Ritchie v. People

• Decision Date: 14 March 1895
• Citation: 40 N.E. 454,155 Ill. 98
• Parties: RITCHIE v. PEOPLE.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

155 Ill. 98

40 N.E. 454

RITCHIE

v.PEOPLE.¹

Supreme Court of Illinois.

March 14, 1895.

Error to criminal court, Cook county; Nathaniel C. Sears, Judge.

Prosecution of William E. Ritchie for violation of the eight-hour law. Defendant was convicted, and he brings error. Reversed.

Moran, Kraus & Mayer, for plaintiff in error.

M. T. Moloney, Atty. Gen., John W. Ela, and Andrew Alex. Bruce, for the People.

MAGRUDER, J.

Upon complaint of the factory inspector appointed under the law hereinafter named, a warrant was issued by a justice of the peace of Cook county against plaintiff in error, and upon his appearance, and waiver in writing of jury trial, a trial was had, resulting in a finding of guilty, and the imposition of a fine of five dollars and costs. The complaint charged that on a certain day in February, 1894, plaintiff in error employed a certain adult female of the age of more than 18 years at work in a factory for more than 8 hours during said day. The plaintiff in error took an appeal to the criminal court of Cook county, and waived a jury, and upon trial in that court before the judge without a jury he was convicted and fined. The case is brought to this court by writ of error for the purpose of reviewing such judgment of the criminal court.

Upon the trial of the cause the defendant below submitted written propositions to be held as law in the decision of the case. By these propositions the trial court was asked to hold that the act of the legislature of Illinois entitled ‘An act to regulate the manufacture of clothing, wearing apparel, and other articles in this state, and to provide for the appointment of state inspectors to enforce the same, and to make an appropriation therefor,’ approved June 17, 1893 (Laws Ill. 1893, p. 99), and each and every section thereof, is illegal and void, and contrary to and in violation of the constitutions of Illinois and of the United States. The court refused all of the propositions so submitted, and exception was taken by the defendant. The present prosecution, as is conceded by counsel for both sides, is for an alleged violation of section 5 of said act. That section is as follows: ‘No female shall be employed in any factory or workshop more than eight hours in any one day or forty-eight hours in any one week.’ ‘Factory’ or ‘workshop’ is defined in section 7 of the act as follows: ‘The words ‘manufacturing establishment,’ ‘factory’ or ‘workshop,’ wherever used in this act, shall be construed to mean any place where goods or products are manufactured or repaired, cleaned or sorted, in whole or in part, for sale or for wages.' Punishment for violation of the provisions of the act is provided for by section 8 thereof in the following words: ‘Any person, firm or corporation, who fails to comply with any provision of this act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be fined not less than three dollars, nor more than one hundred dollars for each offense.’

The main objection urged against the act, and that to which the discussion of counsel on both sides is chiefly directed, relates to the validity of section 5. It is contended by counsel for plaintiff in error that that section is unconstitutional as imposing unwarranted restrictions upon the right to contract. On the other hand, it is claimed by counsel for the people that the section is a sanitary provision, and justifiable as an exercise of the police power of the state. Does the provision in question restrict the right to contract? The words, ‘no female shall be employed,’ import action on the part of two persons. There must be a person who does the act of employing and a person who consents to the act of being employed. Webster defines ‘employment’ as not only ‘the act of employing,’ but also ‘the state of being employed.’ The prohibition of the statute is therefore twofold: First, that no manufacturer or proprietor of a factory or workshop shall employ any female therein more than eight hours in one day; and, second, that no female shall consent to be so employed. It thus prohibits employer and employé from uniting their minds or agreeing upon any longer service during one day than eight hours. In other words, they are prohibited, the one from contracting to employ, and the other from contracting to be employed, otherwise than as directed. ‘To be ‘employed’ in anything means not only the act of doing it, but also to be engaged to do it; to be under contract or orders to do it.' U. S. v. Morris, 14 Pet. 464. Hence a direction that a person shall not be employed more than a specified number of hours in one day is at the same time a direction that such person shall not be under contract to work for more than a specified number of hours in one day. It follows that section 5 does limit and restrict the right of the manufacturer and his employé to contract with each other in reference to the hours of labor.

Is the restriction thus imposed an infringement upon the constitutional rights of the manufacturer and the employé? Section 2 of article 2 of the constitution of Illinois provides that ‘no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.’ A number of cases have arisen within recent years in which the courts have had occasion to consider this provision, or one similar to it, and its meaning has been quite clearly defined. The privilege of contracting is both a liberty and property right. Frorer v. People, 141 Ill. 171, 31 N. E. 395. Liberty includes the right to acquire property, and that means and includes the right to make and enforce contracts. State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307, 22 S. W. 350. The right to use, buy, and sell property and contract in respect thereto is protected by the constitution. Labor is property, and the laborer has the same right to sell his labor, and to contract with reference thereto, as has any other property owner. In this country the legislature has no power to prevent persons who are sui juris from making their own contracts, nor can it interfere with the freedom of contract between the workman and the employer. The right to labor or employ labor, and make contracts in respect thereto upon such terms as may be agreed upon between the parties, is included in the constitutional guaranty above quoted. State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 10 S. E. 285;Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. St. 431, 6 Atl. 354;Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N. E. 62. The protection of property is one of the objects for which free governments are instituted among men. Const. Ill. art. 2, § 1. The right to acquire, possess, and protect property includes the right to make reasonable contracts (Com. v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117, 28 N. E. 1126); and when an owner is deprived of one of the attributes of property, like the right to make contracts, he is deprived of his property, within the meaning of the constitution (In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98). The fundamental rights of Englishmen, brought to this country by its original settlers, and wrested, from time to time, in the progress of history, from the sovereigns of the English nation, have been reduced by Blackstone to three principal or primary articles, ‘the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right of private property.’ 1 Bl. Comm. marg. p. 129. The right to contract is the only way by which a person can rightfully acquire property by his own labor. ‘Of all the rights of persons it is the most essential to human happiness.’ Leep v. Railway Co., 58 Ark. 407, 25 S. W. 75. This right to contract, which is thus included in the fundamental rights of liberty and property, cannot be taken away ‘without due process of law.’ The words ‘due process of law’ have been held to be synonymous with the words ‘law of the land.’ State v. Loomis, supra; Frorer v. People, supra. Blackstone says: ‘The third absolute right, inherent in every Englishman, is that of property, which consists in the free use, enjoyment and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the land.’ 1 Bl. Comm. p. 138; In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98. The ‘law of the land’ is ‘general public law, binding upon all the members of the community, under all circumstances, and not partial or private laws, affecting the rights of private individuals, or classes of individuals.’ Millett v. People, 117 Ill. 294, 7 N. E. 631. The ‘law of the land’ is the opposite of ‘arbitrary, unequal, and partial legislation.’ State v. Loomis, supra. The legislature has no right to deprive one class of persons of privileges allowed to other persons under like conditions. The man who is forbidden to acquire and enjoy property in the same manner in which the rest of the community is permitted to acquire and enjoy it is deprived of liberty in particulars of primary importance to his pursuit of happiness. If one man is denied the right to contract as he has hitherto done under the law, and as others are still allowed to do by the law, he is deprived of both liberty and property to the extent to which he is thus deprived of the right. In line with these principles, it has been held that it is not competent, under the constitution, for the legislature to single out owners and employers of a particular class, and provide that they shall bear burdens not imposed on other owners of property or employers of labor, and prohibit them from making contracts which other owners or employers are permitted to make. Millet v. People, supra; Frorer v. People, supra; Ramsey v. People, 142 Ill. 380, 32 N. E. 364.

We are not unmindful that the right to contract may be subject to limitations growing out of the duties which the individual owes to society, to the public, or the government. These limitations are sometimes imposed by the obligation to so use one's own as not to injure another, by the character of property as affected with a public interest or devoted to a public use, by the demands of public...