D., In re

• Citation: 27 N.Y.2d 90,313 N.Y.S.2d 704,261 N.E.2d 627
• Parties: , 261 N.E.2d 627 In the Matter of Daniel Richard D., a Person Alleged to be a Juvenile Delinquent, Respondent. County of Onondaga, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 02 July 1970
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

Page 704

313 N.Y.S.2d 704

27 N.Y.2d 90, 261 N.E.2d 627

In the Matter of Daniel Richard D., a Person Alleged to be a Juvenile Delinquent, Respondent County of Onondaga, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

July 2, 1970.

Eli Gingold, County Atty. (Hugh C. Gregg, II, Syracuse, and Ronald J. Crowely, North Syracuse, of counsel), for appellant.

Dennis G. O'Hara, Syracuse, for respondent.

SCILEPPI, Judge.

This is an appeal, taken by the County of Onondaga from an order of the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, which reversed an order of the Family Court, Onondaga County, adjudicating Daniel Richard D. to be a juvenile delinquent and remitting the matter to the Family Court for further proceedings.

On January 24, 1969 Daniel Richard D., the respondent herein, was taken into custody in connection with an investigation of the death of his father. The Family Court thereafter determined, pursuant to section 728 of the Family Court Act, that it had jurisdiction over the matter and a petition was filed on January 29, 1969 which charged respondent with being a juvenile delinquent alleging that he had shot and killed his father with a shotgun, acts which if committed by an adult would consitute the crime of murder (Penal Law, Consol.Laws, c. 40, § 125.25). Counsel was retained, the charge was denied and motions were made requesting a jury trial, orders requiring the County Attorney to prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt, service of notice under section 813--f of the Code of Criminal Procedure of his intention, if any, to introduce into evidence a confession or admission of respondent and for a Huntley hearing. These motions were denied, and March 13, 1969 was designated for a 'fact-finding hearing' under section 744 of the Family Court Act. At this time counsel renewed the aforesaid motions which were again denied, and an off-the-record conference among counsel for the respondent, members of the County Attorney's office and the court then ensued. As a result of this conference, the County Attorney offered to file a new petition alleging that respondent had committed an act which, if done by an adult, would constitute the crime of reckless endangerment in the first degree (Penal Law, § 120.25). He added that '(i)t is further our recommendation that upon the appropriate arraignment of this Court and upon Respondent being represented by counsel and by being properly advised by the Court if he admits the allegations of the new petition that at that time I would move for dismissal of the old petition'. The court immediately conducted an inquiry, respondent admitted the allegations of the new petition and the old petition was dismissed. Thereafter on April 3, 1969, a 'dispositional hearing' was held pursuant to sections 743, 745 and 746 of the Family Court Act and respondent was committed to the New York State Agricultural and Industrial School for an indefinite period not to exceed three years (Family Ct.Act, §§ 753, 758). On appeal to the Appellate Division, the determination of the Family Court was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. The majority took the view that respondent was entitled to a jury trial on the question of his delinquency and that the Supreme Court's recent enunciation of the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in juvenile delinquency proceedings (In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368) should be applied retroactively. It further held that respondent was entitled to these rights, notwithstanding the fact that he had admitted all of the allegations of the second petition.

The County Attorney has appealed to our court pursuant to the certified question whether the Appellate Division order was properly made. In support of his position that a reversal is mandated, he argues that it is constitutionally permissible for us to draw a distinction between adults and juveniles under 16 years of age for the purpose of a jury trial. We agree. While it is, of course, true that a finding of juvenile delinquency, which will subject a juvenile to commitment for up to three years, may render the charge serious under Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 and Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 26 L.Ed.2d 437, 16 L.Ed.2d 84, it is our opinion that the distinction, suggested by appellant, is not only proper, but necessary. In Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 1057, the Supreme Court expressed its view that it did 'not mean * * * to indicate that the hearing to be held must conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual amdinistrative hearing; but * * * that the hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.' It was in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 10, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 that the court defined its meaning of fairness to include (1) notice of the charges; (2) right to counsel; (3) privilege against self incrimination; (4) right to confrontation and cross-examination; (5) right to a transcript of the proceedings; and (6) right to appellate review. The court in Gault did not express an opinion on other due process requirements; concluding that due process does have a role to play and that '(t)he problem is to ascertain the precise impact of the due process requisite upon such proceedings' (Gault, supra, at pp. 13--14, 87 S.Ct., at p. 1436). Thus after Gault, it became apparent that the Supreme Court would resort to a case-by-case approach so as to determine what due process rights would obtain at a juvenile delinquency fact-finding hearing. It was in accordance with this approach that the 'reasonable doubt' quantum of proof was recently added to the list (In re Winship, Supra). Mr. Justice Brennan, writing for the court, adhered to the court's view expressed in Kent and Gault that all due process elements were not required and that the sole issue before the court was the necessary quantum of proof. Implicit in the opinion of the court is the view that Winship would not be a death knell to our Family Court because the use of the reasonable doubt standard would not displace any of the benefits of the juvenile process or inhibit the functioning of the system. This point was amplified by Mr. Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion. He wrote: 'In this regard, I think it worth emphasizing that the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a juvenile committed a criminal act before he is found to be a delinquent does not (1) interfere with the worthy goal of rehabilitating the juvenile, (2) make any significant difference in the extent to which a youth is stigmatized as a 'criminal' because he has been found to be a delinquent, or (3) Burden the juvenile courts with a procedural requirement which will make juvenile adjudications significantly more time consuming, or rigid. Today's decision simply requires a juvenile judge to be more confident in his belief that the youth did the act with which he has been charged.' (In re Winship, Supra, 397 U.S. at p. 375, 90 S.Ct. at p. 1078; emphasis added).

We agree with Justice Harlan and a consideration of Kent, Gault and Winship leads us to conclude that trial by jury, in cases involving juvenile delinquents is neither constitutionally required nor desirable. To require a jury trial in such proceedings "would inevitably bring a good deal more formality to the juvenile court without giving the youngster a demonstrably better fact-finding process than trial before a judge" (President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice: Task Force Report on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime, pp. 38--40 (1967); see Duncan, supra, 391 U.S. at p. 158, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491). Moreover, it would make delinquency adjudications unwieldy and disruptive since the Family Court is not structured to handle jury trials. This view is consonant with the majority of most State courts which have passed upon the issue since Gault was decided (see In re Fucini, 44 Ill.2d 305, 255 N.E.2d 380, appeal to the Supreme Court filed April 6, 1970, 38 U.S. Law Week 3398; Dryden v. Kentucky, Ky., 435 S.W.2d 457; In re Johnson, 254 Md. 517, 255 A.2d 419; In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879; In re Agler, 19 Ohio St.2d 70, 249 N.E.2d 808; In re McKeiver, 255 A.2d 921, aff'd. 438 Pa. 339, 265 A.2d 350 (Pa.), probable jurisdiction noted June 29, 1970, 399 U.S. 925, 90 S.Ct. 2271, 26 L.Ed.2d 791; State v. Turner (Ore.), 453 P.2d 910; In re Estes v. Hopp, 73 Wash.2d 263, 438 P.2d 205; Ann. 100 A.L.R.2d 1241, right to Jury Trial in Juvenile Court Delinquency Proceedings; Contra, Peyton v. Nord, 78 N.M. 717, 437 P.2d 716; see, also, DeBacker v. Brainard, 183 Neb. 461, 161 N.W.2d 508, app. dsmd. 396 U.S. 28, 90 S.Ct. 163, 24 L.Ed.2d 148, where the Supreme Court chose not to reach the jury issue because the juvenile delinquency adjudication anteceded Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491, Supra).

Therefore, we see no compelling reason why we should burden the court with a procedural requirement which would make such adjudications significantly time consuming, cumbersome, and result in a loss of secrecy which has always been deemed most desirable, since a jury trial would not necessarily afford the youngster a better fact-finding process.

As to respondent's claim to section 813--f notice, suffice it to say that Family Court procedure is not governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure (see Code Crim.Proc., § 11, Report of Joint Legislative Committee on Court Reorganization, 1962, Part II, p. 2; Matter of Williams, 49 Misc.2d 154, 267 N.Y.S.2d 91). Since we conclude that a jury trial is not constitutionally required, respondent's claim to the right of a separate Huntley hearing is without merit. Absent a jury trial all questions of fact, including those dealing with the voluntariness of any statements, are determinable by the same Judge who presides at the...