Ritchie v. White

• Decision Date: 10 October 1945
• Docket Number: No. 97.,97.
• Citation: 35 S.E.2d 414,225 N.C. 450
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: RITCHIE. v. WHITE.

35 S.E.2d 414

225 N.C. 450

RITCHIE.

v.WHITE.

No. 97.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Oct. 10, 1945.

Appeal from Superior Court, Buncombe County; Wilson Warlick, Judge.

Action by Madeline Ritchie against H. N. White, administrator, to recover for services rendered by plaintiff to her late husband and for support furnished at his instance and for his benefit upon the express promise that he would devise to plaintiff in fee certain realty. From a judgment of nonsuit, plaintiff appeals.

Judgment affirmed.

Civil action to recover for services rendered by plaintiff to her late husband and for support furnished at his instance and for his benefit upon the express promise that he would "make a will * * * and devise to the plaintiff in fee * * * (the home place) his house and lot * * * in the City of Asheville."

John Ritchie was a porter or doorman at the Langren Hotel. On February 18, 1936, he and the plaintiff were married and they lived together in Asheville until December, 1943, when they went to Philadelphia, Pa., so that the husband could have his eyes treated by a physician in that city and the wife could secure employment in a defense plant at good wages. They lived there as husband and wife until the husband's death on February 25, 1945, intending, however, to return to their home in Asheville after the war. There were no children of the marriage. Plaintiff's husband was much older than she.

In July, 1942, John Ritchie became helpless from old age, feeble health and rapidly failing eyesight. He entered into a verbal agreement with his wife to devise her the home place in exchange for her "doing his cooking, sewing, mending and nursing, and furnishing medicines, physicians, lodging, gas, telephone, lights, water, coal and food", stating at the time that the property would amply compensate her, and that he expected her to be paid for "her said services in providing for his nursing, care and support."

The plaintiff, in fulfillment of her promise and in expectation of compensation, first worked in Asheville and devoted her time and earnings to her own and her husband's support, and later in Philadelphia she paid her husband's bills for house rent, medicines, physicians, hospital, water, light and telephone and devoted herself to nursing, sewing, cooking, washing and mending for him. All the moneys expended by the plaintiff for her own support and that of her husband came from her earnings.

As plaintiff's husband died intestate, she filed claim with the administrator of his estate "for services and maintenance" rendered and provided under the agreement with her husband, which she valued at $2,352.20. The claim was rejected, hence this suit.

From judgment of nonsuit entered at the close of plaintiff's evidence, she appeals, assigning errors.

George M. Pritchard, of Asheville, for plaintiff-appellant.

S. J. Pegram, of Asheville (James E. Rector, of Asheville, on the brief), for defendant-appellee.

STACY, Chief Justice.

The question here presented is one of first impression in this jurisdiction. A widow seeks to recover for domestic services and for support furnished her husband under a promise by him to devise her the home place in his will. The husband dies intestate. Is the widow entitled to recover from his estate on quasi contract or implied assumpsit the value of such services and support? The law, answers in the negative.

While it is true that in ordinary transactions married women are permitted to deal with their earnings and property practically as they please or as free traders, Price v. Charlotte Electric R. Co, 160 N.C. 450, 76 S.E. 502, still there is nothing in the statutes to indicate a purpose on the part of the General Assembly to reduce the institution of marriage, or the obligations of family life, to a commercial basis. G.S. §§ 52-12, 52-13. It is the public policy of the State that a husband shall provide support for himself and his family. 41 C.J.S, Husband and Wife, § 14, p. 404; 26 Am.Jur. 934. This duty he may not shirk, contract away, or transfer to another. 41 C.J.S, Husband and Wife, § 15, p. 407. It is not a "debt" in the legal sense of the word, but an obligation imposed by law, and penal sanctions are provided for its wilful neglect or abandonment. Garlock v. Garlock, 279 N.Y. 337, 18 N.E.2d 521, 120 A.L.R. 1331. See alimony and abandonment statutes. G.S. §§ 14-322, 14-325, 50-16.

There are three parties to a marriage contract—the husband, the wife and the State. For this reason marriage is denominated a status, and certain incidents are attached thereto by law which may not be abrogated without the consent of the third party, the State. The moment the marriage relation comes into existence, cer-tain rights and duties spring into being. One of these is the obligation of the husband to support his wife. French v. McAnarney, 290 Mass. 544, 195 N.E. 714, 98 A.L.R. 530. "In the public interest the state has ever deemed it essential that certain obligations should attach to a marriage contract, amongst which is the duty of a husband to support his wife. Defendant was therefore shorn of power to enter into any arrangement or contract which would relieve him of such obligation." Tirrell v. Tirrell, 232 N.Y. 224, 133 N.E. 569, 570.

Married couples are free to contract with each other concerning their property rights in the manner provided by the statutes on the subject, but they are not at liberty, by private agreement, to transfer from one to the other or to absolve either of the obligations which the marital status imposes. VanKoten v. VanKoten, 323 111. 323, 154 N.E. 146, 50 A.L.R. 347. "It is well settled that a husband is bound to support his wife." Reynolds v. Reynolds, 208 N.C. 254, 180 S.E. 70, 77. And he may not by contract relieve himself of the duty to support himself and family, and cast such burden upon his wife. Corcoran v. Corcoran, 119 Ind. 138, 21 N.E. 468, 4 L.R.A. 782, 12 Am.St.Rep. 390. The wife, on the other hand, is a feme covert with the rights, privileges and obligations incident to such status under the law. Coley v. Dalrymple, 225 N.C. 67, 33 S.E.2d 477. The husband is entitled to such domestic services as she may choose to perform, and to her aid, comfort, society and companionship, which the law regards as the full equivalent of support, like aid, comfort, society and companionship on the part of the husband. Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N.C. 821, 32 S.E.2d 611.

The case of Corcoran v. Corcoran, supra, is in many respects much like this one. There a husband conveyed a house and lot to his wife in consideration of her promise to provide the family support and maintenance. Upon default, the husband sued his wife in damages for breach of the contract. It was held that the alleged contract was not an enforceable agreement, and that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. In the course of the opinion, the Indiana Court had this to say: "The law makes it the duty of the husband not only to support himself, but his wife and children as well, and we know of no rule of law, or public policy, which gives any countenance to an attempt by a husband to abdicate the duty which the law casts upon him, and impose it as an obligation upon his wife, through the medium of an ordinary oral contract. * * * Under the enlightened policy of modern legislation, married women have been relieved of many common-law disabilities, but we have not yet progressed so far as to enable a married woman to bind herself by contract with her husband to assume his obligation to furnish support for both."

The mutual rights and duties growing out of the marital relationship are not affected by the statutes relating to the capacity of married women to contract and dispose of their property as if they were unmarried. G.S. § 52-10 et seq.; Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Turner, 202 N.C. 162, 162 S.E. 221. Domestic obligations incident to the marital status still subsist, and they may not be made the subject of commerce. The legal duties and liabilities of plaintiff and her husband remained the same after their agreement as they were before. Neither was relieved of any obligation and neither was bound to perform any additional duty. No new rights were created and no binding obligations were assumed. The contract was not legally enforceable. 13 R.C.L. 1188. If it were, both parties would be bound by it. And yet the husband certainly could not maintain an action for its breach or to enforce its performance. Garlock v. Garlock, supra; Corcoran v. Corcoran, supra. This limitation upon the right of husband and wife to renounce or to abrogate the marital obligations which attach by law applies not alone to one of the spouses, but equally to both. Mirizio v. Mirizio, 242 N.Y. 74, 150 N.E. 605, 44 A.L.R. 714; 17 C.J.S. Contracts, § 233, p. 616.

Clearly, the plaintiff may not recover for domestic services which are imposed by her marital status, even upon an express promise by her husband to pay for such services, as this would be without consideration and contrary to public policy. Frame v. Frame, 120 Tex. 61, 36 S.W.2d 152, 73 A.L.R. 1512 and annotation; 17 C.J.S, Contracts, § 233, p. 616. "The husband, as head of the family, is charged with its support and maintenance, in return for which he is entitled to the wife's services in all those domestic affairs which pertain to the comfort, care, and well-being of the family. Her labors are her contribution to the family supportand care. Whether rendered in or out of the house, no implied obligation to pay arises." Cragford Bank v. Cummings, 216 Ala. 377, 113 So. 243, 244.

In Foxworthy v. Adams, 136 Ky. 403, 124 S.W. 381, 27 L.R.A., N.S, 308, Ann.Cas. 1912A, 327, it was held that notwithstanding legislative authority for husband and wife to contract with each other, an agreement in which the husband promised to pay his wife for her services in nursing him during his last illness, or during any illness, was contrary to public...