Rhyne v. Garfield

• Decision Date: 20 April 1976
• Docket Number: No. 30959,30959
• Citation: 236 Ga. 694,225 S.E.2d 43
• Parties: Plato S. RHYNE, Jr. v. Ramona E. GARFIELD.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 43

225 S.E.2d 43

236 Ga. 694

Plato S. RHYNE, Jr. v. Ramona E. GARFIELD.

No. 30959.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

April 20, 1976.

Paul R. Kohler, Atlanta, for appellant.

Albert B. Wallace, Jonesboro, for appellee.

HALL, Justice.

Plaintiff, Plato S. Rhyne, Jr., appeals from the grant of a motion to strike all three counts of his petition and the consequent dismissal of his complaint. We agree that the trial court was in error and reverse.

Rhyne contracted to purchase the home of Ramona Garfield for $90,000.00 on July 13, 1975. The covenants included a clause requiring the seller to furnish a 'termite letter' and provided for payment of $1,000.00 earnest money and $8,000.00 in cash at closing, for the assumption of a $72,000.00 particularly described mortgage, and for the remaining $10,000.00 to be paid either in cash or pursuant to a five-year note to the seller. The terms of this note, as provided in the contract, were either 'five equal annual payments, plus accrued interest of 8%,' or 'seller to accept $1,000.00-plus accrued interest the first year in lieu of the five equal payments, the balance to be paid in four equal payments plus accrued interest. First payment becoming due on September 1, 1976.' There was no acceleration clause, nor were there provisions to secure the note in the contract.

On August 1, 1975, the closing date, the seller refused to consummate the sale. Rhyne thereafter brought this suit in three counts for specific performance and for damages for his loss of bargain. Garfield answered and filed her motion to strike Rhyne's claims because the contract was too vague and indefinite to be enforceable. The trial court granted her motion and dismissed the complaint.

The standard to be applied to a motion to strike is the same as that on a motion for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Potpourri of Merrick v. Gay Gibson, 132 Ga.App. 565, 208 S.E.2d 579 (1974); Morgan v. White, 121 Ga.App. 794, 175 S.E.2d 878 (1970). This Court recently reiterated that rule in Dillingham v. Doctors Clinic, 236 Ga. 302, 223 S.E.2d 625 (1976): "Under the CPA, a pleading should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.' Cochran v. McCollum, 233 Ga. 104, 210 S.E.2d 13 (1974).' This applies to equitable cases as well as to those at law. Durbin v. Woods, 235 Ga. 120, 218 S.E.2d 865 (1975); Ammons v. Bolick, 233 Ga. 324, 210 S.E.2d 796 (1974).

Garfield's contention that the requirement of a 'termite letter' rendered the contract too vague and indefinite to be enforceable is without merit. This term's meaning and the contractors' intentions are issues of fact to be determined by the trial court. We cannot say, applying the Dillingham standard, that the plaintiff cannot show by any set of facts what the parties had in mind. Code Ann. § 20-702; Paul v. Paul, 235 Ga. 382, 219 S.E.2d 736 (1975).

Similarly, the trial court erred in holding that the payment plan set out in the contract was unenforceable as a matter of law. There is nothing inherently vague or improper in providing for alternative forms of payment in a contract to...