Robinson v. United States

Decision Date14 July 2016
Docket NumberNo. 13–CF–1283.,13–CF–1283.
PartiesDavid T. ROBINSON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
CourtD.C. Court of Appeals

Daniel S. Harawa, Public Defender Service, with whom James Klein and Samia Fam, Public Defender Service, were on the brief, for appellant.

Peter S. Smith, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Vincent H. Cohen, Jr., Acting United States Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and Elizabeth Trosman, Suzanne Grealy Curt, and Erik Kenerson, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellee.

Before FISHER and BLACKBURNE–RIGSBY, Associate Judges, and PRYOR, Senior Judge.

FISHER

, Associate Judge:

After entering conditional pleas of guilty to three charges involving illegal possession of a pistol and ammunition, appellant David Robinson now appeals the trial court's ruling denying his motion to suppress statements. Robinson argues that the statement he made on May 11–12, 2012, should have been suppressed because he did not validly waive his Miranda rights, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)

, and that the statement he made on November 27, 2012, should be suppressed because he was subjected to custodial interrogation without being given Miranda warnings. We agree that the May statement should be suppressed, but decline to suppress the November statement.

I. Background

On January 3, 2012, Howard Sampler was shot and killed in the District of Columbia. On May 11 of that year appellant David Robinson was arrested for a violation of probation and taken to the First District police station. Upon learning of Robinson's arrest, Homicide Detective Anthony Patterson, a thirty-eight-year veteran of the Metropolitan Police Department, went to the First District interrogation room where Robinson was detained and “told him that I was investigating the murder of Howard Sampler and I believed that he had some involvement.” Detective Patterson also told Robinson that “it might help him if he were to talk,” but that Patterson would first “have to advise [Robinson] of his rights.” When Robinson indicated he would like to talk, Detective Patterson took him to an interrogation room on the Homicide Branch side of the building for a taped interview.

Before they entered the Homicide Branch interrogation room, Detective Patterson “may have” shown Robinson a quote on “a printout” of a Facebook page that seemed to indicate Robinson was guilty. Robinson told Detective Patterson that he shot in self-defense.

Once they were in the interrogation room, Detective Patterson read Robinson his Miranda rights from a PD–47 advice of rights form and then added, [n]ow, we don't provide you a lawyer here.” Robinson interjected “Yeah,” and Patterson continued: “But if ... we ask you something and you don't want to talk about it you can say look, I don't have anything to say about that. Okay?” Detective Patterson next read Robinson the first three questions on the PD–47. Robinson answered “yes” to each question, both orally and by putting a checkmark next to the corresponding “yes” on the form. Patterson deliberately omitted reading the fourth question, and Robinson did not respond to that question on the form.1

According to the government's proffer of facts supporting the guilty pleas, Robinson admitted to carrying a .40 caliber pistol “from one location in the Kenilworth neighborhood of Washington, D.C., to the 1500 block of 45th Street NE, Washington, D.C.” and, after an altercation with Howard Sampler at that location, to firing the pistol “multiple times.” Robinson claimed that he acted in self-defense.

From the time he spoke to Detective Patterson in May until late November, Robinson remained incarcerated for violating his probation. On November 27, 2012, a “couple days” after Robinson had been released, Detective Patterson both called Robinson and went to his mother's house (where Robinson was baby-sitting his two-year-old daughter) to tell him that they needed to speak. When Robinson did not come to the police station, Detective Patterson contacted Robinson and also called Sheila Cacho (the mother of Robinson's daughter).2

When Detective Patterson found out that Robinson was no longer baby-sitting, he returned to Robinson's mother's house with two other officers. Robinson's mother cracked open the door and informed the officers that Robinson was not there. Insisting that Robinson was in the house, the officers pushed their way inside and, without invitation or warrant, searched for Robinson.3 Extremely upset, Robinson's mother called him and told him that [h]e needs to go down there and take care of it and don't come back to my house until it's done.”

Robinson soon reported to the police station. Detective Patterson led Robinson through several “locked”4 doors to an interrogation room for a second taped interview. At the end of that interview, Detective Patterson arrested Robinson.

On April 22, 2013, Robinson entered conditional pleas of guilty to carrying a pistol without a license, D.C.Code § 22–4504(a)

; possession of an unregistered firearm, D.C.Code § 7–2502.01(a) ; and unlawful possession of ammunition, D.C.Code § 7–2506.01(3). In return, the government agreed not to introduce any part of the plea “in any future proceeding that may arise out of the circumstances of the death of Howard Sampler.” Robinson also reserved the right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress, see Super. Ct. Crim. R. 11(a)(2).

II. The May Interview

Appellant first contends that the trial court erred in declining to suppress the statement he gave in May because he was not properly advised of, and did not completely waive, his Miranda rights.5 We review the trial court's “legal conclusions concerning the validity of a Miranda waiver de novo. In re M.A., 33 A.3d 378, 381 (D.C.2011)

.

Miranda requires that police ‘adequately and effectively’ warn a suspect of his or her right to remain silent and to have an attorney present during custodial interrogation if the suspect's statements are to be admissible at trial.” In re S.W., 124 A.3d 89, 95 (D.C.2015)

(citation omitted). “After receiving this warning, a suspect may opt to waive his or her rights.” Id. (citation omitted). The accepted practice is for the police to seek “an express written or oral statement of waiver,” which “is usually strong proof of the validity of that waiver.” North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979). Even so, “an explicit statement ... is not invariably necessary to support a finding that the defendant waived the right to remain silent or the right to counsel.” Id. at 375–76, 99 S.Ct. 1755. Waiver may be implied through a defendant's uncoerced statement “coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct” contrary to those rights. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 384, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) (citation omitted).

“As in every waiver case, the government has the burden of showing an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of the right.” Ruffin v. United States, 524 A.2d 685, 700 (D.C.1987)

(quoting Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977) ).

The government argues that Detective Patterson properly advised Robinson of his Miranda rights and that Robinson validly waived them. We agree that Detective Patterson read Robinson the Miranda warnings completely and accurately, and we reject appellant's argument that Detective Patterson's “embellishment” to Miranda (telling Robinson that we don't provide you a lawyer here”) intentionally “obfuscated” the standard Miranda warnings and left Robinson “uncomprehending of and inattentive to the Miranda right to counsel.”6 As the trial court found, this additional statement was not “an impermissible embellishment of the Miranda rights.” See Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203–05, 109 S.Ct. 2875, 106 L.Ed.2d 166 (1989)

(informing suspect that a lawyer would be appointed “if and when you go to court did not render Miranda warnings inadequate). Appellant was therefore properly advised of his Miranda rights.

Moreover, Detective Patterson reread to Robinson the standard advice about his right to remain silent,7 Robinson acknowledged that he understood (“Yeah, I understand”), checked “yes” next to the second PD–47 question (“Do you understand these rights?”), and signed the bottom of the PD–47 form (below all four questions) where it says “Signature of defendant.” These actions persuasively demonstrate Robinson's “awareness of the right to remain silent and a decision to forego that right.”8 ( Steven) Robinson v. United States, 928 A.2d 717, 725 (D.C.2007)

(emphasis added). By contrast, Robinson did not expressly waive his distinct right to have a lawyer present during questioning.

Robinson never stated or checked “yes” after the fourth PD–47 question (“Are you willing to answer any questions without having an attorney present?”) because Detective Patterson deliberately refrained from asking him the question. This omission is not necessarily fatal, and there is no per se rule precluding the government from proving a suspect's abandonment of his Miranda rights through a combination of express and implied waivers.9 However, we repeat the caveat that “if [waiver] forms are to be utilized[,] it would be the better practice to have them completed before questioning a suspect,” In re M.D.J., 346 A.2d 733, 735 (D.C.1975)

(emphasis added). When conducting our de novo review, this court is entitled to be skeptical in a case like this, where an officer deliberately pursues some express waivers but purposefully fails to complete the PD–47, relegating the government to arguing that there was an implied waiver of a key right.

That skepticism is enhanced in the instant case, where Detective Patterson apparently did not appreciate the distinction between PD–47 question three (“Do you wish to answer any questions?”) and question four...

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3 books & journal articles
  • Litigating Miranda Rights
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Suppressing Criminal Evidence - 2017 Contents
    • August 4, 2017
    ...telling him that he couldn’t have a lawyer until after he went to court, the court held the waiver invalid. Robinson v. United States , 142 A.3d 565, 572 (D.C. App. 2016). §10:02 Purpose of Warnings The purpose of giving a person Miranda warnings is to protect against the overwhelming coerc......
  • Litigating miranda rights
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Suppressing Criminal Evidence - 2020 Contents
    • July 31, 2020
    ...telling him that he couldn’t have a lawyer until after he went to court, the court held the waiver invalid. Robinson v. United States , 142 A.3d 565, 572 (D.C. App. 2016). §10:02 Purpose of Warnings The purpose of giving a person Miranda warnings is to protect against the overwhelming coerc......
  • Litigating miranda rights
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Suppressing Criminal Evidence Confessions and other statements
    • April 1, 2022
    ...telling him that he couldn’t have a lawyer until after he went to court, the court held the waiver invalid. Robinson v. United States , 142 A.3d 565, 572 (D.C. App. 2016). §10:02 Purpose of Warnings The purpose of giving Miranda warnings is to protect against the overwhelming coercive power......

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