Ricketts v. City of New York

• Decision Date: 18 March 1999
• Citation: 688 N.Y.S.2d 418
• Parties: 1999 N.Y. Slip Op. 99,173 Hector B. RICKETTS et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF NEW YORK et al., Defendants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 418

688 N.Y.S.2d 418

1999 N.Y. Slip Op. 99,173

Hector B. RICKETTS et al., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF NEW YORK et al., Defendants.

Supreme Court, New York County.

March 18, 1999.

Institute for Justice, Washington, D.C. (William H. Mellor, Clint Bolick, Nicole S. Garnett and Deborah Simpson of counsel), and Shapiro & Lane, L.L.P., Mamaroneck (J. Mark Lane of counsel), for plaintiffs.

Michael D. Hess, Corporation Counsel (Dana Beberman of counsel), for City of New York and others, defendants.

Richard M. Weinberg, New York City (Gail R. Zweig of counsel), for Council of City of New York, defendant.

Eliot Spitzer, Attorney-General, for State of New York and others, defendants.

LOUIS B. YORK, J.

This is an action seeking to nullify local legislation giving the City of New York authority for the granting of franchises for the operation of commuter van services in the City of New York. For a brief history of the development of commuter van services in New York City and the legislation granting the City of New York authority over the operation see the decision in Giuliani v. Council of the City of New York, --- Misc.2d ----, 688 N.Y.S.2d 413 (1999).

Plaintiffs are operators of existing commuter services who have been denied their requests to expand operations or are seeking to obtain authorizations for a new commuter van service and the organization representing the interests of commuter van operators.

In this action, which raises several federal and state constitutional claims, the plaintiffs seek summary judgment on the third and fourth causes of action. The City Council cross-moves for partial summary judgment dismissing the first, second, third and fourth causes of action. The other City defendants also cross-move for partial summary judgment against the first through fourth causes of action

The first cause of action alleges a denial of due process against all defendants in that the state and local legislation prohibits community vans from operating on bus routes and prohibits the picking up of customers except by pre-arrangement. The second cause of action alleges a violation of constitutional rights by allowing the applications for commuter van services to be denied without an explanation or a record for review or merely not responding to the application within 180 days, all of which, once again alleges plaintiff, amount to a deprivation of the plaintiff's right to earn a living. The third cause of action directed against the City defendants seeks to nullify Local Law 115 (1993). It claims that this legislation which does not provide for the permanent authorizations accorded by the State to existing commuter van services (the "grandfather authorizations") is therefore invalid as inconsistent with State law and deprives the owners of these operating services of their constitutional right to liberty by depriving them of the right to earn a living. In addition, they argue that the State enabling legislation transferring regulatory authority from a mayoral designated agency is violated by Local Law 115 which gives the final authority of approval to the City Council, a local legislative body rather than a city agency. The plaintiffs also claim that the local law does not guarantee that the approval process will be completed within 180 days as is required by the enabling Act (N.Y. Transit L. § 80[a] ). The fourth cause of action against the City defendants is directed against Local Law 83 (1997) imposing a moratorium on the granting of new applications. That law has expired and has not been renewed. Therefore, this branch of the motion is denied as moot.

The part of the third cause of action directed against the provision requiring that any decision by the Taxi and Limousine Commission involving approval of an application to establish or extend a franchise is subject to approval by the City Council has been nullified by the decision in Giuliani v. The Council of the City of New York, supra. The City defendants in this action had a full and fair opportunity to litigate this issue. They are estopped from relitigating it in this action. B.R. Dewitt v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596, 225 N.E.2d 195 (1967). The remaining issues boil down to (1) whether the grandfather authorization in the local law should be struck down because it is inconsistent with the permanent status that was granted under the state law and deprives the defendants of their constitutional right to earn a living; and (2) whether the local law by allowing a failure to make a decision of a request by a franchise within 180 days is a denial of an application is inconsistent with the State law requirement of a decision within 180 days; and (3) whether the entire local law must fall because its invalid provisions cannot be severed from the rest of the statute. ¹

A local law is clothed with the presumption of constitutionality. An attack on such a law carries a heavy burden. 41 Kew Gardens Road Associates v. Tyburski, 70 N.Y.2d 325, 520 N.Y.S.2d 544, 514 N.E.2d 1114 (1987). To overcome this heavy burden, movant must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that there is no rational relationship between the legislation and the public interest, even in the absence of relevant legislative findings. Town of North Hempstead v. Exxon Corp., 53 N.Y.2d 747, 439 N.Y.S.2d 342, 421 N.E.2d 834 (1981).

The exceedingly strong presumption of constitutionality applies not only to enactments of the legislature but to ordinances of municipalities as well. While this presumption is rebuttable, unconstitutionality must be demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt and only as a last resort should courts strike down legislation on the ground of unconstitutionality. The ordinance may not be arbitrary. It must be reasonably related to some manifest evil which however need only be reasonably apprehended. It is also presumed that the legislative body investigated and found the existence of a situation showing or indicating the need for or desirability of the ordinance, and, if any stated facts known to be assumed, justifies the disputed measure this Court's power of inquiry ends.

Lighthouse Shores, Inc. v. Town of Islip, 41 N.Y.2d 7, 11-12, 390 N.Y.S.2d 827, 359 N.E.2d 337 (1976). This Court cannot make its determination as to the validity of the routes that vans are allowed to operate in or whether the vans can pick customers up at random or must pick up and deposit them at pre-arranged destinations, even though the Court may think it unwise or believe there is a better way to achieve the City's goals. The City of New York has been granted as part of its police powers the authority to regulate the public streets. VTL § 1640(a)(5); Bakery Salvage Corp. v. City of Lackawanna, 24 N.Y.2d 643, 301 N.Y.S.2d 581, 249 N.E.2d 438 (1969). In its newly granted power allowing the City to regulate van services under Local Law 115, the City has exercised its police power to regulate traffic in the public streets to prohibit commuter vans from traveling on certain routes and to prohibit them from picking up and depositing passengers except at their homes and at non bus route stops. This Court is not in a position to determine either the wisdom or the alternatives. While I may believe there is a better way to accomplish its ends I cannot determine beyond a reasonable doubt that there is no rational relationship between these regulations and the City's police power to regulate traffic in the general public interest.

Nor can I say that the City's failure to continue the permanent status that the franchises had under State control violates State law. The grandfather clause in the enabling statute merely requires those commuter van franchises given permanent licenses by the State to continue to operate through the transition period. It clearly evinces the State's intention for the City to chart its own licensing policy undisturbed by the prior licensing policy of the State.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law ... such local law or ordinance shall ... (iii) make provisions for the continuation of operating authority for van services and other common carriers of passengers approved by the state Commissioner of Transportation pending review operations by the local law or ordinance adopted pursuant to this legislation. [Underscoring supplied.]

It is obvious that this legislation permits the City of New York to limit the previous permanent licenses to operate that were granted by the State. This was the understanding of the State legislators most directly involved in the enactment of the legislation.

The criteria would not have to conform to the criteria in Transportation law section 153 [temporary licenses] and 1514 [permanent licenses] currently applicable to the grant by SDOT [State Department of Transportation] (bracketed material supplied).

Senator Goodman,...