Richardson v. Colvin
| Decision Date | 25 February 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 8:12-cv-03507-JDA |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
| Parties | Lawrence Marvin Richardson, Plaintiff, v. Carolyn W. Colvin, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
This matter is before the Court for a final Order pursuant to Local Civil Rules 73.02(B)(1) and 83.VII.02, D.S.C.; 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); the parties' consent to jurisdiction by a magistrate judge; and the Honorable David C. Norton's February 10, 2014 Order of reference [Doc. 23]. Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner"), denying Plaintiff's claims for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and supplemental security income ("SSI"). For the reasons set forth below, the decision of the Commissioner is reversed and remanded pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)2 for an award of benefits.
Plaintiff filed applications for DIB [R. 99-102, 103-104] and SSI [R.105-108] in January 27, 2010, alleging an onset of disability date of June 3, 2008. Plaintiff's applications were denied initially on June 9, 2010 [R. 43-47], and upon reconsideration on September 8, 2010 [R. 55-56], by the Social Security Administration ("the Administration"). Plaintiff requested a hearing, and on June 10, 2011, Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Richard L. Vogel held a hearing on Plaintiff's claims [R. 24-38].
On June 23, 2011, the ALJ issued his decision, finding Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act ("the Act"). [R. 7-23.] At Step 1,3 the ALJ found Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Act through June 30, 2010 and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 3, 2008, his alleged onset date. [R. 12, Findings 1 & 2.] At Step 2, the ALJ found Plaintiff had severe impairments of borderline intellectual functioning and asthma. [R. 12, Finding 3.] The ALJ also found that Plaintiff had non-severe impairments of diabetes, hypertension, and sleep apnea. [R. 12-13.] At Step 3, the ALJ determined Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the criteria of one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. [R. 13-15, Finding 4.] The ALJ specifically considered Listings 3.02A and 3.03 with respect to Plaintiff's asthma and Listing 12.05 with respect to Plaintiff's borderline intellectual functioning. [Id.] Additionally, the ALJ concluded that the combined effects of Plaintiff's impairments, both severe and non-severe, were not at least equal in severity to those described in Listings 3.02, 3.03, 3.10, 12.05, 4.00 and 9.08. [R. 15.]
Before addressing Step 4, Plaintiff's ability to perform her past relevant work, the ALJ found Plaintiff retained the following residual functional capacity ("RFC"):
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light4 work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) with no concentrated exposure to lung irritants.
[R. 15, Finding 5.] Based on this RFC, at Step 4, the ALJ determined Plaintiff was unable to perform his past relevant work. [R. 18, Finding 6.] However, based on his age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity, the ALJ determined that there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. [R. 18, Finding 10.] Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that, consistent with Medical-Vocational Rule 202.20, Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined in the Act, from June 3, 2008, through the date of the decision. [R. 18-19, Findings 10, 11.]
Plaintiff requested Appeals Council review of the ALJ's decision but on October 10, 2012, the Council declined review. [R. 1-4.] On December 12, 2012, Plaintiff commenced this action for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). [Doc. 1.]
Plaintiff argues this case should be remanded for an award of benefits. [Id. at 11-12.]
The Commissioner's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla—i.e., the evidence must do more than merely create a suspicion of the existence of a fact and must include such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the conclusion. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966) (citing Woolridge v. Celebrezze, 214 F. Supp. 686, 687 (S.D.W. Va. 1963)) ( ).
Where conflicting evidence "allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the [Commissioner] (or the [Commissioner's] designate, the ALJ)," not on the reviewing court. Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996); see also Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991) (). Thus, it is not within the province of a reviewing court to determine the weight of the evidence, nor is it the court's function to substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner so long as the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Laws, 368 F.2d at 642; Snyder v. Ribicoff, 307 F.2d 518, 520 (4th Cir. 1962).
The reviewing court will reverse the Commissioner's decision on plenary review, however, if the decision applies incorrect law or fails to provide the court with sufficient reasoning to determine that the Commissioner properly applied the law. Myers v. Califano, 611 F.2d 980, 982 (4th Cir. 1980); see also Keeton v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994). Where the Commissioner's decision "is in clear disregard of the overwhelming weight of the evidence, Congress has empowered the courts to modify or reverse the [Commissioner's] decision 'with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.'" Vitek v. Finch, 438 F.2d 1157, 1158 (4th Cir. 1971) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Remand is unnecessary where "the record does not contain substantialevidence to support a decision denying coverage under the correct legal standard and when reopening the record for more evidence would serve no purpose." Breeden v. Weinberger, 493 F.2d 1002, 1012 (4th Cir. 1974).
The court may remand a case to the Commissioner for a rehearing under sentence four or sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Sargent v. Sullivan, 941 F.2d 1207 (4th Cir. 1991) (unpublished table decision). To remand under sentence four, the reviewing court must find either that the Commissioner's decision is not supported by substantial evidence or that the Commissioner incorrectly applied the law relevant to the disability claim. See, e.g., Jackson v. Chater, 99 F.3d 1086, 1090-91 (11th Cir. 1996) (); Brehem v. Harris, 621 F.2d 688, 690 (5th Cir. 1980) (). Where the court cannot discern the basis for the Commissioner's decision, a remand under sentence four may be appropriate to allow the Commissioner to explain the basis for the decision. See Smith v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1176, 1181-82 (4th Cir. 1986) (); Gordon v. Schweiker, 725 F.2d 231, 235 (4th Cir. 1984) (). On remand under sentence four, the ALJ should review the case on a complete record, including any new material evidence. See Smith, 782 F.2d at 1182 (). After a remand under sentence four, the courtenters a final and immediately appealable judgment and then loses jurisdiction. Sargent, 941 F.2d 1207 (citing Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 102 (1991)).
In contrast, sentence six provides:
The court may . . . at any time order additional evidence to be taken before the Commissioner of Social Security, but only upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to...
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