Richio v. Miami-Dade County

• Decision Date: 04 June 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00CV1406.,00CV1406.
• Citation: 163 F.Supp.2d 1352
• Parties: Isel RICHIO, Plaintiff, v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

163 F.Supp.2d 1352

Isel RICHIO, Plaintiff, v. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, Defendant.

No. 00CV1406.

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

June 4, 2001.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Leslie Holland, Coral Gables, FL, for plaintiff.

William X. Candela, Dade County Attorney's Office, Miami, FL, for defendant.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

UNGARO-BENAGES, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed February 6, 2001.

THE COURT has considered the Motion, the pertinent portions of the record, and is otherwise fully advised in the premises. Plaintiff filed her Complaint on April 20, 2000 alleging a claim for disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA" or "the Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. Defendant now moves for summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff is not disabled as defined by the ADA, the County granted her request for an accommodation and she was not constructively discharged. For the following reasons, Defendant's motion will be granted.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is authorized only when the moving party meets its burden of demonstrating that "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). The Adickes Court explained that when assessing whether the movant has met this burden, the court should view the evidence and all factual inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Adickes, 398 U.S. at 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598; Poole v. Country Club of Columbus, Inc., 129 F.3d 551, 553 (11th Cir.1997) (citing Adickes).

The party opposing the motion may not simply rest upon mere allegations or denials of the pleadings; after the moving party has met its burden of coming forward with proof of the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving party must make a sufficient showing to establish the existence of an essential element to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933 (11th Cir.1989).

If the record presents factual issues, the Court must not decide them; it must deny the motion and proceed to trial. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 983, 991 (5th Cir.1981). Summary judgment may be inappropriate even where the parties agree on the basic facts, but disagree about the inferences that should be drawn from these facts. See Lighting Fixture & Elec. Supply Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 420 F.2d 1211, 1213 (5th Cir.1969). If reasonable minds might differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts then the Court should deny summary judgment. See Impossible Electronic Techniques, Inc. v. Wackenhut Protective Sys., Inc., 669 F.2d 1026, 1031 (5th Cir.1982). See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ("[T]he dispute about a material fact is `genuine,' ... if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.").

Moreover, the party opposing a motion for summary judgment need not respond to it with evidence unless and until the movant has properly supported the motion with sufficient evidence. See Adickes, 398 U.S. at 160, 90 S.Ct. 1598. The moving party must demonstrate that the facts underlying all the relevant legal questions raised by the pleadings or otherwise are not in dispute, or else summary judgment will be denied notwithstanding that the non-moving party has introduced no evidence whatsoever. See Brunswick Corp. v. Vineberg, 370 F.2d 605, 611-12 (5th Cir.1967). The Court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

BACKGROUND

The following material facts are viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the non-movant herein.¹

In January 1993, Plaintiff was hired as a Consumer Protection Inspector in Miami Dade County's Consumer Services Department ("CSD") Call Center. The CSD is responsible for regulating and overseeing certain industries throughout the County. Def.'s Stmt. of Material Facts at 1 ("Def.'s Stmt."). Plaintiff's duties in the Call Center included receiving and logging customer complaints. She worked Monday through Friday from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. She reported directly to Ray Stewart who reported to Mario Goderich, the director of the Consumer Protection Division. Id. at 2.

On May 8, 1998, Plaintiff's psychotherapist Diana de Cardenas wrote the CSD a letter that stated: "Please excuse Isel Richio from work due to emotional problems. She will be under my care for the next 60 days. Thank you for your time and cooperation. If I can be of further assistance to you, please don't hesitate to call me." Def.'s Ex. 1. On the same day Plaintiff filled out the Consumer Services Department Metro-Dade County Leave of Absence Application Form. In question 2 entitled "Reason for the request. Check one reason and then explain below:" Plaintiff checked the box stating: "Family Leave as provided by Ordinance." In the same section, she also checked the box for: "Serious personal health condition which makes me unable to perform the functions of my position (Certification by health care provider will be required)." Plaintiff did not write anything in the "Explanation" section. Def.'s Ex. 2. However, according to her deposition testimony, Plaintiff had become depressed after her home was burned. Pla.'s Depo. at 34.

On May 14, 1998, Liliana Seiglie, the departmental personnel officer, wrote Plaintiff a letter stating in pertinent part:

Please be informed that you have been placed on a Medical Leave of Absence effective May 11, 1998 through July 10, 1998 according to the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA). FMLA entitles you to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid or paid leave per calender year for specific family or personal medical reasons, with the guarantee of job protection. Since you are suffering an unforeseeable medical emergency that qualifies under FMLA, we are obliged by law to place you on a Leave of Absence.

Def.'s Ex. 3.

On June 24, 1998, de Cardenas sent the CSD another letter that stated: "Please excuse Isel Richio from work due to emotional problems. She will be under my care until August 6, 1998. Thank you for your time and cooperation. If I can be of further assistance to you, please don't hesitate to call me." Def.'s Ex. 4. On the following day, de Cardenas sent another letter to the CSD stating: "Please excuse Isel Richio from work because she is still experiencing emotional problems. She will be under my care until September 30, 1998, where she may return to work. Thank you for your time and cooperation. If I can be of further assistance to you, please don't hesitate to call me." Pla.'s Ex. A. On the same day, Plaintiff sent a letter to Mario Goderich stating: "This is to inform you that as per my physician's orders, I need to extend my Leave of Absence until September 30, 1998. I am presently on medication and going to therapy." Def.'s Ex. 5.

On July 10, 1998, CSD Director Sheila Rushton sent Plaintiff a letter explaining:

FMLA entitles you to take twelve weeks of unpaid or paid leave per calendar year for specific family or personal medical reason. You are currently on FMLA until July 10, 1998. Please be advised that a 30 day extension has been approved until August 9, 1998 to complete your twelve weeks of FMLA.

Your requested leave from August 10 through September 30 is being denied until further information is obtained from your doctor. Based on your current job description, your doctor will be asked to provide us with more information on your medical limitations. You may be required to complete a Fitness for Duty evaluation by a County appointed doctor prior to our reevaluation of your request.

Def.'s Ex. 6.²

On August 12, 1998, Plaintiff reported to work, but was sent home early because her blood pressure was very high. Pla.'s Depo. at 46-49. When Plaintiff returned to work the next day, she was placed in a clerical position in the same department. Id. at 46. While in this position, Plaintiff was allowed to leave to go to the doctor or home if she did not feel well. Id. at 46, 49. Plaintiff remained in the clerical position until the county doctor provided Defendant with the results of Plaintiff's fitness for duty report on October 9, 1998. Id. at 49-51.³ The county doctor's evaluation stated in pertinent part:

Dr. Haefner saw her, felt she had major depression signal episode moderate. He recommended for that the time being she not return to work and that the determination of her readiness for her returning to work be made by a therapist who she is being followed. So at this time I will make her unfit until she is cleared to return to work by her private physician.

Def.'s Ex. 6a. On October 9, 1998, CSD Director Sheila Rushton sent Plaintiff a letter notifying her she been placed on leave. The letter stated in pertinent part:

We are in receipt of your Fitness for Duty physical examination. Based upon the medical recommendation of the County appointed doctor, you have been placed on a Leave of Absence without pay due to medical reasons until November 15, 1998. Please be advised that you will be required to submit medical progress reports from your attending physician every two weeks.

Def.'s Ex. 7.

On October 21, 1998, de Cardenas wrote a letter to Mario Goderich stating:

I am writing this letter in behalf of Iselle Richio, who is...