Riddick v. Riddick

• Citation: 906 So.2d 813
• Decision Date: 14 December 2004
• Docket Number: No. 2003-CA-00323-COA.,2003-CA-00323-COA.
• Parties: Roger Cole RIDDICK, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Patricia Waddell RIDDICK, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Mississippi

906 So.2d 813

Roger Cole RIDDICK, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Patricia Waddell RIDDICK, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

No. 2003-CA-00323-COA.

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

December 14, 2004.

J. Edward Rainer, Brandon, attorney for appellant.

Paul E. Rogers, Jackson, attorney for appellee.

EN BANC.

CHANDLER, J., for the Court.

ISSUES I THROUGH VI

¶ 1. Patricia Waddell Riddick Koestler filed a motion to increase child support payments. She also sought to invalidate the part of her marital dissolution agreement that reduced child support payments when the children began college as well as the portion of the agreement which allowed her former husband to cease making mortgage payments on the former marital home upon her remarriage. She charged her former husband with contempt for refusing to pay medical bills and refusing to pay their daughter's college tuition. Finally, she asked the court to order her former husband to make the car payments on their daughter's car. Her former husband, Roger Cole Riddick, counter-claimed, seeking to hold Patricia in contempt for alienating their children from him and for violating the morals clause of their marital dissolution agreement. He also sought custody of their minor children.

¶ 2. The chancellor granted Patricia Riddick Koestler's motion to increase child support payments, held that the agreement for Roger Riddick to pay reduced child support was void against public policy, ordered Roger to make the automobile payments on their daughter's car, and held Roger Riddick in contempt for not paying the daughter's tuition but declined to hold him in contempt for not paying the medical bills. The court denied Patricia's request to order Roger to continue to make mortgage payments after Patricia's remarriage, finding the contract to be a non-modifiable provision of the parties' property agreement. The chancellor denied Roger's requests to hold Patricia in contempt and denied Roger's request to change custody. Roger appeals, raising the following issues:

I. WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING ROGER TO PAY AN INCREASE IN CHILD SUPPORT OF TWENTY-FIVE PERCENT

II. WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARITAL DISSOLUTION AGREEMENT PROVISION REGARDING COLLEGE TO VIOLATE PUBLIC POLICY

III. WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO HOLD PATRICIA IN CONTEMPT FOR ALLEGEDLY ALIENATING ROGER FROM HIS CHILDREN

IV. WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO HOLD PATRICIA IN CONTEMPT FOR VIOLATING THE MORALS CLAUSE OF THE MARITAL DISSOLUTION AGREEMENT

V. WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING ROGER IN

CONTEMPT FOR FAILING TO PAY COLLEGE EXPENSES

VI. WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING ROGER TO MAKE PAYMENTS ON A NEW AUTOMOBILE WHEN HEATHER REFUSED TO ADHERE TO THE TERMS FOR OBTAINING A NEW VEHICLE

VII. WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PATRICIA'S ATTORNEY'S FEES AND DENYING ROGER'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES.

¶ 3. Patricia cross-appeals, raising the following issue:

I. WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ROGER'S OBLIGATION TO MAKE MORTGAGE PAYMENTS ON THE FORMER MARITAL HOME IS INTERPRETED TO CONSTITUTE A NON-MODIFIABLE PROPERTY SETTLEMENT PROVISION OF THE PARTIES' MARITAL DISSOLUTION AGREEMENT

¶ 4. We find reversible error with regards to issues I, II and V and reverse and render the chancellor's decision. We reverse and remand with regards to issue VI. We affirm with regards to issues III, IV, and VII and on cross-appeal.

FACTS

¶ 5. Roger Cole Riddick and Patricia Waddell Riddick Koestler were divorced on May 13, 1999, in the Chancery Court of Rankin County. The parties had three minor children, Jason Allen Riddick, born October 9, 1979¹; Heather Renee Riddick, born March 6, 1983; and Stephen Tyler Riddick, born August 2, 1989. The court granted both parties joint legal custody.

¶ 6. From the time of the divorce until December 2001, Patricia, Heather, and Stephen were living in the former marital home. Roger was to make payments on the house. Patricia was to have exclusive use, occupancy, possession, and control of the house until Stephen reaches the age of twenty-one, or Patricia remarries, whichever comes first.

¶ 7. In August, 2001, Patricia moved into a new home in Clinton, which cost $166,000. She filed a motion for modification on September 10, 2001, where she asked for increased child support. She also claimed that the provisions of the original marital dissolution agreement were ambiguous and sought to have these provisions modified.

¶ 8. Roger counter-claimed, requesting that the court hold Patricia in contempt for violating provisions of the marital dissolution agreement. He alleged that Patricia intentionally caused an estrangement with Heather and that she attempted to do the same with Stephen. Roger alleged that Patricia failed to keep Roger informed of his children's educational pursuits and that she blocked Roger's access to Heather's school and medical records. He sought an order of contempt due to Patricia's violations of the morals clause of the marital dissolution agreement. He sought custody of Stephen on the grounds that Stephen's grades had significantly declined after Patricia's move to Clinton.²

¶ 9. On July 16, 2002, Patricia filed motions for contempt. She claimed that Roger failed to pay medical bills, failed to provide her with an explanation of benefits forms from the insurance company, and refused to pay for Heather's college expenses.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 10. The chancellor issued his opinion denying Roger's request for a change of Stephen's custody. He found that Patricia's move was a "material change in circumstances," but did not find any proof that Stephen's welfare was adversely affected.

¶ 11. On Patricia's motion to increase child support, the chancellor increased Roger's child support obligation by twenty-five percent, from $1,000 per month to $1,250 per month for each child, retroactive to September, 2001. This increase in child support was based on the chancellor's "judicial notice of the increased needs, after almost three and one-half years, of children ages nineteen and thirteen. This holding was also based on an increase of Roger's monthly net income of twenty-eight percent. Moreover, the evidence showed their needs to have increased." The chancellor ordered that the child support shall continue until Heather reaches age twenty-one or is otherwise emancipated.

¶ 12. The original marital dissolution agreement provided that Roger would not owe Patricia child support during any month that Heather or Stephen was enrolled in college and not living in Patricia's house. If a child attended college but lived with Patricia, Roger's child support would decrease to $500 per month. Patricia believed that this provision of the marital dissolution was contrary to law and requested the chancellor to declare that the provision violated public policy. The chancellor agreed and ordered Roger to pay Patricia $1,250 per month for Heather's support regardless of whether she is attending college and regardless of whether she lives full-time with Patricia. The chancellor reasoned that the obligation to pay child support "is not eliminated just because a child undertakes a post-secondary education, even if the child does not live full-time in the home of the custodial parent during such schooling."

¶ 13. The court denied Roger's motion for contempt for Patricia's allowing her then-boyfriend and current husband to stay overnight with Patricia. The chancellor reasoned that any violation did not adversely affect the children. The chancellor also noted that Roger exposed Stephen to the same situation when Stephen, Roger, and his then-girlfriend, currently his wife, all stayed in the same condominium while on vacation. The chancellor also declined to hold Patricia in contempt for allegedly alienating the children from Roger.

¶ 14. The chancellor required Roger to buy a new car for Heather. In 2000, Roger agreed to buy Heather a 2000 Oldsmobile Alero and make payments on the car if Heather maintained good grades in college, obtained a part time job, and agreed to visit Roger more often. Heather did not fulfill her end of the bargain, but the chancellor ordered Roger to pay for the new vehicle on the grounds that Roger is not allowed to contract away his obligation to provide a reasonable means of transportation for Heather.

¶ 15. Despite evidence showing that Patricia failed to provide Roger with any information regarding Heather's college, other than sending him the bills for tuition and her subsequent citation for contempt, the chancellor found Roger to be in contempt and ordered him to pay Heather's educational expenses. The chancellor did not, however, find Roger to be held in willful contempt. The chancellor also declined to hold Roger in contempt for failing to pay medical expenses.

ANALYSIS

I. WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING ROGER TO PAY AN INCREASE IN CHILD SUPPORT OF TWENTY-FIVE PERCENT

¶ 16. The chancellor ordered a twenty-five percent increase in Roger's child support payments, from $1,000 per month to $1,250 per month, per child. When a petitioner is seeking a financial modification, she must show a material change in circumstances. Elements that may be considered include (1) increased needs caused by advanced age and maturity of the children (2) increase in expenses, and (3) inflation factor (sic). Other factors include (4) the relative financial condition and earning capacity of the parties, (5) the health and special needs of the child, both physical and psychological, (6) the health and special medical needs of the parents, both physical and psychological, (7) the necessary living expenses of the father, (8) the estimated amount of income taxes the respective parties must pay on their incomes, (9) the free use of a residence, furnishings, and automobile and (10) such other facts and circumstances that bear on the support subject shown by the evidence. Lawrence v. Lawrence, 574 So.2d 1376, 1382 (Miss.1991). Roger believes that ...