Robinson's Case
Decision Date | 23 November 1993 |
Citation | 623 N.E.2d 478,416 Mass. 454 |
Parties | ANN MARIE ROBINSON'S CASE. |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
W. Frederick Uehlein, Natick, for the insurer.
Roger J. Brunelle, Worcester, for the employee.
Before LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, LYNCH and GREANEY, JJ.
Hartford Insurance Company (insurer) appeals from a decision of a reviewing board affirming a report of an administrative judge awarding compensation under G.L. c. 152, § 34 (1992 ed.), to Ann Marie Robinson (employee). We transferred the case from the Appeals Court on our own motion and affirm the decision of the reviewing board.
We briefly summarize the facts found by the administrative judge and adopted by the reviewing board. From 1976 until March 11, 1987, the employee was employed as an occupational health nurse at Data General Corporation (employer). Beginning in October, 1985, there was a general reduction in the employer's staff. As a result of the reductions, the employee assisted many coworkers in dealing with their personal and emotional problems arising from the loss of their jobs. The employee was overwhelmed by the increased demands placed on her and the constant exposure to the emotional problems of coworkers. As a result, she lost fifty pounds, became tense, and developed tension-related physical illnesses. The parties stipulated that the employee suffers from depression and anxiety. The administrative judge determined that the employee was totally disabled from performing gainful employment and found that the employee's emotional disability was "primarily caused by a series of events occurring within her employment," such as her steadily increasing job responsibilities, work load, and increasing demands from superiors.
The standard of review for appeals from decisions of a reviewing board is defined in the workers' compensation statute. General Laws c. 152, § 12(2), as appearing in St.1985, c. 572, § 26, provided: "Any appeal from a decision by a reviewing board shall be taken pursuant to section fourteen of chapter thirty A, except that such appeal shall be filed with the appeals court of the commonwealth." General Laws c. 30A, § 14 (1992 ed.), limits the instances where a court may set aside or modify an agency's decision. See Lettich's Case, 403 Mass. 389, 395, 530 N.E.2d 159 (1988). Section 12(2) was amended by St.1991, c. 398, § 32A, and now provides:
"Any appeal from a decision by a reviewing board shall be taken pursuant to section fourteen of chapter thirty A, except that such appeal shall be filed with the appeals court of the commonwealth and provided further that clause (e ) of paragraph seven of section fourteen of chapter thirty A shall not apply to such appeals."
General Laws c. 30A, § 14(7)(e ), provides that a court may set aside or modify an agency's decision if it determines the decision is "[u]nsupported by substantial evidence." General Laws c. 30A, § 1(6) (1992 ed.), defines "[s]ubstantial evidence" as "such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Under the substantial evidence standard, courts were required to scrutinize the whole record to determine whether the standard had been met. Boston Edison Co. v. Boston Redevelopment Auth., 374 Mass. 37, 54, 371 N.E.2d 728 (1977).
We first decide whether the former or the present provision of § 12(2) applies. General Laws c. 152, § 2A (1992 ed.), provides a mechanism to determine when an amendment to G.L. c. 152 will apply retroactively or prospectively. Section 2A provides:
1
Thus, all amendments not increasing or decreasing the amount of compensation are considered procedural or remedial and apply retroactively. Statute 1991, c. 398, § 107, provides that the amendment to § 12(2), eliminating from appellate scrutiny consideration whether the decision is "[u]nsupported by substantial evidence," is procedural and thus applies retroactively.
We are constrained to set aside or modify the decision of the reviewing board only if the decision is:
G.L. c. 30A, § 14(7). We note, as other courts have, that these varying standards may overlap with the substantial evidence standard. As the employee correctly points out:
Howe v. Health Facilities Appeals Bd., 20 Mass.App.Ct. 531, 537 n. 6, 481 N.E.2d 510 (1985), and authorities cited.
With this standard in mind we next turn to the substantive issue raised by the insurer; first, that the employee failed to meet her burden of proof under G.L. c. 152, § 1(7A). General Laws c. 152, § 1(7A), as amended through St.1985, c. 572, § 11, and St.1986, c. 662, § 6, 2 defines "[p]ersonal injuries" within the meaning of c. 152, and provides, in part:
The insurer posits that the Legislature has signalled its desire that employees be put to a higher standard of proof in workers' compensation cases involving mental or emotional disability and that the employee has failed to meet that heightened standard. We do not agree.
Although the amendments to § 1(7A) would mandate a different result than in Kelly's Case, 394 Mass. 684, 477 N.E.2d 582 (1985), that does not mean that all of the court's reasoning has been supplanted. In Kelly's Case, the court indicated that none of the earlier precedents, on which the insurer now relies, "suggest[s] that entitlement to workers' compensation for emotional disability requires proof of facts in addition to those required when the disability is only physical, and we discern no basis in G.L. c. 152 for...
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