Ridenour v. Ridenour
Decision Date | 02 June 1995 |
Docket Number | No. 15622,15622 |
Citation | 120 N.M. 352,901 P.2d 770,1995 NMCA 72 |
Parties | , 64 USLW 2163 Larry RIDENOUR and Hiltrud Ridenour, Petitioners-Appellees, v. Catherine C. RIDENOUR, Respondent-Appellant. |
Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Mother appeals the trial court's Order on Petition for Grandparental Visitation. The issues raised on appeal are: (1) whether the Grandparent's Visitation Privileges Act (GVA), NMSA 1978, §§ 40-9-1 to -4 (Repl.Pamp.1994), is constitutional as applied herein; and (2) whether the amount of visitation granted is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.
Grandparents are the paternal grandparents of Child. Parents (Mother and Father) of Child were divorced in July of 1989. Pursuant to a November 29, 1989, stipulated order, Mother and Father entered into a joint custody arrangement, with Mother providing the primary residence for Child. The stipulated order provided that Child, prior to starting school, had eight days visitation per month with Father--with the proviso that such visitation be in the company of one of the Grandparents. Following the divorce, Mother and Child lived with Grandparents for approximately six months.
Further, after Parents' divorce, Father had very little contact with either Child or Grandparents. After Child started school in September 1992, no new time-sharing plan was discussed or developed by the Parents. Father continued to have very little contact with either Child or Grandparents. After starting school in September 1992, Child spent two to four days a month with Grandparents.
On December 27, 1993, the relationship between Mother and Grandparents deteriorated. Mother accused Grandmother of sexual abuse, and Grandparents accused Mother of abandonment, lack of supervision, substance abuse, and other misbehavior. Mother terminated all contact between Child and Grandparents. Grandparents subsequently filed a Petition for Grandparental Visitation. The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the Order on Petition for Grandparental Visitation from which Mother appeals.
The applicable statute, Section 40-9-2(A)-(F) provides in pertinent part that grandparents may file a visitation petition when one of the following threshold requirements has been met: the filing of a judgment of dissolution of marriage, legal separation, or the existence of a parent-child relationship pursuant to the Uniform Parentage Act; one or both parents are deceased; a child under six years resided with a grandparent at least three months; a child over six years resided with a grandparent at least six months; or adoption proceedings are involved.
Once one of the foregoing threshold requirements is met, the trial court shall assess the best interests of the child; the prior interaction between the child and grandparent, the prior interaction and present relationship between the grandparent and each parent of the child, and the time-sharing or visitation arrangements that were in place prior to the filing of the petition. See § 40-9-2(G)(1)-(5).
Mother argues that enforcement of the GVA is an unconstitutional intrusion of Mother's right to raise Child as she sees fit because there has not been any threshold showing of harm to Child requiring the exercise of the State's parens patriae protective mode. Clearly, case law recognizes parents' fundamental constitutional right to raise their children. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1394-95, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) (); Griffin v. Strong, 983 F.2d 1544, 1547 (10th Cir.1993) ( ); Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 113 N.M. 57, 64, 823 P.2d 299, 306 (1991) ( )(quoting Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 595 (D.C.Cir.1983)); Oldfield v. Benavidez, 116 N.M. 785, 790, 867 P.2d 1167, 1172 (1994) ( ).
However, case law also establishes that parents' right to raise their children is not beyond regulation in the public interest. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386, 98 S.Ct. 673, 681, 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1978) ( ); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 64 S.Ct. 438, 442, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944). New Mexico's appellate courts have consistently recognized the State's parens patriae power to act in the best interests of the children. See, e.g., Oldfield, 116 N.M. at 791, 867 P.2d at 1173 ( ); In re Adoption of Francisco A., 116 N.M. 708, 713, 866 P.2d 1175, 1180 (Ct.App.1993) ( ); Rhinehart v. Nowlin, 111 N.M. 319, 325, 805 P.2d 88, 94 (Ct.App.1990) ( ). Similarly, out-of-state courts have also recognized a state's parens patriae power to act when merited by a child's best interests. See, e.g., Spradling v. Harris, 13 Kan.App.2d 595, 778 P.2d 365, 367 (1989) ( ); Roberts v. Ward, 126 N.H. 388, 493 A.2d 478, 481 (1985) ( ). See generally Annotation, Grandparents' Visitation Rights, 90 A.L.R.3d 222, 232 (1979).
An acknowledgment that parents' right to raise their children is not beyond regulation accommodates and balances the interests of the grandparents, the state, and the children. For example, apart from parents' fundamental rights, case law also recognizes the rights of extended family members. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977) ( ); see also Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203, 209 (Mo.1993) (en banc) (); Lockhart v. Lockhart, 603 N.E.2d 864, 866 (Ind.Ct.App.1992) ( ); People ex rel. Sibley v. Sheppard, 54 N.Y.2d 320, 326-27, 445 N.Y.S.2d 420, 423, 429 N.E.2d 1049, 1052 (1981) ( ).
In addition, balanced against the parents' right to raise their children are the best interests and rights of the children. New Mexico case law establishes that parents' rights are secondary to the best interests and welfare of the children. See In re Adoption of J.J.B., 119 N.M. 638, ----, 894 P.2d 994, 1008 (1995) [ ]() ; Oldfield, 116 N.M. at 790, 867 P.2d at 1172 (); In re Adoption of Francisco A., 116 N.M. at 714, 866 P.2d at 1181 (); In re Samantha D., 106 N.M. 184, 186, 740 P.2d 1168, 1170 (Ct.App.) (any right of the parents is secondary to the best interests and welfare of the children), cert. denied, 106 N.M. 174, 740 P.2d 1158 (1987); see also Roberts, 493 A.2d at 481 ( ).
Case law also recognizes the state's compelling interests in the welfare of its children. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766, 102 S.Ct. at 1401-02 ( ); Oldfield, 116 N.M. at 791, 867 P.2d at 1173 ( ); Sketo v. Brown, 559 So.2d 381, 382 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990) (...
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