Republic Royalty Co. v. Evins

• Decision Date: 29 August 1996
• Docket Number: Nos. 13-96-309-C,13-96-319-CV,s. 13-96-309-C
• Citation: 931 S.W.2d 338
• Parties: REPUBLIC ROYALTY COMPANY, Relator, v. The Honorable Joe B. EVINS, Judge, 206th Judicial District Court, Hidalgo County, Texas, Respondent. Pedro ALONSO, Jr., et al., Relators, v. The Honorable Micaela ALVAREZ, Judge, 139th Judicial District Court, Hidalgo County, Texas, Respondent.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 338

931 S.W.2d 338

REPUBLIC ROYALTY COMPANY, Relator, v. The Honorable Joe B. EVINS, Judge, 206th Judicial District

Court, Hidalgo County, Texas, Respondent.

Pedro ALONSO, Jr., et al., Relators, v. The Honorable Micaela ALVAREZ, Judge, 139th Judicial

District Court, Hidalgo County, Texas, Respondent.

Nos. 13-96-309-CV, 13-96-319-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas,

Corpus Christi.

Aug. 29, 1996.

Rehearing Overruled Aug. 29, 1996.

Frank E. Weathered, Dunn & Weathered, Corpus Christi, Richard D. Sullivan, Ann Catherine Grandich, Scarromanno & Clegg, L.L.P., Houston, Ronald O. Holman, Holman, Robertson, Eldridge, Dallas, Dan C. Perry, Luke C. Kellogg, Jon Christian Amberson, Jack Paul Leon, San Antonio, Francisco J. Rodriguez, Rodriguez, Prunedo, Tovar, Enriquez & Calvillo, McAllen, Edward G. Aparicio, Aparicio & McLaren, McAllen, for Relators.

Calhoun Bobbitt, Bobbitt & Halter, San Antonio, Steven A. Fleckman, Fleckman & McGlynn, Austin, Edmundo O. Ramirez, Ellis, Koeneke & Ramirez, McAllen, Orrin Harrison, III, Sheryl L. Hopkins, Vinson & Elkins, Dallas, J. Craig Youngblood, Houston, Tracy L. Howard, John Harrell Feldt, Jon Scott Hollyfield, Vinson & Elkins, L.L.P., Houston, Reynaldo Ortiz, McAllen, Guy Stanford Lipe, Houston, J. G. Adami, Jr., Warburton, Adami, McNiell, Paisley & McGuire, Alice, Benjamin H. Sheppard, Andrew McCollam, Houston, Ralph H. Duggins, Bradley C. Poulos, Shayne D. Moses, Clifton Matthew Terrell, Cantey & Hanger, Fort Worth, Mark David Beatty, Cantey Hanger Gooch Munn & Collins, Fort Worth, Eduardo R. Rodriguez, Edward Michael Rodriguez, Rodriguez, Colvin & Chaney, Brownsville, for Real Parties in Interest.

Before SEERDEN, C.J., and CHAVEZ and RODRIGUEZ, JJ.

OPINION

SEERDEN, Chief Justice.

The present mandamus actions involve a dispute between two Hidalgo County district courts over jurisdiction concerning cases that have been consolidated and ordered transferred back and forth between the 139th District Court and the 370th District Court. Interconnected with this dispute is a related issue concerning the effect of the attempted disqualification of the judge of the 139th District Court. We conclude that mandamus relief is appropriate to settle the present dispute.

Republic Royalty Co. (Republic) filed the first lawsuit in December of 1994, against Shell Western E & P Inc., et al., (Shell) concerning a royalty interest under an oil and gas lease. This lawsuit was randomly assigned to the 139th District Court in Hidalgo County. In April of 1995, Pedro Alonso, Jr., et al. (Alonso) also filed a lawsuit in Hidalgo County against Fina Oil and Chemical Co., et al. (Fina) based on royalty interests under a separate oil and gas lease. The second lawsuit was randomly assigned to the 370th District Court in Hidalgo County.

On April 17, 1996, Republic filed a motion to recuse Judge Micaela Alvarez from presiding over the lawsuit in the 139th District Court on the grounds of an alleged prior association with a particular law firm. Judge Alvarez referred this motion to the presiding judge of the administrative district. However, before the motion to recuse could be acted upon, Republic and Alonso filed a motion in the 370th District Court to transfer the first lawsuit into the 370th District Court and consolidate it with the second lawsuit. Judge Noe Gonzales of the 370th District Court heard the motion on April 29, 1996, and on May 15, 1996, signed an order transferring and consolidating the lawsuits into that court. ¹

The motion to recuse, which had been referred to District Judge Joe B. Evins, was set for hearing on June 17, 1996. Although Republic attempted to withdraw the motion as moot due to the transfer of the first lawsuit to the 370th District Court, Judge Evins proceeded with the hearing and signed an order granting withdrawal of the motion "with prejudice to its refiling."

On June 21, 1996, Shell and Fina then filed in the 139th District Court a motion to transfer the consolidated cases back from the 370th District Court to the 139th District Court. Alonso and Republic then filed in the 370th District Court motions to disqualify and recuse Judge Alvarez and requesting a temporary restraining order and temporary injunction preventing Shell and Fina from urging their motion to transfer before Judge Alvarez.

On June 27, 1996, without a hearing on the motion, Judge Alvarez signed an order transferring the cases back to the 139th District Court. On that same day, the 370th District Court signed the requested temporary restraining order and on July 10, 1996, signed a temporary injunction preventing Shell and Fina from proceeding before Judge Alvarez.

Republic filed its present mandamus proceeding in this Court against Judge Evins, complaining that he abused his discretion by adding the words "with prejudice to its refiling" to his order granting withdrawal of the original motion to recuse. In addition, Alonso has filed its mandamus proceeding against Judge Alvarez, complaining that she abused her discretion in ordering the consolidated lawsuits transferred back to her court.

ALONSO MANDAMUS

Alonso complains by its mandamus proceeding that the first lawsuit was properly transferred to the 370th District Court and that Judge Alvarez improperly attempted to regain jurisdiction by ordering it transferred back to the 139th District Court.

Mandamus will issue only to correct a clear abuse of discretion or violation of a duty imposed by law when that abuse cannot be remedied by appeal. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex.1992). Specifically, when one court directly interferes with the jurisdiction of the other, mandamus becomes appropriate. See Hall v. Lawlis, 907 S.W.2d 493 (Tex.1995); Abor v. Black, 695 S.W.2d 564, 567 (Tex.1985); Sweezy Construction, Inc. v. Murray, 915 S.W.2d 527, 530-31 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1995, orig. proceeding); see also Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263 (Tex.1974); Hardy v. McCorkle, 765 S.W.2d 910, 913 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, orig. proceeding). Accordingly, when litigation becomes deadlocked because two courts are struggling for jurisdiction over the same lawsuit and actively interfering with each other's proceedings thereon, the remedy by appeal is generally inadequate and mandamus is appropriate to settle the dispute. HCA Health Services of Texas, Inc. v. Salinas, 838 S.W.2d 246, 248 (Tex.1992). We hold that mandamus is an appropriate remedy in the present dispute between the 139th and 370th District Courts involving this litigation. ²

The Texas Constitution and the Texas Government Code authorize district courts within the same county to transfer cases exchange benches, and to provide local rules for the administration of such transfers and exchanges. Tex. Const. art V, § 11; Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 24.303, 74.093 (Vernon 1988 & Supp.1996). In addition, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 330(e), concerning exchange and transfer between district courts, provides generally that the district judges in counties with two or more district courts having civil jurisdiction may "exchange benches or districts from time to time, and may transfer cases and other proceedings from one court to another." Accordingly, litigants do not have a protected proprietary interest in having their cases heard by a particular district judge or court within the county of filing. Excel Corp. v. Valdez, 921 S.W.2d 444 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1996, orig. proceeding); European Crossroads' Shopping Center, Ltd. v. Criswell, 910 S.W.2d 45, 51 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1995, writ denied); Starnes v. Holloway, 779 S.W.2d 86, 97 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1989, writ denied).

These statutes and rules for transfer between courts in the same county were clearly intended as a convenience for the courts and the parties, with an underlying assumption that the courts, if not the parties, would communicate and cooperate with one another in a collegial fashion. The statutes and rules generally rely on judicial restraint and collegiality to prevent district and county courts within the same county from fighting one another for jurisdiction over a particular case. See Excel; R.J. Gallagher Co. v. White, 709 S.W.2d 379, 381 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, orig. proceeding) (The Gallagher court acknowledged the possibility of judicial chaos created by transfers back and forth between district courts competing for the same case, though the court denied that such chaos had occurred in that case.)

Absent such collegiality among the judges of the several courts within the same county, however, there is no mechanism to prevent the present sort of transfers back and forth between courts in a dispute over jurisdiction aside from the intervention of either the local administrative judge, or the appellate court by mandamus.

We use an abuse of discretion standard to review the trial court's decision to transfer a case, exchange benches, or hold court for another judge. Excel; European Crossroads', 910 S.W.2d at 51. A trial court abuses its discretion when it does not follow guiding rules and principles and reaches an arbitrary and unreasonable decision. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex.1992).

The general common law rule in Texas is that the court in which suit is first filed acquires dominant jurisdiction to the exclusion of other coordinate courts. Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex.1974); Cleveland v. Ward, 116 Tex. 1, 285 S.W. 1063 (1926); see also Hardy, 765 S.W.2d at 912 (cases filed within the same county). In the present case, the first lawsuit was filed in the 139th District Court, which would therefore be the court of dominant jurisdiction. Although the lawsuit could certainly have been transferred to another court within the same county for some legitimate reason involving judicial convenience, availability, or equalization of dockets, the principle of dominant jurisdiction in the first court dictates that it not be transferred arbitrarily once a lawsuit has been...