Reza v. State
| Decision Date | 08 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 3D12–877.,3D12–877. |
| Citation | 163 So.3d 572 |
| Parties | Tomas REZA, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Kenneth J. Kukec, Miami, for appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Jeffrey R. Geldens, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before SUAREZ, LAGOA and SCALES, JJ.
Tomas Reza seeks to reverse a pretrial order denying his motion to suppress two separate confessions and to set aside his conditional nolo pleas, reverse the ensuing convictions and remand for further proceedings. We reverse and remand as to case number 2009–CF–635 for further proceedings. We affirm as to case number 2009–CF–726.
There were three robberies with assaults in Key West over a week's time. Mr. Lee was assaulted on the evening of July 8, 2009, knocked to the ground and his wallet stolen. He could only generally describe his assailants as two juvenile males on bicycles. A week later, Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Milone were similarly attacked, minutes apart, by what they both described as a group of four or five black juveniles on bicycles. All three victims were beaten and their wallets stolen while they were incapacitated on the ground.
A bystander recovered a cell phone from the site where Mr. Milone was assaulted. Police detectives used information on the phone to track down 17–year old Cornelius Jones. Officers Calvert and Leahy were sent out by the investigative unit to locate Jones and to bring him to the police department for questioning regarding the robberies. The officers went to his apartment and spoke to his mother. Although Jones was not there and she could not contact him (he had lost his cell phone the previous night), Jones's brother took them to an area where he said Jones could be found. Officer Calvert testified that Officer Leahy walked a mangrove path cut- through between two apartment complexes, and in a small open area among the trees they found Jones with another person. When the police officer asked Jones where he was the previous night, he declined to answer and declined to voluntarily come in for questioning. Officer Leahy handcuffed Jones. The officer turned to the other person who was with Jones, Tomas Reza, a 16–year–old Hispanic male. Neither officer knew him, or had any instructions regarding him. They nevertheless questioned Reza about who he was and where he had been the night before. Officer Calvert testified that Reza appeared very nervous, refused to answer questions about where he had been the previous night, and also refused to voluntarily come with them to the police station for questioning. Reza was then handcuffed and both juveniles were placed in separate squad cars and taken to the local police station. Neither Jones nor Reza resisted, and neither were read their Miranda rights.
Confession # 1, Case No.2009–CF–635 . The police contacted Reza's mother and she met them at the station. In the interview room and with his mother present,1 Reza was read his Miranda rights and he signed the Miranda waiver form. He was not handcuffed at that time. Upon questioning by Detective Haley, he made statements that indicated he participated in the Sullivan and Milone attacks. He implicated Jones as well. Immediately after the interrogation, Reza was booked on charges based on the Sullivan and Milone muggings. The time between Reza's arrest and the beginning of the interview was approximately forty-five minutes.
Confession # 2, 2009–CF–726 . Two weeks later, while incarcerated in the juvenile detention facility, Reza was interviewed by the detectives regarding the first victim, Mr. Lee. During this interview, Reza was read his Miranda rights and admitted that he and Jones had assaulted and robbed Mr. Lee. Based on these statements, Reza was additionally charged with Lee's robbery as well. The two cases2 were transferred to adult court, as Reza had turned 17. Reza sought to suppress his statements in both cases;3 the record indicates that both parties agreed the motion was dispositive. After a suppression hearing the trial court summarily denied the motion to suppress. It appears from the record that by the time the motion to suppress was filed on behalf of Reza and co-defendant Jones, Reza's two cases had been consolidated. Thus, the order denying the motion to suppress does not distinguish between Reza's first and second confessions or between Reza and co-defendant Jones. Reza eventually pled nolo contendere on all three counts (robbery, battery on a person over 65 [victim Sullivan], aggravated battery [victim Milone], robbery [victim Lee] ), expressly reserving the right to appeal denial of the motion to suppress. We defer to the trial court's factual findings but review the legal conclusions de novo. Gray v. State, 981 So.2d 562, 564 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).
Confession #1, Case No.2009–CF–635 While the arresting police officer may have had some suspicion that Reza was being evasive in his answers and behavior, that suspicion did not approach the level necessary to establish probable cause to detain or arrest.4 In Popple v. State, 626 So.2d 185, 186 (Fla.1993), the Florida Supreme Court explained that there are essentially three levels of police-citizen encounters. The first level is considered a consensual encounter and involves only minimal police contact. During a consensual encounter a citizen may either voluntarily comply with a police officer's requests or choose to ignore them. Because the citizen is free to leave during a consensual encounter, constitutional safeguards are not invoked. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980).
The second level of police-citizen encounters involves an investigatory stop as enunciated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). At this level, a police officer may reasonably detain a citizen temporarily if the officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. § 901.151 Fla. Stat. (2014) ; Gray v. State, 981 So.2d 562, 564–65 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) ; State v. Cortez, 705 So.2d 676, 678 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (quoting State v. Russell, 659 So.2d 465, 468 (Fla. 3d DCA). In order not to violate a citizen's Fourth Amendment rights, an investigatory stop requires a well-founded, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. A mere hunch is not enough to support a stop. Popple, 626 So.2d at 186 ; State v. Taylor, 826 So.2d 399, 405 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) ; Carter v. State, 454 So.2d 739 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).
Even if Reza's initial detention could be considered a consensual encounter, it did not meet the criteria for an investigatory stop because “[w]hether an officer's suspicion is reasonable is determined by the totality of the circumstances which existed at the time of the stop and is based solely on facts known to the officer before the stop.” Fuentes v. State, 24 So.3d 1231, 1234 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). In Reza's case, the officer had no prior information about Reza, did not know who Reza was when he was found with Jones, and admitted at the suppression hearing that Reza did not match the description of the perpetrators. Further, the officer could not articulate reasons for handcuffing and bringing Reza to the station other than that Reza did not look him in the eyes when he questioned him, was anxious, and refused to answer his questions. “[The] police may properly handcuff a person whom they are temporarily detaining when circumstances reasonably justify the use of such restraint.” Reynolds v. State, 592 So.2d 1082, 1085 (Fla.1992) ; Saturnino–Boudet v. State, 682 So.2d 188 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). Circumstances that justify handcuffing include instances “where it was reasonably necessary to protect the officers' safety or to thwart a suspect's attempt to flee.” Reynolds, 592 So.2d at 1084. Such circumstances were not present here. As a result of the lack of probable cause at the time of the initial detention, the trial court should have granted Reza's motion to suppress those statements arising out of the first interrogation.
The State concedes that Reza's initial detention was an arrest without probable cause. It argues, however, that subsequent events broke the causal connection between the initial illegal arrest and Reza's inculpatory statements. E.g., Adams v. State, 830 So.2d 911 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) () (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) ; Roman v. State, 475 So.2d 1228 (Fla.1985) ). In particular, the State asserts that the circumstances of the arrest were sufficiently detached from the actual interrogation to support the use of the admissions against Reza. The State argues that those intervening circumstances include, for example, the police encountering Reza with Jones in the mangrove cut-through area ...
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