Richardson v. State

Decision Date01 February 1982
Docket NumberNo. 05-81-00300-CR,05-81-00300-CR
Citation629 S.W.2d 164
PartiesCharles Gregory RICHARDSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Nikki DeShazo, Dallas, for appellant.

R. Kristin Weaver, Asst. Dist. Atty., Dallas, for appellee.

Before ROBERTSON, STEPHENS and VANCE, JJ.

VANCE, Justice.

Appeal is from a conviction of burglary of a vehicle, enhanced, with punishment assessed at life. Appellant advances seven grounds of error; we address only his contention that the trial court erred in failing to set aside the indictment under the Speedy Trial Act. We agree, and accordingly reverse with instructions to dismiss.

This case was called for trial on February 20, 1980, at which time the appellant presented his motion to set aside the indictment under Tex.Code Crim.Pro.Ann. art. 32A.02 (Vernon Supp.1982). A hearing on said motion was held and at the conclusion of the hearing the court denied the motion.

Article 32A.02 (Speedy Trial Act) provides in part:

Section 1. A court shall grant a motion to set aside an indictment, ... if the state is not ready for trial within:

(1) 120 days of the commencement of a criminal action if the defendant is accused of a felony;

Section 2. (a) ... a criminal action commences for purposes of this article when an indictment ... against the defendant is filed in court, unless prior to the filing the defendant is either detained in custody or released on bail or personal bond to answer for the same offense or any other offense arising out of the same transaction, in which event the criminal action commences when he is arrested. (Emphasis supplied).

The record shows that the appellant was arrested for the transaction out of which the instant case arose on July 3, 1978. The indictment in this case, charging the appellant with the offense of burglary of a vehicle, was returned on November 28, 1979, some 512 days after the criminal action commenced on July 3, 1978. At the hearing on the motion to set aside the indictment the state did not announce that it had been ready within 120 days after July 3, 1978, as required. Barfield v. State, 586 S.W.2d 538 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). Further, the state offered no evidence to show why it was not ready within the 120 days so as to bring it within any of the exceptions under Section 4 of Art. 32A.02, supra, that would have excluded periods of time where the State was required to be ready. Pate v. State, 592 S.W.2d 620 (Tex.Cr.App.1980).

The State, in effect, argues that the instant case is "reindictment" of ...

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24 cases
  • Hill v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 8 Abril 1987
    ...readiness will not carry over from the first to the second indictment. Hill cites this Court's opinion of Richardson v. State, 629 S.W.2d 164, 165 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1982, pet. ref'd) in support of this In Richardson v. State, the original indictment alleged the offense of burglary of a vehi......
  • McGlothlin v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 13 Marzo 1986
    ...proof, even though they involve the same complaining witness and arise from the same transaction. See Richardson v. State, 629 S.W.2d 164, 165 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1982, pet. ref'd). See also Perez v. State, 678 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (approving Richardson The two indictments involv......
  • Nowell v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • 12 Noviembre 1986
    ...5 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1983, no pet.); Wilson v. State, 633 S.W.2d 952 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1982, no pet.); Richardson v. State, 629 S.W.2d 164 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1982, pet. ref'd). It is not necessary to make a new announcement of ready every time the defendant moves to dismiss. Since we presum......
  • Santibanez v. State
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • 14 Mayo 1986
    ...v. State, 678 S.W.2d 85 (Tex.Cr.App.1984); Durrough v. State, 620 S.W.2d 134 (Tex.Cr.App.1981). Cf., however, Richardson v. State, 629 S.W.2d 164 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1982). Because the Speedy Trial Act addresses itself to prosecutorial delay, rather than to the judicial process as a whole, an......
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