Robeson v. International Indem. Co., 37771
Decision Date | 14 October 1981 |
Docket Number | No. 37771,37771 |
Parties | ROBESON, now Love v. INTERNATIONAL INDEMNITY COMPANY et al. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Robert S. Windholz, Atlanta, for Rebecca Robeson, now Love.
James B. Gurley, Atlanta, for International Indemnity Co. et al.
The plaintiff, Rebecca Robeson Love, filed a petition for declaratory judgment against International Indemnity Company and Joel Love.
In the petition, the plaintiff states that she sustained serious bodily injuries while riding as a passenger in a motor vehicle owned by her and driven by defendant Joel Love. The plaintiff alleges that the injuries were caused by Joel's negligence, and in the petition the plaintiff states that Joel does not deny this. The plaintiff and Joel became husband and wife subsequent to the date the foregoing injuries were sustained. The plaintiff made a claim for her damages against her automobile liability and no-fault insurer, defendant International Indemnity Company; but International denied the claim under the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity. The plaintiff seeks a declaration that interspousal tort immunity does not bar assertion of her claim against the defendants. She argues that the interspousal immunity rule is either inapplicable here, or that it is unconstitutional, or that it should now be abrogated by this court on policy grounds. The superior court granted International Indemnity's motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiff appeals.
1. Taylor v. Vezzani, 109 Ga.App. 167(1), 135 S.E.2d 522 (1964).
Therefore, it is clear that the claim presently being asserted by the plaintiff is barred by application of the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity.
2. We are thus presented with the question of whether the doctrine should now be judicially abrogated, either on the ground that it is unconstitutional or on policy grounds.
It cannot be said that the doctrine of interspousal immunity is unconstitutional, as a matter of due process or equal protection. As was stated by the Supreme Court of Delaware in reaching this conclusion: Alfree v. Alfree, 410 A.2d 161, 163(4) (Del.Supr.1979).
3. Therefore, if the doctrine is to be abrogated, it must be done on policy grounds.
As was previously stated, interspousal immunity was originally based on the legal fiction that husband and wife are in law one person. Although the common-law doctrine concerning the legal identity of husband and wife was eroded through the passage of statutes known as Married Women's Acts in all American jurisdictions in the mid-19th century, the doctrine of interspousal immunity was generally retained by the states on policy grounds that allowance of such suits would disrupt marital harmony and lead to fraudulent, collusive, and frivolous law suits. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, § 122, 4th Ed. (1971). The view has also been espoused that criminal prosecutions and divorce actions provide adequate remedies for interspousal torts. Id. As late as 1971, the interspousal immunity rule was still followed in a majority of the states. Id.
These policy grounds were cogently stated by the Supreme Court of Florida in rejecting an argument that the doctrine of interspousal immunity be judicially abrogated in that state: Raisen v. Raisen, 379 S.E.2d 352, 355 (Fla.1979).
However, there has been widespread modern criticism of the policy justifications underlying the rule. See 92 A.L.R.3d 901, Anno., Modern Status of Interspousal Tort Immunity and Personal Injury and Wrongful Death Actions (1979). It has been argued that insofar as the rule is an attempt to foster domestic tranquility, it is overly paternalistic, antiquated, and ineffectual in any event. It has also been argued that insofar as the rule is an attempt to deter fraudulent and frivolous claims, it is overbroad in that it deters the meritorious as well as the nonmeritorious--the courts being equipped to winnow the latter from the former. In this regard, it has been pointed out that insurance companies can protect themselves by exclusionary clauses written into insurance policies.
Acceptance of this criticism is evidenced by the fact that in the past decade the rule has been abrogated in an increasing number of states; and it now appears that only 16 states, including Georgia, still adhere to the rule. See MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71 (Me.1980).
4. For two reasons, we hold that the doctrine of interspousal immunity should not now be abrogated by this court.
(a) If interspousal tort litigation was allowed, it would be broadly divisible into two distinct types: those suits in which the judgment would actually be paid by one of the spouses and those suits in which an insurance company would be liable for payment of the judgment. Since husband and wife do live from the same purse, it is somewhat problematic to order one to pay a money judgment obtained by the...
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