Bond v. Thruston, 60 Nev. 19, 24, 98 P.2d 343, 345, 100 P.2d 74, this court, in dealing with the elements constituting a cause of action, quoted Pomeroy's Code Remedies as follows: 'The cause of action, as it appears in the complaint when properly pleaded, will therefore always be the facts from which the plaintiff's primary right and the defendant's corresponding primary duty have arisen, together with the facts which constitute the defendant's delict or act of wrong. * * * If the facts alleged show one primary right of the plaintiff, and one wrong done by the defendant which involves that right, the plaintiff has stated but a single cause of action, no matter how many forms and kinds of relief he may claim that he is entitled to, and may ask to recover; the relief is no part of the cause of action.'

In Silverman v. Silverman, 52 Nev. 152, 169, 283 P. 593, 598, this court stated, 'The true test of the identity of 'causes of action,' as that term is used in connection with the plea of former adjudication, is the identity of the facts essential to their maintenance. The identity of the causes of action may appear from evidence in the two cases as well as from the pleadings. The authorities agree that when the same evidence supports both the present and the former cause of action, the two causes of action are identical.' Followed in Miller v. Miller, 54 Nev. 44, 52...