Rheuark v. State

• Citation: 601 So.2d 135
• Parties: Elton Bruce RHEUARK v. STATE. CR 90-922.
• Decision Date: 31 January 1992
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 135

601 So.2d 135

Elton Bruce RHEUARK v. STATE.

CR 90-922.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

Jan. 31, 1992.

Rehearing Denied May 1, 1992.

Certiorari Denied July 24, 1992

Alabama Supreme Court 1911298.

Jackie D. Ferguson, Huntsville, for appellant.

James H. Evans, Atty. Gen., and Joseph G.L. Marston III, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

McMILLAN, Judge.

The appellant was convicted of possession of marijuana in the second degree, in violation of § 13A-12-214, Code of Alabama 1975, and the unlawful possession of a controlled substance, specifically psilocybin, in violation of § 13A-12-212, Code of Alabama 1975.

I

The appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the warrantless search of his house and the seizure of the narcotics as a result of the search were allegedly illegal. The record indicates that, after a telephone conversation with the appellant, the appellant's parents contacted emergency medical personnel and requested that they go to the appellant's residence, because he appeared to be under the influence of narcotics and during the conversation had been threatening suicide or stating that he was going to die. The appellant, completely unclothed, was found by the emergency medical technicians behind a chair. An emergency medical technician testified that, after being contacted concerning the appellant, he contacted the Huntsville Police Department and the sheriff's department. One of the technicians testified that the appellant "had a wild look about him" and that "his eyes were wired." He testified that the appellant "wouldn't answer no questions at all" and that he "just looked at us." An employee of the ambulance service that responded to the call testified that the appellant answered his questions in a delayed manner, but that he gave appropriate answers. The witness testified that the appellant dressed himself and walked to the ambulance. The witness testified that, upon entering the house, he noticed several plants "spread all over the room." He testified that members of the sheriff's department, who were already on the scene, and the emergency medical technicians were unsure of the type of plants and attempted to identify them. He further testified that he believed that the appellant was asked to identify questions concerning the nature of the plants. He testified that the appellant's condition improved during the time he was at his house. He stated that he was present when the appellant signed a consent to search form and that, in his opinion, the appellant understood what was going on when he signed the form. On cross-examination, the witness testified that the appellant stated that he wanted to cooperate when he signed the form.

A police officer who was present during the appellant's arrest testified that the Huntsville Police Department was contacted by the Huntsville emergency medical technicians, who had requested that the police respond quickly to the call, because of the nature of the situation. The officer testified that, upon entering the house, he noticed several plants that had what "looked like fungus and other stuff growing off of them." He testified that another officer stated that he believed the plants were a type of mushroom "that you get high off of" and that they therefore notified their supervisor, who in turn notified the vice and narcotics division of the police department.

A sergeant in the vice and narcotics division testified that he arrived at the scene when the appellant was being put into the ambulance. He testified that he was briefed by a paramedic and a uniformed supervisor on the scene concerning the plants, which appeared to be mushrooms. He testified that he asked if the appellant had signed a consent form, and being told that he had not, the sergeant instructed the officers "not to do any searching until I talk to the defendant." The sergeant testified that he spoke to the appellant and attempted to ascertain whether the appellant could understand the situation. He testified that the appellant "seemed fine; a little wild in appearance; a little slow in his statement; but other than that, fine." He stated that he read the appellant his rights, pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), very slowly and clearly, asking him if he understood them. The sergeant testified that the appellant responded that he did and that he was aware of them. He stated that the appellant further said, " 'Look, I want to do anything to cooperate.' " The appellant then signed the consent form.

The State argues that the search and seizure of the evidence were lawful because the appellant consented to the search and because the narcotics were seized pursuant to the plain view exception to the exclusionary rule. The appellant argues that his consent was involuntary, because, he says, he lacked the capacity to consent to the search due to the fact that he was under the influence of psilocyn. He further argues that his condition was obvious and that the authorities must have known of his lack of capacity.

In Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986), the United States Supreme Court held that coercive police activity is a necessary prerequisite to finding that a confession is involuntary within the meaning of the due process clause. "Absent police conduct causally related to the confession, there is simply no basis for concluding that any State actor has deprived a criminal defendant of due process of law." 479 U.S. at 164, 107 S.Ct. at 520. In so holding, the Court stated:

"We have also observed that '[j]urists and scholars uniformly have recognized that the exclusionary rule imposes a substantial cost on the societal interest in law enforcement by its proscription of what concededly is relevant evidence.' United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 448-449 [96 S.Ct. 3021, 3029, 49 L.Ed.2d 1046] (1976). See also United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627, 100 S.Ct. 1912, 1916-17, 64 L.Ed.2d 559 (1980); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 [94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561] (1974). Moreover, suppressing respondent's statements would serve absolutely no purpose in enforcing constitutional guarantees. The purpose of excluding evidence seized in violation of the Constitution is to substantially deter future violations of the Constitution. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906-913 [104 S.Ct. 3405, 3411-15, 82 L.Ed.2d 677] (1984). Only if we were to establish a brand new constitutional right--the right of a criminal defendant to confess to his crime only when totally rational and properly motivated--could respondent's present claim be sustained.

" ... '[T]he central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant's guilt or innocence,' Delaware v. VanArsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 [106 S.Ct. 1431, 1436, 89 L.Ed.2d 674] (1986), and while we have previously held that exclusion of evidence may be necessary to protect constitutional guarantees, both the necessity for the collateral inquiry and the exclusion of evidence deflect a criminal trial from its basic purpose. Respondent would now have us require sweeping inquiries into the state of mind of a criminal defendant who has confessed, inquiries quite divorced from any coercion brought to bear on the defendant by the State. We think the Constitution rightly leaves this sort of inquiry to be resolved by State laws governing the admission of evidence and erects no standard of its own in this area.... 'The aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or false.' Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 [62 S.Ct. 280, 290, 86 L.Ed. 166] (1941)."

Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166-67, 107 S.Ct. at 521.

Given the rules of evidence, we do not believe that the evidence concerning the appellee's intoxication at the time of his consent was sufficient to prove that his consent was involuntary.

" ' "[U]nless intoxication, in and of itself, so impairs the defendant's mind that he is 'unconscious of the meaning of his words,' the fact that the defendant was intoxicated at the time he confessed is simply one factor to be considered when reviewing the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession." Carr v. State, 545 So.2d 820, 824 (Ala.Cr.App.1989). "The intoxicated condition of an accused when he makes a confession, unless it goes to the extent of mania, does not affect the admissibility and evidence of the confession, but may affect its weight and credibility." Callahan v. State, 557 So.2d 1292, 1300 (Ala.Cr.App.), affirmed, 557 So.2d 1311 (Ala.1989).' "White v. State, [Ms. 8 Div. 473, August 24, 1990] (Ala.Cr.App.1990)."

State v. Austin, 596 So.2d 598 (Ala.Cr.App.1991).

In the present case, there was ample testimony that, although the appellant's responses were slow, they were appropriate; thus the appellant appeared to understand the meaning of his words. Moreover, the appellant stated that he was aware of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and that he understood them. Therefore, the search and seizure were legal, based on the appellant's consent to search, and the admission of the evidence seized as a result of that search was therefore proper. Moreover, Alabama cases have held that where the evidence pertaining to the voluntariness of a consent is conflicting, the trial court is in the best position to determine whether there was a lawful, voluntary consent. Daniels v. State, 534 So.2d 628, 654 (Ala.Cr.App.1985), affirmed, 534 So.2d 664 (Ala.1989), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1040, 107 S.Ct. 898, 93 L.Ed.2d 850 (1987). A trial court's finding will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is found to be palpably contrary to the weight of the evidence. Id.

Furthermore, the evidence was properly admitted pursuant...