Rieger v. Wat Buddhawararam of Denver, Inc.
| Decision Date | 21 November 2013 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 12CA1875 |
| Citation | 338 P.3d 404 |
| Parties | Martin RIEGER, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. WAT BUDDHAWARARAM OF DENVER, INC., Defendant–Appellee. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Affirmed. City and County of Denver District Court No. 11CV4480, Honorable Herbert L. Stern, III, Judge
Mark A. Simon, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff–Appellant.
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, Colin C. Campbell, Joleen J. Mossoni Polk, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant–Appellee.
Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE LOEB
¶ 1 In this premises liability case, plaintiff, Martin Rieger, appeals the district court's summary judgment in favor of defendant, Wat Buddhawararam (the Temple). We affirm.
¶ 2 The following facts are undisputed from the district court record.
¶ 3 On July 26, 2010, Rieger was helping his friend and neighbor, Chris Margotta, trim a large tree on the Temple's property. Rieger and Margotta had agreed that Rieger would not be paid for his help and would do it as volunteer work. Margotta, whose wife was a member of the Temple, was also a volunteer and had arranged a group of men, including Rieger, to help with the project. Margotta provided all the tools, including chainsaws, ladders, and shears. Rieger had no interaction with the Temple prior to volunteering on the day he was injured. Margotta acted as the leader of the project, although for a part of the project, a group of monks from the Temple were observing. Late in the day, Rieger was holding the ladder for Margotta while Margotta was cutting branches from the tree. Margotta cut a branch, which fell onto Rieger, causing him serious injuries.
¶ 4 Rieger filed a complaint against the Temple, and the Temple designated Margotta as a nonparty at fault. Rieger then filed an amended complaint naming Margotta as a defendant but subsequently voluntarily dismissed him from the case, acknowledging that Margotta was immune from liability under the Volunteer Service Act, § 13–21–115.5, C.R.S.2013, and the Federal Volunteer Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14501. However, Rieger maintained that the Temple was still vicariously liable for Margotta's negligence.
¶ 5 After discovery, the Temple filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and that, as a matter of law, the Temple was not liable for Rieger's injuries under the Colorado Premises Liability Act (CPLA), section 13–21–115, C.R.S.2013. Although Rieger argued, as he does on appeal, that the monks supervised the tree trimming, Rieger conceded and testified in his deposition that when the monks asked the volunteers to cut more branches, he voiced his objections to Margotta a number of times because he believed that they did not have the proper equipment to handle the heavier branches. Rieger also testified that Margotta agreed with his objections but “did not want to let the monks down,” and when Margotta decided he was willing to continue the work, Rieger chose “to stand by [Margotta and] was going to hang with him.” Rieger also argued he was an invitee, not a licensee for purposes of the CPLA.
¶ 6 The district court granted the Temple's motion for summary judgment, concluding and reasoning as follows:
[T]he Colorado Premises Liability Act constitutes the sole remedy against a landowner for physical injuries sustained on the landowner's property. Vigil v. Franklin, 103 P.3d 322 (Colo.2004). Volunteers are generally classified as licensees under the Colorado Premises Liability Act. Grizzell v. Hartman Enterprises[, Inc.], 68 P.3d 551, 554 (Colo.App.2003).
....
Plaintiff contends that he was an invitee, not a licensee, while working on Temple property. The Court is unpersuaded. It is undisputed that Plaintiff was part of a volunteer work crew which cut down tree branches on Temple property. Under the Colorado Premises Liability Act, Plaintiff constitutes a licensee.
Plaintiff also contends that the Temple should be held liable because it exercised control over the volunteers' work. However, Plaintiff admitted that the volunteers supplied the tools and that Mr. Margotta directed the work crew in all respects. Furthermore, Plaintiff has failed to show any danger that [the Temple] created and of which the volunteers were not aware.
Finally, Plaintiff contends that the Temple is vicariously liable for Mr. Margotta's negligent direction of the project. However, where a landowner exercises no control over a volunteer's conduct beyond suggesting the general nature of a project, the landowner owes the volunteer no duty as a matter of law. Cottam v. First Baptist Church of Boulder, 962 F.2d 17 (10th Cir.1992).
¶ 7 Rieger contends the district court erred in granting the Temple's motion for summary judgment. We disagree.
¶ 8 We review the grant of a summary judgment motion de novo. W. Elk Ranch, L.L.C. v. United States, 65 P.3d 479, 481 (Colo.2002).
¶ 9 Summary judgment is appropriate where the trial court determines that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Larrieu v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 2013 CO 38, ¶ 6, 303 P.3d 558, 560.
¶ 10 The moving party has the initial burden to show that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Once this burden of production is satisfied, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to establish that there is a triable issue of fact. Cont'l Air Lines, Inc. v. Keenan, 731 P.2d 708, 712–13 (Colo.1987). Failure to meet this burden will result in summary judgment in favor of the moving party. Casey v. Christie Lodge Owners Ass'n, 923 P.2d 365, 366 (Colo.App.1996).
¶ 11 To properly review the grant of summary judgment in the case before us, we are called upon to interpret the CPLA, section 13–21– 115. Issues of statutory interpretation are legal issues, which we review de novo. Candelaria v. People, 2013 CO 47, ¶ 10, 303 P.3d 1202, 1204.
¶ 12 Rieger contends the district court erred in concluding he was a licensee rather than an invitee for purposes of the CPLA. We disagree.
¶ 13 In order to analyze Rieger's status under the CPLA, we must first address the district court's conclusion that he was a volunteer.
¶ 14 A volunteer is one who does, or undertakes to do, something which he or she is not legally or morally obligated to do and the undertaking is not in pursuance or protection of his or her personal interests. Heckman v. Warren, 124 Colo. 497, 506, 238 P.2d 854, 859 (1951). A “volunteer” is defined in the Volunteer Service Act as “a person performing services for a nonprofit organization ... without compensation, other than reimbursement for actual expenses incurred.” § 13–21–115.5(3)(c)(I), C.R.S.2013. One who voluntarily assumes to act as the servant of another cannot recover for personal injuries as a servant, although requested to act by a servant of the master, but the rule is otherwise where the volunteer has an interest in the work. Heckman, 124 Colo. at 506, 238 P.2d at 859.
¶ 15 On appeal, Rieger appears to make a general contention that he was not a volunteer, but he does not offer any evidence in support of this contention. To the contrary, the entire record, including admissions in his deposition, makes it clear that Rieger was a volunteer. Rieger does not dispute that he was not paid for his work at the Temple, nor does he dispute that he was not legally or morally obligated to assist with cutting the tree down at the Temple.
¶ 16 Accordingly, we discern no error in the district court's conclusion that Rieger was a volunteer.
¶ 17 Because Rieger was a volunteer, we also conclude that the district court properly ruled that Rieger, as a matter of law, was a licensee under the CPLA.
¶ 18 Although Rieger phrases his contentions in terms of negligence, his right to recovery against the Temple is controlled by the CPLA, which provides the sole and exclusive remedy against a landowner for physical injuries on the landowner's property. See Vigil, 103 P.3d at 328–29. In that regard, the CPLA outlines the respective duties that a landowner owes to trespassers, invitees, and licensees and provides that a breach of those duties may result in liability for damages caused. Lombard v. Colo. Outdoor Educ. Ctr., Inc., 187 P.3d 565, 570 (Colo.2008).
¶ 19 Section 13–21–115(5)(a), C.R.S.2013, defines an “invitee” as
a person who enters or remains on the land of another to transact business in which the parties are mutually interested or who enters or remains on such land in response to the landowner's express or implied representation that the public is requested, expected, or intended to enter or remain.
An invitee may recover for damages caused by the landowner's unreasonable failure to exercise reasonable care to protect against dangers of which he actually knew or should have known. § 13–21–115(3)(c)(I), C.R.S.2013.
¶ 20 Section 13–21–115(5)(b), C.R.S.2013, defines a “licensee” as “a person who enters or remains on the land of another for the licensee's own convenience or to advance his own interests, pursuant to the landowner's permission or consent.” Section 13–21–115(3)(b), C.R.S.2013, provides the exclusive standard of care for a licensee, as follows:
A licensee may recover only for damages caused:
(I) By the landowner's unreasonable failure to exercise reasonable care with respect to dangers created by the landowner of which the landowner actually knew; or
(II) By the landowner's unreasonable failure to warn of dangers not created by the landowner which are not ordinarily present on property of the type involved and of which the landowner actually knew.
¶ 21 Volunteers are generally classified as licensees. Grizzell, 68 P.3d at 554. For premises liability purposes, a volunteer occupies roughly the same position as an implied licensee. Pifer...
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