Roberts v. C-73 Med. Dir.
| Decision Date | 13 July 2015 |
| Docket Number | 1:14-cv-5198-GHW |
| Parties | KENO ROBERTS, Plaintiff, v. C-73 MEDICAL DIRECTOR, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, appearing pro se, filed this case on July 7, 2014 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging, as relevant here, that he received constitutionally inadequate medical care while incarcerated on Rikers Island. See Dkt. No. 1. He sued various persons and entities, including Dr. Kara Greenwald, who treated him for approximately 10 days at Bellevue Hospital. On January 16, 2015, Dr. Greenwald filed a motion to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim. See Dkt. Nos. 34-37.
Pursuant to a December 17, 2014 scheduling order, and as discussed during a telephone conference with all parties earlier that day, plaintiff's opposition to Dr. Greenwald's motion to dismiss was due February 16, 2015. See Dkt. No. 28. Plaintiff did not file an opposition or otherwise respond to Dr. Greenwald's motion by the February 16, 2015 deadline. On May 28, 2015, still having received no response, the Court issued an order notifying plaintiff that if he did not respond to Dr. Greenwald's motion by June 18, 2015—four months after the original due date—the Court would decide the motion without his opposition. See Dkt. No. 42. On June 24, 2015, theCourt received a letter from plaintiff dated June 12, 2015, responding to other issues raised in the Court's May 28, 2015 order. See Dkt. No. 45. As plaintiff did not respond to or otherwise address Dr. Greenwald's motion in that letter, the Court has decided the motion without plaintiff's input. For the reasons outlined below, defendant Dr. Greenwald's motion to dismiss the complaint is GRANTED. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint within 30 days.
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings two claims: one alleging denial of adequate medical care and one alleging excessive force. The latter is not relevant to the current motion because it does not involve Dr. Greenwald. As to the former, plaintiff first alleges that he was wrongfully prescribed the medication Simvastatin, which caused him to develop Type 2 Diabetes. See Compl., Dkt. No. 1, at 4; Brief, Dkt. No. 1-1, at 4-5.1 After taking Simvastatin as prescribed, on February 8, 2013, plaintiff alleges he "almost died when his blood sugar levels escalated causing plaintiff to go into shock, whereas, he was immediately rushed to Elmhurst General Hospital near death." Brief at 3; see also Compl. at 4. "From Elmhurst General plaintiff was rushed to Bellevue Hospital because the sugar level continued to go out of control[ ] . . . ." Brief at 4.
It was at Bellevue Hospital that plaintiff was placed under Dr. Greenwald's care. See Brief at 6. She treated him from February 13 through 23, 2013. See id. Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Greenwald "failed to provide plaintiff with adequate medical care and treatment, as well as grossly failed to prescribe adequate medications, because of such, plaintiffs medical conditions as well as the blood sugar levels could not be stabilized . . . ." Id. Plaintiff further alleges that he requested to see a specialist2 but that Dr. Greenwald denied this request until a point when his physical condition hadworsened. See Brief at 6, 7. Once he saw the specialist, plaintiff says he was prescribed medication and given dietary instructions. See Brief at 7. Despite being scheduled to see the specialist "on a regular basis," plaintiff alleges that Dr. Greenwald still "failed to prescribe any kind of medication for plaintiff that could control his blood sugar levels, [and] because of such, plaintiff's blood sugar level became so out of control[ ] that it got erratic, and thereafter, was never stabilized." Id.
Upon his discharge from Bellevue, plaintiff was treated at the North Infirmary Command ("NIC") for three days, where he alleges the staff "failed to provide him with insulin, medication(s) and the appropriate diet." Brief at 5, 7. Plaintiff claims that at Bellevue, as well as at Rikers, Elmhurst, and the NIC, "defendants . . . failed grossly to provide plaintiff with not only adequate medical care and treatment; but failed to provide him with adequate medication and an adequate diet sufficient enough to meet hi[s] medical needs, that being sugar diabetes." Brief at 13.
Plaintiff alleges that he has suffered serious and long-lasting effects from the allegedly inadequate medical care he received. See, e.g., Compl. at 5 (); Brief at 5 (); Brief at 6 (). Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Greenwald's actions were a cause of these effects:
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Rule 8 "does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
When ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court "must accept all allegations in the complaint as true and draw all inferences in the non-moving party's favor." LaFaro v. New York Cardiothoracic Grp., PLLC, 570 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2009). The Court, however, is not required to credit "mere conclusory statements" or "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the plaintiff must allege facts that, if accepted as true, "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). To meet this plausibility standard, the plaintiff must "plead[ ] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant[s] [are] liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.
Because he is proceeding pro se, the Court must liberally construe plaintiff's submissions and "interpret[ ] [them] to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (emphasis in original); see also, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (). "This admonition 'applies with particular force when a plaintiff's civil rights are at issue.'" Bell v. Jendell, 980 F. Supp.2d 555, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Maisonet v. Metro. Hosp. & Health Hosp. Corp., 640 F.Supp.2d 345, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)).
To prevail on a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must show that Dr. Greenwald "acted under color of state law and that she deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Palmieri v. Lynch, 392 F.3d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1994)). Because plaintiff is a pretrial detainee in state custody, he "receives protection against mistreatment at the hands of prison officials under . . . the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," rather than the Eighth Amendment, which is applicable only to convicted prisoners. Caiozzo v. Koreman, 581 F.3d 63, 69 (2d Cir. 2009).
Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Greenwald and various other defendants denied him constitutionally adequate medical care. In the Second Circuit, courts analyze such claims "under the same standard irrespective of whether they are brought under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 72. "In order to establish an Eighth [or Fourteenth] Amendment claim arising out of inadequate medical care, a prisoner [or pretrial detainee] must prove 'deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.'" Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)) (internal alteration omitted). This standard has an objective and a subjective prong:3 Id. (internal citation omitted). "An official acts with the requisite deliberate indifference when that official 'knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.'" Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)); see also Caizzo, 581 F.3d at 65-66.
IV. ANALYSIS
"[G]iven the fact-specific nature of Eighth Amendment denial of medical care claims, it is difficult to formulate a precise standard of 'seriousness' that is adequately sensitive (in the sense of capturing those medical conditions properly within the realm of...
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