Robinson v. State

• Decision Date: 16 April 1968
• Docket Number: No. 164,164
• Citation: 3 Md.App. 666,240 A.2d 638
• Parties: Luther ROBINSON v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 666

3 Md.App. 666

240 A.2d 638

Luther ROBINSON v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 164.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

April 16, 1968.

Charles Philip Brown, Baltimore, for appellant.

Henry J. Frankel, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Charles E. Moylan, Jr., Barrett W. Freedlander and Hillary Caplan, State's Atty., and Asst. State's Attorneys, Baltimore, on brief, for appellee.

Before MURPHY, C. J., and ANDERSON, MORTON, ORTH and THOMPSON, JJ.

MURPHY, Chief Justice.

Appellant was convicted on May 2, 1967, in the Criminal Court of Baltimore, Judge Charles D. Harris presiding without a jury, of storehouse-breading and larceny and sentenced to five years imprisonment in the Maryland House of Correction on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. He contends on this appeal that the lower court erred (a) in admitting his confession into evidence since it was not shown to have been voluntarily made, and (b) that there was no evidence corroborating the confession sufficient to justify the convictions.

The evidence adduced at the trial showed that appellant was arrested without a warrant 'for investigation' by Baltimore County police officers at 8:30 p. m. on December 10, 1966. He was taken to police headquarters in Towson and interrogated about a number of Baltimore County burglaries until about midnight, when he was transferred to the Parkville station for the night. He was returned to Towson the following afternoon and again briefly interrogated, after which he was taken to the Cockeysville station to spend the night. On Monday, december 12, he was again returned to Towson where he was interrogated from about 10:00 a. m. until 1:30 p. m. when he gave a statement to the officers admitting offenses in Baltimore County. On Tuesday, December 13, the Baltimore County Police phoned Sgt. Arthur Simonsen of the Baltimore City Police Department, telling him that they had the appellant in custody and that he was responsible for a burglary in Baltimore City. Sgt. Simonsen proceeded at once to Towson headquarters and at 1:00 p. m. that day, appellant gave him a statement admitting complicity in the Baltimore City offenses involved in the instant case.

At the trial, Sgt. Simonsen testified that prior to interrogating appellant, he advised him of his rights under Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694; that appellant affirmatively and expressly waived these rights; tht the appellant appeared in fairly good condition during the interrogation, even though he was known to be a drug addict; and that no threats, promises, or inducements were made to appellant to cause him to make a statement. The appellant objected to the introduction of the statement on the ground that under Westover v. United States, 384 U.S., at page 494, 86 S.Ct., at page 1638, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, a companion case to Miranda v. State of Arizona, supra, the persistent and lengthy interrogation conducted by Baltimore County officers immediately prior to his interrogation by Sgt. Simonsen was such as to make the confession given by him to Sgt. Simonsen the involuntary product of the coercive and unconstitutional pressures applied earlier by the Baltimore County officers. Appellant, testifying on the issue of the voluntariness of his statement to Simonsen, stated that the Baltimore County officers never advised him of his Miranda rights, that he was a drug addict and ill during his interrogation by Baltimore County officers, that he was told by the Baltimore County officers that he would be taken to a hospital if he would confess to certain crimes in that County, and that he was told that he could involve a co-defendant, Samuel Spedalere, only if he himself confessed. On cross-examination by the State, appellant testified, in somewhat contradictory manner, that he did not confess to the Baltimore County crimes because he was told he would be taken to a hospital, but because Spedalere had given a statement to the police, and he was told by Baltimore County officers that 'it would be best' if he gave a statement to 'clarify up all these crimes.' Appellant testified that he gave a statement because he wanted to involve Spedalere, that he gave a statement after he found out that Spedalere had confessed, that he gave a statement so that, 'his records * * * would be clarified' as to the crimes that he had committed, and that he confessed because he was told by the officers that if he did not, he would be picked up later.

While the Baltimore County police officers who had arrested and interrogated appellant were present in court and testified for the State, they were not asked, nor did they rebut or contradict appellant's testimony concerning the promises and verbal threats allegedly made by them to him to obtain a confession to the Baltimore County crimes, nor did they rebut appellant's testimony that they did not advise him of his Miranda rights at any time while in their custody.

The trial judge admitted the confession into evidence, finding as a fact from the evidence that there was no persistent or prolonged interrogation overbearing the will of the appellant to resist, that appellant's movement between the various stations was due to the fact that there was inadequate sleeping facilities at Towson headquarters, that Sgt. Simonsen had given appellant all Miranda warnings prior to interrogating him, that he did not believe appellant's statement that the County officers had promised him hospital treatment in return for a confession, and that the reason appellant confessed was because of his knowledge that Spedalere had implicated him and 'to get back at Spedalere' he also made a statement.

It is well settled that in order for a confession to be admissible into evidence against an accused, the State must prove that it was voluntary and not the product of force, threats, promises or inducements. Abbott v. State, 231 Md. 462, 190 A.2d 797; Cooper v. State, 1 Md.App. 190, 228 A.2d 840. Otherwise stated, to be voluntary, a statement cannot be 'extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence.' Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1493, 12 L.Ed.2d 653; Lyter v. State, 2 Md.App. 654, 236 A.2d 432. In post-Miranda trials, where the State seeks to introduce a statement taken from an accused during custodial interrogation, it must, as part of its proof of voluntariness, affirmatively show that all warnings required to be given to an accused by that case prior to such interrogation were so given, Robinson v. State, 1 Md.App. 522, 231 A.2d 920, and that the accused, in giving the statement, understood his rights and knowingly and intelligently waived them, Brown v. State, Md.App., 239 A.2d 761, filed March 6, 1968. The basic standard governing the admissibility of an extra-judicial statement is whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, the statement was voluntary. Clewis v. State of Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 87 S.Ct. 1338, 18 L.Ed.2d 423; Taylor v. State, 238 Md. 424, 209 A.2d 595; McFadden v. State, 1 Md.App. 511, 231 A.2d 910. Within this constitutional framework, the question of whether a confession should be admitted in evidence is ordinarily a matter for the trial court to decide and its determination will not be disturbed on appeal unless there was a clear abuse of discretion. Cunningham v. State, 247 Md. 404, 231 A.2d 501; Carrington v. State, 1 Md.App. 353, 230 A.2d 112.

The record before us does not disclose the details of the confession given by the appellant to Baltimore County police officers, nor does it contain any evidence to show that appellant confessed his involvement in the Baltimore City crime to the Baltimore County police officers. The implication to be gathered from the testimony, as we read it, is that it was Spedalere, appellant's confederate, and not the appellant, who informed the Baltimore County police of appellant's participation in the Baltimore City crime which ultimately lead to Sgt. Simonsen's questioning of the appellant at Towson police headquaters. This is not a case then falling precisely within the rule articulated in Combs v. State, 237 Md. 428, 435, 206 A.2d 718; that where one confession is held to be involuntary and inadmissible, subsequent confession to the same crime is presumed to flow from the improper influence which produced the first confession, at least until a cessation of that influnce is definitely shown; and that the evidence to overcome and rebut such a presumption must be clear, strong and satisfactory, and any doubt on the question resolved in favor of the accused. Cases of this factual posture are well illustrated by Clewis v. State of Texas, supra, where the Supreme Court held, under the...