Robert S. v. Stetson School, Inc.

• Decision Date: 03 July 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00-1438,00-1438
• Citation: 256 F.3d 159
• Parties: (3rd Cir. 2001) ROBERT S., A MINOR APPELLANT v. STETSON SCHOOL, INC.; RICHARD J. ROBINSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE STETSON SCHOOL; DAVE LAPRADE, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS UNIT COUNSELOR, EMPLOYED BY THE STETSON SCHOOL; RAY WILLIAMS, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS UNIT COUNSELOR, EMPLOYED BY THE STETSON SCHOOL; MIKE WILLIAMS, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS UNIT COUNSELOR, EMPLOYED BY THE STETSON SCHOOL; ROBERT MARTIN, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS UNIT COUNSELOR, EMPLOYED BY THE STETSON SCHOOL
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 159

256 F.3d 159 (3rd Cir. 2001)

ROBERT S., A MINOR APPELLANT v. STETSON SCHOOL, INC.; RICHARD J. ROBINSON, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE STETSON SCHOOL; DAVE LAPRADE, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS UNIT COUNSELOR, EMPLOYED BY THE STETSON SCHOOL; RAY WILLIAMS, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS UNIT COUNSELOR, EMPLOYED BY THE STETSON SCHOOL; MIKE WILLIAMS, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS UNIT COUNSELOR, EMPLOYED BY THE STETSON SCHOOL; ROBERT MARTIN, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS UNIT COUNSELOR, EMPLOYED BY THE STETSON SCHOOL

No. 00-1438

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Argued April 20, 2001

July 3, 2001

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA (Dist. Court No. 99-CV-6710) District Court Judge: Norma L. Shapiro

Jonathan J. James Arthur B. Jarrett (argued) James & Jarrett, P.C. Stephen Girard Building - 7th Floor 21 South 12th Street Philadelphia, PA 19107 Counsel for Appellant

Jonathan D. Weiss John C. Farrell (argued) Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin 1845 Walnut Street Philadelphia, PA 19103 Counsel for Appellees

Before: Alito, McKEE, Circuit Judges, and Alarcon, Senior Circuit Judge¹

OPINION OF THE COURT

Alito, Circuit Judge

Robert S. ("Robert"), then a minor, filed this action against the Stetson School ("Stetson"), several Stetson employees, and others. His complaint asserted claims against the school and its staff members under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 for violating his federal constitutional rights by subjecting him to physical and psychological abuse. ² The complaint also contained a variety of state-law claims against these defendants. In this appeal, Robert challenges the District Court's decision that Stetson and its staff did not act under color of state law, as well as two of the District Court's evidentiary rulings. We affirm.

I.

Robert was a victim of sexual abuse, and he in turn molested his younger brother. In 1993, when Robert was 13, the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas found him to be a "dependent child,"³ see 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. SS 6302, 6351, and placed him, with his mother's consent, in the temporary custody of the Philadelphia Department of Human Services ("DHS").⁴ At no time, however, did a court find Robert to be a "delinquent child," see 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. SS 6302, 6352, nor was he convicted of any crime.

DHS decided that Robert would be best served by enrolling him in Stetson, a school that specializes in the treatment and education of juvenile sex of fenders. This decision was not mandated by any court order and was done with the consent of Robert's mother. DHS remained Robert's legal custodian throughout his stay at Stetson and was authorized to remove him at any time if it was not fully satisfied with the services that Stetson was providing. In fact, at the urging of Robert's mother, DHS eventually did remove Robert from Stetson in March 1997.

Stetson is a private, residential institution located in Barre, Massachusetts. At the time of Robert's enrollment, Stetson had approximately 55 residential students and four or five commuter students. All of the Stetson students were sex offenders. Incorporated under Massachusetts law and licensed by the state, Stetson was governed by a board of trustees, the members of which were elected by a board of corporators. None of the members of the board of trustees or the board of corporators were appointed by a government entity, and none were federal, state, or local employees.

Stetson's buildings and property were all privately owned and maintained, and Stetson had full control over its admissions process. Admissions decisions were made by a committee that reviewed applications and conducted interviews of interested applicants. Stetson was not obligated to accept any student. In fact, Stetson historically refused to accept students with criminal records and had successfully gone to court to exclude students whom it did not believe satisfied its stringent enrollment criteria.⁵

In pursuing its mission of providing treatment and education to juvenile sex offenders, Stetson worked in close concert with state and local governments. For example, Stetson and the City of Philadelphia entered into various financial and performance contracts regarding Philadelphia children placed in the school. These contracts were entered into pursuant to the Pennsylvania Child Protective Services Act, 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. S 6301 et seq. According to the testimony of Richard Robertson, Stetson's Executive Director, the City of Philadelphia paid Stetson slightly more than $200 per day for each student, an amount that was insufficient to cover the school's actual costs. Costs not covered by tuition were covered by grants from private foundations, other charitable contributions, and loans. Neither DHS nor the City of Philadelphia had any involvement in the day-to-day management of Stetson. That task was left entirely to the Stetson staff.

Stetson provided a structured environment for its students. Students were not permitted to leave campus without supervision, were assigned bed times, were generally awakened at approximately the same time, and ate their meals at times set by the staff. Although the school did not require uniforms, it had a dress code.⁶ Students were allowed to use both computers and telephones, but when students used a telephone, a Stetson staff member was normally in the room for therapeutic reasons.⁷ Students were allowed to write and receive mail.

Some were also allowed to leave campus with supervision and to go home for vacations. Stetson did not employ any mechanical or chemical restraints; the buildings did not have bars on the windows; and the school did not permit corporal or physical punishment.

Robert alleged that Stetson staff members subjected him to physical and psychological abuse, including wrestling with him and kicking and punching him. Robert claimed that this conduct violated Stetson's policy against "horseplay"⁸ and severely disrupted his treatment. He reported this alleged abuse to a Stetson therapist in February 1997. After an internal investigation, Stetson concluded that three of its counselors had violated the anti-horseplay policy and subsequently suspended them. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts also investigated and decided that Stetson had acted appropriately in punishing the counselors.

Not satisfied with the school's response, Robert filed this action, asserting claims under S 1983 for violations of his constitutional rights, as well as state-law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, false arrest, false imprisonment, invasion of privacy, negligence, and state-law civil rights violations. On motion of the Stetson defendants, the District Court bifurcated the trial. After hearing evidence on the question of state action, the Court made findings of fact related to that question and held that the Stetson defendants were not state actors. A trial was then held on Robert's state-law claims, but the jury did not award him any relief, and Robert took this appeal.

II.

Embodying the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 934-35 (1982); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966), 42 U.S.C. S 1983 provides a cause of action that may be asserted against "[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage . . . of any state . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . " (emphasis added). Thus, a plaintiff in a section 1983 action bears the threshold burden of proving that "the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F .3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Moore v. Tartle, 986 F.2d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 1993)).

As noted, the Stetson School is a private institution, and thus the school and its employees do not formally wield the authority of the state. There are, however, some circumstances in which "seemingly private behavior `may fairly be treated as that of the State itself.' " Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch., 121 S.Ct. 924, 930 (2001) (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974)). The Supreme Court recently wrote that there are "a host of facts that can bear on the fairness of such an attribution" and that "[a]midst such variety, examples may be the best teachers." Id. We therefore begin our analysis of the state-action question in this case with the Supreme Court's decision in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982), which provides the example that is most closely analogous to the present case.

Rendell-Baker concerned the New Perspectives School, an institution with many similarities to the Stetson School. The New Perspectives School was a nonprofit institution that specialized in treating and educating students who had experienced difficulty completing public high schools (largely due to drug, alcohol, and behavioral problems). New Perspectives was a private school, located on private property, and operated by a private board of directors. Students who attended New Perspectives were generally referred by local school committees or the state department of health. The school committees paid New Perspectives for its services, and at least 90% of New Perspectives' operating budget came from public funds. To be eligible for this funding, New Perspectives was required to comply with various local and state regulations. The school also entered into contracts with governmental bodies that referred students to the school.

Applying the factors discussed in Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982), a case handed down on the same day as Rendell-Baker, the...