Rockingham Electrical Supply Co., Inc. v. Wright-Ryan Construction, Inc.
| Decision Date | 14 February 2017 |
| Docket Number | CV-15-36 |
| Parties | ROCKINGHAM ELECTRICAL SUPPLY COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff v. WRIGHT-RYAN CONSTRUCTION, INC., Defendant |
| Court | Superior Court of Maine |
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND FOR SANCTIONS
Defendant Wright-Ryan Construction, Inc. ("Wright-Ryan") moves for summary judgment on the sole count of the amended complaint made by Plaintiff Rockingham Electrical Supply Company, Inc. ("Rockingham") to enforce a mechanic's lien. See 10 M.R.S. § 3251, et seq. (2015); M.R. Civ. P. 56. Also before the Court is Wright-Ryan's motion for sanctions against Rockingham. See M.R. Civ. P. 11. For the following reasons Wright-Ryan's motion for summary judgment is denied Rockingham's amended complaint is dismissed with prejudice, and the Court will consider further arguments on possible sanctions.
Wright-Ryan was the general contractor under a contract with the Trustees of Lincoln Academy (the "Owner") to complete work at the Owner's property in Newcastle, Maine (the "Property"). (Def.'s S.M.F. ¶ 1.) Wright-Ryan entered into a subcontract with TRT Electric, Inc. ("TRT") to complete work and improvements at the Property. (Id. ¶ 2.)
Rockingham claims that, pursuant to a contract, it provided TRT goods and materials that were related to improvements at the Property. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 4.) Rockingham claims that TRT owes it $43, 308.59 for those goods and materials. (Id. ¶ 5.) Rockingham did not have a contract with either Wright-Ryan or the Owner. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 7.)
On or about August 10, 2015, Rockingham filed a "CERTIFICATE OF MECHANIC'S LIEN and STATEMENT OF LIEN CLAIM" (the "Lien Certificate") with the Lincoln County Registry of Deeds. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 10.) There is no other lien certificate recorded by Rockingham against the Property. (Id. ¶ 12.) The final paragraph in the body of the Lien Certificate reads as follows:
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Rockingham Electrical Supply Company, Inc. has caused its name to be hereunto affixed and this Certificate to be signed and sworn this 3rd day of August, 2015.
(Pl's Opp. S.M.F. ¶ 11 ().) The notary attestation on the Lien
Certificate reads as follows:
Personally appeared, Karen Lane, duly authorized, known to me, or satisfactorily proven to be the person whose name is subscribed to the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged that s/he executed the same for purposes therein contained in his/her capacity as Credit Manager of the Company.
(Id. ().)
On August 13, 2015, counsel for Wright-Ryan emailed counsel for Rockingham "seeking to negotiate the voluntary bonding off of Rockingham's lien." (Def.'s S.M.F. ¶ 15.) In the body of the email, counsel for Wright-Ryan wrote, "Please let me know Rockingham Electric's position regarding this request and, if they are amendable to the agreement, if you have any changes to it." (Def.'s Opp. to Pl's S. AddT M.F. ¶ 35.) Counsel for Wright-Ryan attached to the email (1) a proposed agreement entitled "Agreement to Discharge of Lien by Bond as Substitute Security" with signature lines for both Wright-Ryan and Rockingham, (2) a "Discharge of Lien" with a signature line for Rockingham, and (3) a copy of the fully executed "Release of Lien Bond" that Wright-Ryan proposed to deliver to Rockingham if an agreement was reached. (Def.'s S.M.F. ¶ 16.)
Rockingham asserts that it accepted Wright-Ryan's August 13 offer on September 18, 2015, when counsel for Rockingham executed the proposed agreement and lien discharge and returned the two documents to counsel for Wright-Ryan. (Pl's S. Add'l M.F. ¶ 39 (denied).) Wright-Ryan asserts that Rockingham did not accept Wright-Ryan's offer, but rather "offered a new draft agreement... as a counteroffer."(Def.'s S.M.F. ¶¶ 18, 19 (both denied).) However, Wright-Ryan effectively admits that the "new draft agreement" is identical to the proposed agreement attached to the August 13 email. (Pl's S. Add'l M.F. ¶ 36 ().) Confusingly, Wright-Ryan also asserts that the August 13 email to which Rockingham allegedly replied with a counteroffer was not an offer at all, "but at best a solicitation for an offer." (Def.'s Opp. to Pl's S. Add'l M.F. ¶ 35.)
On October 1, 2015, Wright-Ryan proposed a modification to the proposed agreement that Rockingham had executed. (Def.'s S.M.F. ¶ 24.) Rockingham rejected the proposed modification. (Id. ¶ 25.) Wright-Ryan has not counter-executed the proposed agreement, and the Lien Certificate has not been discharged or vacated. (Id. ¶¶ 21, 29.) In addition, no party has petitioned the Court under 10 M.R.S.A. § 3263 to release the lien on the Property or to accept a bond as alternate security for the lien on the Property. (Id. ¶¶ 32, 33.)
Rockingham brought its initial complaint to enforce the lien, dated September 18, 2015, against TRT, TRT's president, and Wright-Ryan. By order dated April 11, 2016, the Court ordered Rockingham to file within ten days an amended complaint "stating specifically in each count the relief sought, what party or parties the relief is sought against, and the factual basis for such claims." On April 21, 2016, Rockingham filed the amended complaint against Wright-Ryan.
Wright-Ryan moves for summary judgment on the sole count of the amended complaint.
Summary judgment is appropriate if, based on the parties' statements of material facts and the cited record, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. M.R. Civ. P. 56(c); Dyer v. Dep't of Transp., 2008 ME 106, ¶ 14, 951 A.2d 821. Id. (citations omitted). When deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id.
However, the Court cannot reach the merits of a matter if it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter at issue. Tomer v. Me. Human Rights Comm'n, 2008 ME 190, ¶ 15, 962 A.2d 335. Although Wright-Ryan does not move to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss an action if it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter at issue therein. M.R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). See also Jensen v. Jensen, 2015 ME 105, ¶ 11, 121 A.3d 809 (quoting Foley v. Ziegler, 2005 ME 117, ¶ 8, 887 A.2d 36) ("the issue of a court's authority may be raised sua sponte at any point.").
Wright-Ryan argues that the Lien Certificate is invalid because it does not contain a proper jurat.[1] (Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. 8 (citing Pineland Lumber Co, v. Robinson, 382 A.2d 33, 38 (Me. 1978)).) Rockingham admits that the Lien Certificate contains only an acknowledgement by the notary public, not a jurat, but argues that the Lien Certificate is sufficient nonetheless. (Def.'s S.M.F. ¶ 11; Pl's Opp. to Def.'s S.M.F. ¶ 11.)
Under Maine statutory law, a claimant who furnishes materials used for the improvement of a building has a lien on the building property to secure payment for such materials, provided that the materials were furnished pursuant to a contract with the property owner or with the property owner's consent. 10 M.R.S. § 3251. However, that lien is dissolved unless the claimant properly files a lien statement within 90 days after furnishing the materials. 10 M.R.S. § 3253(1)(A). The lien statement "must be subscribed and sworn to by the person claiming the lien, or by someone on the claimant's behalf." Id. (emphasis added).
The court generally interprets the mechanic's liens statutes liberally to effectuate the dual purpose of affording security to claimants and providing notice to owners and purchasers. HCI Corp. v. Voikos Constr. Co., 581 A.2d 795, 798 (Me. 1990). However, this liberal statutory construction only applies when no express statutory command has been disobeyed (i.e. when the claimant is within the statute). Island Terrace Condo. Owners Ass'n v. Coastal Constr. & Landscaping, Inc., No. RE-02-090, 2005 Me. Super LEXIS 18, at *5-6 (Jan. 10, 2005) (citing Pineland Lumber Co. v. Robinson, 382 A.2d 33, 36 (Me. 1978); Twin Island Dev. Corp. v. Winchester, 512 A.2d 319, 323 (Me. 1986); Combustion Eng'g v. Miller Hydro Group, 577 A.2d 1186, 1188 (Me. 1990)). In order to be sufficient under the statute, a lien statement must be subscribed and sworn, "which only the affixed jurat or certificate by the officer administrating the oath can adduce." Pineland Lumber Co., 382 A.2d at 38.
A claimant was not within the statute, therefore, when the notary subscription on the claimant's lien statement was a "mere acknowledgement" that the subscriber was the claimant or the claimant's agent and that the instrument was the claimant's free act and deed. Id. at 39. Because the claimant was not within the statute, the attempted lien was invalid and the trial court was correct to dismiss the claimant's suit. Id.
Rockingham attempts to distinguish Pineland and argues that the Lien Certificate is sufficient despite the lack of a jurat because the body of the Lien Certificate contains language stating that "IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Rockingham caused its name to be hereunto affixed and this Certificate to be signed and sworn . . . ." (Pl's Opp. to Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. 5.) However, the Court in Pineland held that the lien oath requirement was not satisfied even when the body of the lien statement contained language stating that the claimant "certif [ied] on oath" that it was a true statement. Pineland Lumber Co., 382 A.2d at 35. The language "to be signed and sworn" sounds...
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