Rhodes v. General Motors Corp., Chevrolet Div.

• Decision Date: 21 May 1993
• Citation: 621 So.2d 945
• Parties: 21 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 34 Daniel C. RHODES and Sabrina Rhodes v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, CHEVROLET DIVISION; and Chrysler Credit Corporation. 1911866.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 945

621 So.2d 945

21 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 34

Daniel C. RHODES and Sabrina Rhodes v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, CHEVROLET DIVISION; and Chrysler Credit Corporation.

1911866.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

May 21, 1993.

Gaines C. McCorquodale and Jacqualyn M. Sheffield of McCorquodale and McCorquodale, Jackson, for Daniel C. Rhodes and Sabrina Rhodes.

Richard T. Dorman and Patricia J. Ponder of McRight, Jackson, Dorman, Myrick & Moore, Mobile, for General Motors Corp.

Mayer W. Perloff of Reid, Friedman, Perloff & Ross, Mobile, for Chrysler Credit Corp.

INGRAM, Justice.

The plaintiffs, Daniel and Sabrina Rhodes, appeal from summary judgments entered in favor of the defendants, Chrysler Credit Corporation and General Motors Corporation.

The Rhodeses, husband and wife, purchased a 1989 Chevrolet Cavalier automobile from David Jones Chevrolet, Inc. ("Jones"). The car was manufactured and warranted by General Motors Corporation; Chrysler Credit Corporation financed the purchase. After the Rhodeses purchased the automobile, they returned it to Jones on three occasions for repairs. While Jones still had possession of the car after the third repair, Chrysler Credit repossessed it because of the Rhodeses' failure to make scheduled payments.

The Rhodeses filed an eight-count complaint against Chrysler Credit, General Motors, and Jones. They sought damages from General Motors and Jones for breach of warranty and sought compensatory damages from Chrysler Credit and Jones for wrongful repossession, conversion, fraudulent misrepresentation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress by extreme and outrageous conduct. Also, in Count VIII, they sought damages based on a claim that Chrysler Credit wrongfully reported the repossession and deficiency to a credit bureau. In the first amendment to their complaint, the Rhodeses added a demand against Jones and Chrysler Credit for punitive damages. In their second amendment, they sought damages against General Motors for mental anguish and suffering. ¹ Finally, the Rhodeses amended their complaint a third time, seeking damages from General Motors and Jones for fraudulent misrepresentations they said occurred during the sale of the automobile.

Each of the defendants moved for a summary judgment. The trial court first granted a summary judgment in favor of Jones. Holding that "there is no genuine issue as to the liability of [the defendants], and that said defendant[s] [are] entitled to a judgment as a matter of law," the trial court later entered summary judgments in favor of Chrysler Credit and General Motors. It is from these judgments that the Rhodeses appeal. ²

A summary judgment is proper when the motion and the materials submitted in support of it, and those submitted in opposition thereto, "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c)(3), A.R.Civ.P. To defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must present substantial evidence to support its claims. Ala.Code 1975, § 12-21-12. To satisfy the "substantial evidence test," the nonmoving party is required to present "evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the

exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved." West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989). "[O]n review of a summary judgment, we must view all the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and we must entertain all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the nonmovant." Lee v. City of Gadsden, 592 So.2d 1036, 1038 (Ala.1992).

I. Claims against General Motors

With regard to their claims against General Motors, the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the Rhodeses, shows the following: On July 13, 1989, the Rhodeses purchased a 1989 Chevrolet Cavalier from Jones. The Cavalier had been manufactured by General Motors. On the date of purchase, the odometer on the automobile registered 291 miles.

After purchasing the automobile, the Rhodeses returned it to Jones for repairs on three occasions. On August 9, 1989, Jones performed some touch-up painting on the car. On August 24, 1989, the Rhodeses brought the car back to Jones, complaining of noise in the transmission. At that time, Jones installed a new clutch, pressure plate, and throw out bearing. Finally, on September 26, 1989, the Rhodeses brought the car back to Jones, again complaining of noise in the transmission. At that time Jones removed the transmission from the car and shipped it to a company specializing in transmission repairs, and that company performed repairs on the transmission.

It is undisputed that General Motors paid for each of these repairs under the terms of the "New Car Limited Warranty" that applied to the car. Under the terms of that warranty, General Motors had agreed to cover repairs to correct any defect in materials or workmanship of the car for three years or 50,000 miles, whichever came first.

While Jones still had the car after the third repair, Chrysler Credit repossessed it because of the Rhodeses' failure to make scheduled payments. Except to the extent that they claim consequential damages as a result of having the car repaired, the Rhodeses make no claims against General Motors with regard to the repossession of the car. See footnote 1.

A. The Breach of Warranty Count

In the first count of their complaint, the Rhodeses seek damages from General Motors for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. Ala.Code 1975, § 7-2-314. General Motors asserts that it cannot be held liable under this theory because Jones, not General Motors, was the seller of the automobile.

We note that each section in the Uniform Commercial Code dealing with implied warranties places obligations on the seller of goods. In this case, General Motors was the manufacturer of the automobile, and Jones was the seller. § 7-2-103(1)(d). In Wellcraft Marine v. Zarzour, 577 So.2d 414 (Ala.1990), we stated: "There is no right of action on an implied warranty theory against a manufacturer for property damage without privity of contract." 577 So.2d at 419. (Emphasis in Wellcraft.) Similarly, we conclude that, without privity of contract, there is no right of action against a manufacturer for direct economic loss. ³

The Rhodeses contend that in extending a written warranty, General Motors created privity of contract with the Rhodeses. When presented with a similar contention in Wellcraft, we held: "Regardless of any express warranties that a manufacturer may wish to give with a product, by their very language the commercial code's implied warranty sections apply to the seller of the product." Id. at 419.

                (Emphasis added.)   We see no reason to disturb that holding in this case.  Accordingly, as to the count alleging a breach of implied warranty, the summary judgment in favor of General Motors is affirmed
                

In Count II of their complaint, the Rhodeses allege that General Motors breached its express written warranty. The written limited warranty provides that General Motors will pay for the costs of any repairs to the vehicle necessitated by defects in materials or workmanship during the applicable warranty period. It is undisputed that each time the Rhodeses brought the vehicle in for repairs, it was repaired and General Motors paid all charges for the repair. The Rhodeses produced no evidence that the September 26, 1989, repair failed to remedy the car's transmission problem. ⁴ There is no evidence that while the Rhodeses had possession of the car it ever stopped or failed to operate.

After considering the record and the parties' briefs, we conclude that the trial judge correctly held that the Rhodeses had failed to present substantial evidence in support of their breach of warranty claim. See, Belcher v. Versatile Farm Equipment Co., 443 So.2d 912 (Ala.1983); Dickson v. U-J Chevrolet Co., 454 So.2d 964 (Ala.1984). Accordingly, as to the count alleging a breach of the express warranty, the summary judgment in favor of General Motors is affirmed.

B. The Misrepresentation Count

In Count IX of their complaint as amended, the Rhodeses allege that General Motors represented to them that the car they were purchasing was new and was without defects. The Rhodeses do not allege that any specific representation to this effect was made to them. Rather, they claim that because General Motors supplied them with a "New Car Limited Warranty," General Motors was warranting that the car was new and was without defects.

The Rhodeses do not claim that the car had been previously owned, wrecked, or damaged or that it had any patent defects. Rather, they claim that the fact that the car had to be repaired three times after purchase is evidence that the car was not new and that it was defective.

In Tittle v. Steel City Oldsmobile GMC Truck, Inc., 544 So.2d 883 (Ala.1989), we considered the application of a warranty that provided: "This warranty covers any repairs and needed adjustments to correct defects in material or workmanship." 544 So.2d at 891. In that case, we concluded that rather than guaranteeing the car to be free of defects, the warranty actually anticipated that defects would arise and provided for remedying such defects. Id. Similarly, we conclude that the language in this warranty cannot be construed as a representation that the car was and would remain free of defects. ⁵

Because the Rhodeses failed to present substantial evidence to support their claim that General Motors falsely represented that the car they purchased was new and without defects, we conclude that the trial court properly entered the summary judgment as to the misrepresentation count against General Motors. Accordingly, with regard to that count the summary judgment is affirmed. ⁶

II. The Claims against Chrysler Credit

With regard to the Rhodeses' claims against...