Rice v. State

• Decision Date: 24 June 1999
• Docket Number: Nos. 2-98-390-C,2-98-391-CR,s. 2-98-390-C
• Citation: 991 S.W.2d 953
• Parties: Paul Harold RICE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, State. . Rehearing Overruled
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 953

991 S.W.2d 953

Paul Harold RICE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, State.

Nos. 2-98-390-CR, 2-98-391-CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Fort Worth.

Rehearing Overruled June 24, 1999.

May 27, 1999.

Thomas M. McMurray, Denton, for Appellant.

Bruce Isaacks, Criminal District Attorney, Gregory P. Propes, Assistant District Attorney, Heather Rattan, Assistant District Attorney, Earl Dobson, Assistant District Attorney, Michael Moore, Assistant District Attorney, Matthew Paul, State Prosecuting Attorney, Denton, for Appellee.

Panel A: CAYCE, C.J.; LIVINGSTON and HOLMAN, JJ.

OPINION

TERRIE LIVINGSTON, Justice.

In a single point, appellant Paul Harold Rice contends the trial court abused its discretion by failing to conduct a hearing, sua sponte, as to his competency to stand trial. Because the evidence did not raise a bona fide doubt as to appellant's competency, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

On January 6, 1995, appellant pleaded guilty to, and was adjudged guilty of, two charges of aggravated assault and one charge of delivery of a controlled substance. Pursuant to a plea bargain, appellant received ten years' community supervision.

During appellant's community supervision, he worked for an industrial cleaning company. There, he was exposed to toxic chemicals. Due to his exposure, appellant developed several neurological disorders. Among the most significant was "toxic metabolic encephalopathy." This condition is characterized by seizures, memory loss, and "cognitive deficits." Appellant's condition rendered him 100% disabled under the Workers Compensation Act.

On August 14, 1997, the State moved to revoke appellant's community supervision. On February 26, 1998, the State amended its motion to revoke. In the amended motion, the State alleged appellant failed to (1) meet with his community supervision officer, (2) pay administrative fees, (3) permit his community supervision officer to visit him at home, (4) pay a fine, (5) notify the department of any change in his address, (6) pay restitution, and (7) complete community service. On July 30, 1998, appellant pleaded true to failing to meet with his community supervision officer, and pleaded not true or an affirmative defense to all other counts. Appellant's community supervision was revoked, and he was sentenced to ten years' confinement.

DISCUSSION

Appellant contends the trial court erred in failing to hold a hearing to determine his competency at the revocation hearing. Appellant argues that sufficient evidence was presented to raise the question of whether he was competent to stand trial, and that the trial court was required to halt the proceedings, inquire into his competency, and impanel a jury to decide the issue. To support his argument, appellant points to his mental disorder, workers' compensation disability, and physicians' letters.

Specifically, appellant argues that in deciding to hold the hearing, "the trial court [was] to assay just that evidence tending to show incompetency, putting aside all competing indications of competency, to find whether there is some evidence, a quantity more than none or a scintilla, that rationally may lead to a conclusion of incompetence." Sisco v. State, 599 S.W.2d 607, 613 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1980) (emphasis added). We disagree, because the Sisco standard is not applicable in this instance.

There are several stages in determining an accused's competency to stand trial. See Hatten v. State, 978 S.W.2d 608, 610 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.); Brown v. State, 960 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd). Each step is guided by a different standard or test. Compare Collier v. State, 959 S.W.2d 621, 625 (Tex.Crim.App.1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 119 S.Ct. 335, 142 L.Ed.2d 276 (1998) (must raise a bona fide doubt as to competency to obtain hearing), with Sisco, 599 S.W.2d at 613 (at the hearing, regardless of competing evidence of competency, presentation of more than a scintilla of evidence requires impaneling a jury).

The first step requires that the trial court be made aware there is some doubt as to the accused's competency. See Collier, 959 S.W.2d at 625; Brown, 960 S.W.2d at 774. This may be done pretrial by motion or during trial by presentation of any evidence that would raise a bona fide doubt as to the accused's competency including the court's observations of the accused. See TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.02, § 2(a), (b) (Vernon 1979); Brown, 960 S.W.2d at 774. In fact, it is of little importance how the issued is raised. See Townsend v. State, 427 S.W.2d 55, 63 (Tex.Crim.App.1968). Once raised, the second step requires the court to conduct a hearing to determine whether any evidence exists that may rationally lead to a conclusion of incompetency pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 46.02, section 2. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.02, § 2(b). In step three, if any evidence of incompetency is presented during the hearing, regardless of contrary evidence, the court must impanel a separate jury to decide the accused's competency. See id.; Sisco, 599 S.W.2d at 613. In the fourth and final step, a jury, based on a preponderance of the evidence, determines whether an accused is competent to stand trial. See TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.02, § 2(b).

The Sisco standard, advanced by appellant, is used when "determining after hearing ... whether 'there is evidence to support a finding of incompetency to stand trial.' " Sisco, 599 S.W.2d at 613. In other words, the Sisco standard only applies to a court's decision whether to impanel a jury after the section 2 hearing has occurred, not the court's decision to conduct a section 2 hearing. Because the court did not conduct a hearing, the "bona fide doubt" standard, not the Sisco standard, applies. Cf. Moore v. State, No. 72,638, slip op. at 4-6, --- S.W.2d ----, ---- -- ----, 1999 WL 233918, at * 2-3 (Tex.Crim.App. Apr. 21, 1999).

Appellant also argues that this case is factually indistinguishable from this court's decision in Thornhill v. State that ordered a jury trial on competency. Thornhill v. State, 910 S.W.2d 653 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 1995, pet. ref'd). Notwithstanding his assertion, the question before us is whether the trial court should have conducted the initial section 2 hearing, not whether the court should have impaneled a jury to determine appellant's competency. Thornhill deals only with whether the trial court should have impaneled a jury; thus, it is inapplicable to this case.

Having determined the appropriate standard, we now address the merits of appellant's claim. Without question, conviction of an accused who is legally incompetent to stand trial violates due process of law. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378, 86 S.Ct. 836, 839, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966); Bonner v. State, 520 S.W.2d 901, 905 (Tex.Crim.App.1975); Thompson v. State, 915 S.W.2d 897, 901 (Tex.App.--Houston [1 st Dist.] 1996, pet. ref'd). Once an issue of incompetency arises, a separate hearing for determination of competency is required to meet due process demands. See Townsend, 427 S.W.2d at 57.

Whether incompetency exists at the time of trial is left to the discretion of the trial judge. See Ainsworth v. State, 493 S.W.2d 517, 521 (Tex.Crim.App.1973); Thompson, 915 S.W.2d at 901. Therefore, to determine whether the trial court erred in not conducting a competency hearing, we review the trial court's decision under an abuse of discretion standard. See Thompson, 915 S.W.2d at 901.

Pretrial assertions of incompetency may be made by the accused, his counsel, or by the court. See TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.02, § 2(a). Here, neither appellant nor his counsel raised the issue of incompetency pretrial. Similarly, there was no request for a separate proceeding to determine the issue during trial. Instead, appellant claims on appeal for the first time that the court should have halted the proceedings and conducted a competency hearing sua sponte.

Article 46.02, section 2(b) provides:

If during the trial evidence of the defendant's incompetency is brought to the attention of the court from any source, the court must conduct a hearing out of the presence of the jury to determine whether or not there is evidence to support a finding of incompetency to stand trial.

Id.

To trigger a section 2 hearing, the evidence must sufficiently create a bona fide doubt in the mind of the court whether the defendant meets the test of legal competence. See Collier, 959 S.W.2d at 625. The test of legal competence to stand trial is whether the defendant has the present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. See TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46.02, § 1(a) (Vernon 1979); Barber v. State, 737 S.W.2d 824, 828 (Tex.Crim.App.1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1091, 109 S.Ct. 1559, 103 L.Ed.2d 861 (1989); Thompson, 915 S.W.2d at 901-02.

Generally, a bona fide doubt about a defendant's legal competence is raised only if the evidence indicates recent severe mental illness, moderate mental retardation, or truly bizarre acts by the defendant. See Collier, 959 S.W.2d at 625. The courts of this state have consistently maintained that the test is not whether the accused labored under some mental, behavioral, or psychological impairment; rather, the critical inquiry is whether the accused had the ability to consult with his attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and had a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. See Porter v. State, 623 S.W.2d 374, 380 (Tex.Crim.App.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 965, 102 S.Ct. 2046, 72 L.Ed.2d 491 (1982) (evidence of earlier psychological problems not enough to show defendant incompetent to stand trial); Leyva v. State, 552 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) (even judicial determination that a person is mentally ill is not...