Richardson v. Richardson

• Decision Date: 05 February 2014
• Docket Number: No. 08–12–00076–CV.,08–12–00076–CV.
• Citation: 424 S.W.3d 691
• Parties: Thomas Mark RICHARDSON, Appellant, v. Julie Ana RICHARDSON, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

424 S.W.3d 691

Thomas Mark RICHARDSON, Appellant,

v.Julie Ana RICHARDSON, Appellee.

No. 08–12–00076–CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas,

El Paso.

Feb. 5, 2014.

C.R. Kit Bramblett, El Paso, John P. Mobbs, for Appellant.

Myer J. Lipson, Kristina Voorhies Legan, El Paso, for Appellee.

Before McCLURE, C.J., RIVERA, and RODRIGUEZ, JJ.

OPINION

GUADALUPE RIVERA, Justice.

This is an appeal from a divorce decree. In two issues, Appellant Thomas Mark Richardson (Thomas), argues that the trial court erred by ordering him to pay the separate debt of Appellee Julie Ana Richardson (Julie) and that legally and factually insufficient evidence supported the trial court's calculation of community reimbursement. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In contemplation of their marriage, Thomas and Julie purchased a Palm Harbor mobile home. The parties were married on November 29, 2002. Prior to marriage, Thomas was engaged in farming in Dell City, Texas; the couple continued those activities during their marriage. Thomas incurred a Farm Service Agency (FSA) loan debt and student loan debt before the marriage. During the marriage, Julie signed on a note for the renewal of the FSA loan and Thomas made payments towards his FSA loan debt and paid off his student loan debt. Thomas filed for divorce on February 16, 2011. After settling many issues through mediation, a final divorce hearing was conducted on August 3, 2011. Before any testimony was presented, Thomas's counsel informed the trial court that the only issues before it were financial issues concerning the debt of the parties. The trial court signed the divorce decree on November 17, 2011. No findings of fact and conclusions of law were requested.

In the divorce decree, Thomas was awarded the 2003 Palm Harbor mobile home as his sole and separate property, and ordered to pay the balance due on the promissory note given as part of the purchase price on the mobile home. The decree included a paragraph awarding Julie $55,678.98 and $14,079.23 in attorney's fees “[f]or the purpose of a just and right division of property ....” Thomas filed a motion for new trial, which was denied. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Thomas raises two issues on appeal.¹ In Issue One, he argues that the trial court erred by ordering him to pay the entire mortgage debt on the Palm Harbor mobile home. In Issue Two, he challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support Julie's reimbursement award.

Standard of Review and Applicable Law

We review most appealable issues in a family law case, such as property division incident to divorce or partition, conservatorship, visitation, and child support, under an abuse of discretion standard. Garcia v. Garcia, 170 S.W.3d 644, 648 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2005, no pet.). The test for an abuse of discretion is whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules and principles. Id. at 649;Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex.1985).

In reviewing a trial court's division of a marital estate, it is our duty to presume that the trial court properly exercised its discretion. Chafino v. Chafino, 228 S.W.3d 467, 473 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2007, no pet.); Burney v. Burney, 225 S.W.3d 208, 215 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2006, no pet.). Thus, the party challenging the division bears the burden of demonstrating from the evidence in the record that the trial court's division was so unjust and unfair as to be an abuse of discretion. Chafino, 228 S.W.3d at 472–74;Burney, 225 S.W.3d at 215.

Under the Texas Family Code, a trial court must divide the estate of the parties in a manner that is just and right having due regard for the rights of each party. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 7.001 (West 2006). Although the division must be equitable, a trial court need not divide community property equally. Chafino, 228 S.W.3d at 473;Chacon v. Chacon, 222 S.W.3d 909, 915 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2007, no pet.). A trial court is afforded broad discretion in its division of marital property upon divorce. See Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex.1981).

We employ a two-pronged test in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion and inquire: (1) did the trial court have sufficient information upon which to exercise discretion, and (2) did the trial court abuse its discretion by making a property division that was manifestly unjust or unfair? Chafino, 228 S.W.3d at 472;Burney, 225 S.W.3d at 215;Chacon, 222 S.W.3d at 915. In making the division, the trial court was authorized to consider a variety of factors, which our jurisprudence commonly refers to as the “Murff ” factors. Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 699;Garcia, 170 S.W.3d at 653. Among the variety of “Murff ” factors that the trial court may consider in dividing the marital estate are: (1) the spouses' capacities and abilities; (2) benefits which the party not at fault would have derived from the continuation of the marriage; (3) business opportunities; (4) relative physical conditions; (5) relative financial conditions; (6) disparity of ages; (7) size of separate estates; (8) the nature of the property; and (9) disparity of earning capacity. Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 699. “We defer to the trial court's determination of the credibility of the witnesses' testimony and disturb the trial court's findings only in a case of clear abuse of discretion.” Burney, 225 S.W.3d at 215;see Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 700 (absent an abuse of discretion, the trial court's property division will not be disturbed on appeal).

The legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence are not independent grounds of error, but rather they are factors in our assessment of whether the trial court abused its discretion. Zeifman v. Michels, 212 S.W.3d 582, 587 (Tex.App.-Austin 2006, pet. denied); Boyd v. Boyd, 131 S.W.3d 605, 611 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.). In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, crediting favorable evidence if a reasonable fact finder could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless a reasonable fact finder could not. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex.2005). The decisive test for legal sufficiency is whether the evidence at trial would allow reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review. Id. In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we consider and weigh all of the evidence in the record, and we may overturn a judgmentonly if it is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.1986).

If we find reversible error that materially affects the trial court's “just and right” division of the property, we must remand the entire community estate for a new division. See Jacobs v. Jacobs, 687 S.W.2d 731, 732 (Tex.1985). As in this case, when the trial court does not make findings of fact and conclusions of law, we must presume the trial court made all the findings necessary to support the judgment. Chafino, 228 S.W.3d at 472;Sprick v. Sprick, 25 S.W.3d 7, 11 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1999, pet. denied); see also Gainous v. Gainous, 219 S.W.3d 97, 103 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (where a trial court does not enter findings of fact or conclusions of law, we must draw every inference supported by the record in favor of the trial court's judgment). If the trial court's implied findings are supported by the evidence, we are required to uphold the judgment on any theory of the law applicable to the case. Garcia, 170 S.W.3d at 648.

THE 2003 PALM HARBOR MORTGAGE DEBT

In Issue One, Thomas contends the trial court erred in ordering him to pay the entire mortgage loan debt on the mobile home awarded to him as his separate property in the divorce decree because a portion of the loan was Julie's separate property debt prior to the marriage. Thomas urges that we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand for a new division of the community estate because the trial court committed reversible error in ordering him to pay this debt. Julie responds that the trial court did not err in characterizing the mobile home and the debt associated with it as community property because Thomas failed to rebut the community property presumption.

The Community Property Presumption

In Texas, property possessed by either spouse during or on dissolution of marriage is presumed to be community property, absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. SeeTex. Fam.Code Ann. § 3.003 (West 2006); Warriner v. Warriner, 394 S.W.3d 240, 247 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2012, no pet.). Clear and convincing evidence is the proof that produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264 (Tex.2002); Viera v. Viera, 331 S.W.3d 195, 206 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2011, no pet.).

The community property presumption applies to both assets and liabilities. Viera, 331 S.W.3d at 204. Therefore, there is a presumption that debt acquired by either spouse during marriage was procured on the basis of community credit. Sprick, 25 S.W.3d at 17,citing Wierzchula v. Wierzchula, 623 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ). An asset purchased on borrowed funds is presumptively community in character, and borrowed funds that are utilized for living expenses should be treated the same. Sprick, 25 S.W.3d at 17.

Property owned or claimed by a spouse before marriage or acquired after marriage by gift, devise, or descent is that spouse's separate property. Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 15; Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 3.001(1)(2) (West 2006). As to separate property, the trial court is without authority to divest a spouse of it. Burney, 225 S.W.3d at 219;see Cameron v. Cameron, 641 S.W.2d 210, 215–16 (Tex.1982); Langston v. Langston, 82 S.W.3d 686, 688 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2002, no pet.) (trial court may not divest a spouse of separate...