Richard P, Matter of
| Decision Date | 11 September 1981 |
| Citation | 110 Misc.2d 833,442 N.Y.S.2d 911 |
| Parties | In the Matter of RICHARD P, A Person Alleged to be a Juvenile Delinquent, Respondent. |
| Court | New York Family Court |
This is a delinquency petition alleging the commission of acts by the respondent which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crimes set forth in P.L. 220.31 and P.L. 220.16 relating to the sale and possession of a controlled substance. Respondent appeared in Intake A on June 13, 1981, and was paroled for trial on July 20, 1981, Part I. On July 17, 1981, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion for pre-trial discovery, some 45 days after the commencement of this proceeding.
Under Rules promulgated as "Standard and Goals" for the New York State Courts, the Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference on July 3, 1975 and revised in February 1979, established inter alia a 20-day limit for all pre-trial motions and applications, after which such motions and applications shall be deemed waived, except those of a jurisdictional nature.
Under C.P.L. 240.90 and 255.20 such pre-trial motions are made within 45 days of arraignment. Respondent contends that established practice of the Family Court has been to invoke the CPL time limit on such motions, and the "Standards and Goals" rule is inapplicable. Petitioner contends that the Office of Court Administration rule is applicable, notice of the same having been given to all supervising personnel including the Corporation Counsel and the Legal Aid Society.
At issue is whether this motion has been waived by reason of untimeliness under the time limitation of the Office of Court Administration Rules.
The original concept of the Juvenile Court system was to provide a benevolent and less formal means than criminal courts could provide for dealing with the special and often sensitive problems of youthful offenders. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368.
Notwithstanding the uniqueness of the juvenile court constitutional principles of due process and fair treatment have become a part of the procedure accorded to juveniles. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527; Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84; McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647.
In the People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N.Y.2d 682, 385 N.Y.S.2d 518, 350 N.E.2d 906, the Court of Appeals opined thusly:
"Whatever may be the articulated explanation or however persuasive one assigned reason may appear in comparison with another, it cannot be denied that society, the Legislature and the courts all recognized that where the individual rights of children as well as adults are entitled to constitutional protection, there are significant, even compelling differences between children and adults which permit different procedures with respect to criminal behavior without denial of constitutional equal protection or due process." (emphasis added). (Cites omitted).
Underscoring this fact is the court's recognition that the Code of Criminal Procedure does not govern Family Court procedure. Matter of D., 27 N.Y.2d 90, 313 N.Y.S.2d 704, 261 N.E.2d 627.
In accordance with the Judiciary Law, Section 211, "the Chief Judge, after consultation with the administrative board, shall establish standards and administrative policies for general application to the unified court systems throughout the state including but not limited to standards and administrative policies relating to: * * *
(b) The adoption, amendment, recission and implementation of rules and orders regulating practice and procedure in the courts, subject to the reserved power of the legislature provided for in section thirty of article six of the constitution."
Article 6, Section 30 of the Constitution of the State of New York, states:
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