Rochester v. State

• Decision Date: 05 June 2014
• Docket Number: No. SC12–1932.,SC12–1932.
• Parties: Kemar ROCHESTER, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

140 So.3d 973

Kemar ROCHESTER, Petitioner,

v.STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. SC12–1932.

Supreme Court of Florida.

June 5, 2014.

Carol Stafford Haughwout, Public Defender, and Ian Eric Seldin, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, FL, for Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, and Consiglia Terenzio, Bureau Chief, and Richard Chambers Valuntas, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, FL, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

This case is before the Court for review of the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in Rochester v. State, 95 So.3d 407 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012), which the Fourth District certified is in direct conflict with the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in Montgomery v. State, 36 So.3d 188 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010).¹ For the reasons explained below, we approve the Fourth District's holding that section 775.082(3)(a) 4., Florida Statutes (2008), imposes a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years' imprisonment for adults convicted of lewd or lascivious molestation of a child under the age of twelve.

I. BACKGROUND

Kemar Rochester was convicted of lewd or lascivious molestation of a child under the age of twelve in violation of section 800.04(5)(b), Florida Statutes (2008). Prior to sentencing, Rochester filed a motion seeking a downward departure sentence pursuant to section 921.0026(2)(j), Florida Statutes (2008), which provides for downward departures in sentencing if certain mitigating circumstances are present.² The trial court found that it had no discretion to impose a downward departure sentence, even though it was inclined to do so, because section 775.082(3)(a) 4. imposed a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years' imprisonment for violations of section 800.04(5)(b). Therefore, the trial court denied Rochester's motion and sentenced him to twenty-five years in prison.

The Fourth District affirmed the trial court, concluding that the legislature intended to impose a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years' imprisonment in section 775.082(3)(a) 4. Rochester, 95 So.3d at 410. In so holding, the Fourth District certified conflict with the Second District's decision in Montgomery, which concluded that the legislature did not intend to impose a mandatory minimum sentence in this section. Id. at 411.

II. ANALYSIS

Lewd or lascivious molestation of a child under twelve by an adult is “a life felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.082(3)(a) 4.” § 800.04(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2008). Section 775.082(3)(a) 4. provides as follows:

(3) A person who has been convicted of any other designated felony may be punished as follows:

(a) ....

....

4.a. Except as provided in sub-subparagraph b., for a life felony committed on or after September 1, 2005, which is a violation of s. 800.04(5)(b), by:

(I) A term of imprisonment for life; or

(II) A split sentence that is a term of not less than 25 years' imprisonment and not exceeding life imprisonment, followed by probation or community control for the remainder of the person's natural life, as provided in s. 948.012(4).

b. For a life felony committed on or after July 1, 2008, which is a person's second or subsequent violation of s. 800.04(5)(b), by a term of imprisonment for life.

The certified conflict issue in this case is whether the twenty-five year sentence set forth in subsection (3)(a)4.a(II) above is a mandatory minimum sentence.³ This involves an issue of statutory interpretation and is subject to de novo review. See Johnson v. State, 78 So.3d 1305, 1310 (Fla.2012) (“Judicial interpretations of statutes are pure questions of law subject to de novo review.”). When construing a statute, we have stated that “ ‘[l]egislative intent guides statutory analysis, and to discern that intent we must look first to the language of the statute and its plain meaning.’ ” Tasker v. State, 48 So.3d 798, 804 (Fla.2010) (quoting Fla. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs. v. P.E., 14 So.3d 228, 234 (Fla.2009)).

We find that, contrary to Rochester's argument, the use of the term “may” in section 775.082(3) does not give the trial court the broad discretion to impose a downward departure sentence of less than twenty-five years' imprisonment. Rather, when section 775.082(3)(a) 4. is read as a whole, it is clear that the phrase “may be punished as follows” in subsection 775.082(3) is simply referring to the trial court's discretion to choose among the two sentencing alternatives listed in section 775.082(3)(a) 4.—life imprisonment or a sentence of not less than twenty-five years followed by community control or probation for the rest of the offender's life. Furthermore, the use of the phrase “of not less than 25 years” establishes that the twenty-five year sentence set forth in this section is a mandatory minimum sentence. See Stoletz v. State, 875 So.2d 572, 576 (Fla.2004) (acknowledging that the phrase “for not less than 5 years” in section 322.28(2)(a)(2), Florida Statutes (1999), established a mandatory minimum period for license revocation). Therefore, while the statute does give the trial court some discretion in which sentence it chooses to impose for violations of section 800.04(5)(b), under the plain meaning of the statutory language the trial court does not have the discretion to impose a sentence below the twenty-five year minimum set forth in section 775.082(3)(a) 4.a(II).

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, we approve the decision of the Fourth District in Rochester and disapprove the Second District's decision in Montgomery to the extent that it is inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

POLSTON, C.J., and LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

PARIENTE, J., dissents with an opinion.

PARIENTE, J., dissenting.

I dissent because the applicable statute does not preclude trial courts from imposing a downward departure sentence. Specifically, unlike a “mandatory minimum” statute that requires the defendant to serve a minimum sentence day-for-day, section 775.082(3)(a) 4., Florida Statutes (2008), does not contain any language indicating that the twenty-five-year sentencing minimum it sets forth is a “mandatory minimum” sentence that must be served day-for-day, or that the application of gain time or other early release schemes is prohibited.

In my view, because there is no requirement that the defendant serve the twenty-five-year minimum sentence provided in section 775.082(3)(a) 4. day-for-day, the Fourth District Court of Appeal erred in concluding that the trial court, which considered the twenty-five-year sentence in this case to be “extremely excessive,” was precluded from downwardly departing. Accordingly, Rochester—who was initially offered a sentence of seven and a half years by the State—should be resentenced.

At the heart of this case rests a question of statutory construction regarding whether the sentencing minimum provided by section 775.082(3)(a) 4. is a “mandatory minimum” sentence that must be served day-for-day. Contrary to the majority's construction of the statute, nothing within section 775.082(3)(a) 4. expressly precludes a trial court from imposing a downward departure sentence. In addition, as even the State concedes in this proceeding, nothing within the statute precludes the defendant from receiving gain time, as in other statutes that provide for a “mandatory minimum” sentence that must be served day-for-day, and this Court should at least make that point clear. Absent these express prohibitions against a downward departure sentence and the application of gain time, the trial court was not prohibited from downwardly departing from the minimum twenty-five-year sentencing option provided in the statute, as the majority erroneously concludes, and the defendant's sentence is subject to gain time and other possible early release schemes.

Although the majority's statutory construction analysis focuses solely on the impact of the word “may” in the statute, the specific question for this Court to resolve is whether the Legislature has expressly precluded trial courts from imposing a downward departure sentence of less than the twenty-five-year sentencing minimum provided in the statute—assuming the statutory requirements for a downward departure sentence are satisfied—and whether the defendant's sentence is subject to gain time. The Fourth District and this Court have determined that the use of the word “may” within the statute is permissive in allowing a trial court the choice of only the sentencing alternatives within section 775.082(3)(a) 4. itself, which requires either a sentence of life imprisonment or a sentence of not less than twenty-five years followed by probation or community control for the remainder of the defendant's natural life. See majority op. at 4; Rochester v. State, 95 So.3d 407, 410 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). I disagree with this construction that the two sentences provided in the statute are the only sentencing options for a trial court to consider.

To the contrary, as is generally true with sentencing statutes unless otherwise expressly stated, nothing within section 775.082(3)(a) 4. precludes a trial court from imposing a downward departure sentence if the statutory criteria of sections 921.0026 and 921.00265, Florida Statutes, concerning the requirements and mitigating circumstances for which a departure is reasonably justified, are met. This is because, although the sentencing minimum mandated by section 775.082(3)(a) 4. is twenty-five years, the sentence is not a “mandatory minimum” sentence that must be served day-for-day such as those set forth in, for example, sections 775.082(9)(b) or 893.135(3), Florida Statutes, which contain specific language indicating that the sentence is a “mandatory minimum” or that the defendant is not eligible for any form of early release. See§ 775.082(9)(b), Fla. Stat. (2008) (“A person sentenced under paragraph (a) shall be released only by expiration of sentence and shall not be eligible for...