Rocky Hill Inc. Dist. v. Hartford Rayon Corp.

Decision Date08 January 1937
Citation122 Conn. 392,190 A. 264
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesROCKY HILL INCORPORATED DIST. v. HARTFORD RAYON CORPORATION et al.

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; Newell Jennings, Judge.

Action by the Rocky Hill Incorporated District against the Belamose Corporation, the name of which was changed after the bringing of the action to the Hartford Rayon Corporation, to recover taxes assessed and levied upon property of the defendant tried by the court. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

Remanded with direction to amend as to error in amount of judgment only.

William H. Blodgett and Howard E. Hausman, both of Hartford, for appellants.

Ernest L. Averill and Albert S. Bill, both of Hartford, for appellee.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HINMAN, BANKS, AVERY, and BROWN, JJ.

HINMAN, Judge.

The complaint sought recovery of taxes assessed and levied by the plaintiff upon property of the defendant in 1932, 1933, 1934, and 1935. The defendant by special defenses raised the issues, first, whether all or any part of the property of the defendant is within the limits of the plaintiff district; second, if it is, whether its inclusion therein under the circumstances is unconstitutional; and, third, whether the taxes sought to be collected are invalid because of certain omissions in the proceedings pertaining to their assessment. The points involved in this appeal are substantially those above mentioned as presented by the special defenses and we consider them in their order, stating in connection with each such of the material facts as are essential to the discussion.

The real estate upon which the taxes here concerned were assessed is owned by the defendant the Belamose Corporation, the name of which has been changed since the action was brought to the Hartford Rayon Corporation, and all of the property the taxation of which is involved was owned by it on the respective taxing dates. In October, 1929, at a town meeting of the town of Rocky Hill, the selectmen were delegated to appoint a committee to investigate the matter of obtaining water for the town, which committee in its findings and report to the adjourned town meeting in March, 1930, considered and proposed a district which included the property of the defendant. On January 3, 1931, a special meeting was held pursuant to the provisions of sections 544 and 545 of the General Statutes, to act upon a petition of " voters and taxpayers in the town of Rocky Hill, residing within the district bounded on the north by the town line; on the west by Bailey Road and Bailey Road extension, crossing West Street or Retreat Road to a point opposite the South School; on the south by an imaginary line running from said point to the Connecticut River; on the east by the Connecticut River to the Ferry Landing and from that point by the Old Meadow Road to the northern boundary line," requesting the selectmen to call such meeting for " the formation of a Water District within the above described boundaries" and " the obtaining of such authority as may be necessary within the District to construct and maintain sidewalks, crosswalks, drains and sewers, to establish water works to supply water for domestic, commercial and fire protection purposes within said District, to name the district, to choose necessary officers, to provide for the expense incidental to the formation of the district, therefore to lay and collect taxes to accomplish the purposes of said District and to transact any other business proper to come before said meeting." At this meeting resolutions were adopted " that a district be formed for any and all purposes set forth in section 545 of the General Statutes" ; and " that said District may construct and maintain sidewalks, crosswalks, drains, and sewers, and to establish water works to supply water for domestic, commercial, and fire protection purposes within said district." Resolutions were also adopted naming the district and specifying the officers thereof, officers were elected to hold office until the next annual meeting, and a resolution was passed " that at the expense of the district the President forthwith cause a survey to be made of the territorial limits of said district," also one appointing a committee to prepare and obtain legislation giving the district " the necessary power to construct or purchase water works and to purchase and distribute water."

Pursuant to the resolution authorizing him to do so, the district president, Charles E. Holmes, employed Chester W. Ladd, a land surveyor, to make a survey of the territorial limits of the district, the results of which were set forth in a technical description, which was recorded early in March, 1931, in the town records of Rocky Hill and were delineated on a map, referred to in the description, which was filed in April, in the office of the town clerk. In making the survey Ladd was instructed by Holmes as to where the lines should be drawn, the southerly boundary line being located after a conference between Holmes, Ladd, and Edmond W. Courtney, first selectman of the town of Rocky Hill. The location of the east, north, and west boundaries is not challenged by the defendant, the disputed portion being the south boundary, described in the petition and notice leading up to the formation of the district as " on the south by an imaginary line running from [a point opposite the South School] to the Connecticut River." The line as surveyed and shown on the map runs, by varying courses, in a generally southeasterly direction from the designated starting point to the river, and passes a short distance southerly of, and includes within the district, the group of factory buildings of the defendant. The defendant claims that this line as so laid out is inadmissible under any reasonable interpretation of the description in the petition, and that, instead, the boundary should be a straight line, running from the beginning point due east to the river or to the nearest point on the river, or on a line parallel with the northern boundary of the district. A boundary following any one of these suggested lines would terminate at the river about one-third of a mile northerly from the present termination and would include in the district none of the defendant's property.

Whatever might be our conclusion as to these claims, the defendant's laches and tardiness in advancing them and the consequences thereof are such as to estop it from now asserting them. The finding shows that before the line was surveyed Holmes informed officials of the defendant that it was being laid out and that the surveyor would enter upon its property for that purpose. At the time of the survey four monuments were placed along the line on the defendant's land. Officials of the company knew of the pendency in the General Assembly and the contents of the bill authorizing the district to provide for a water supply, also of a bill authorizing the district to issue water bonds, which was passed (21 Special Laws 1931, p. 348), and, pursuant to the authority granted by it, bonds in the amount of $100,000 were issued. The defendant had at least constructive notice of all town and district meetings, through notices placed, at its request, on a special bulletin board in its factory, and on and after April, 1931, of the boundaries of the district, by the map on file. After the receipt of the first tax bill, in May, 1932, the defendant protested and refused to pay the tax, but made no claim that its property was not within the district, and it took no action prior to the commencement of the present suit to have the taxes declared illegal on that ground or to have the validity of the south boundary line adjudicated. Instead, the officers of the company recognized the fact that its property was within the district and were seeking a means of withdrawing therefrom. In the meantime taxes for four years had been assessed, those against the defendant being from 22 to 26 per cent of the total tax levy of the district, and bonds had been issued the interest and payments on account of principal of which, as well as all other expenses of the district, were made payable from taxes. Manifestly serious public inconvenience, confusion, and injury would result from an adjudication, now, excluding the defendant's property from the district, which could have been avoided had the defendant asserted its claim thereto with reasonable promptness.

" Every applicant to a court whose claim, if granted, must invite consequences of such serious import, should be held to have waived his right to make such a contention where he has had a fair opportunity to make it, and failed to avail himself of it, and thereafter rights, public or private, have intervened which will be prejudiced if the applicant shall succeed." Coombs v. Larson, 112 Conn. 236, 246 152 A. 297, 301. This principle is as applicable to cases of inclusion of property within the limits of a municipal corporation in its formation as it has been held to be in cases of subsequent annexation. 1 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (2d Ed.) § 306. " If a taxpayer were permitted to long acquiesce in [an] order of annexation and then secure its overthrow, great confusion would ensue and much injustice be often done. High considerations of public policy and of justice require that a taxpayer who is notified that a public corporation claims to have extended its limits so as to take in his property should act with promptness and proceed with diligence, if he would resist the attempted annexation." Strosser v. Fort Wayne, 100 Ind. 443, 449; Kuhn v. Port Townsend, 12 Wash 605, 614, 41 P. 923, 29 L.R.A. 445, 50 Am.St.Rep. 911; Black v. Brinkley, 54 Ark. 372, 15 S.W. 1030; Rural Special School...

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  • Comm'r of Pub. Safety v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n Tax Assessor of The Town of North Stonington v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n Judicial Branch v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n Afscme, s. 18617
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 28 Junio 2011
    ...given the long tradition of the openness of grand lists.7 See, e.g., [301 Conn. 348 , 21 A.3d 752] Rocky Hill Inc. District v. Hartford Rayon Corp., 122 Conn. 392, 403, 190 A. 264 (1937); Davis v. Freedom of Information Commission, 47 Conn.Supp. 309, 310, 790 A.2d 1188 (2001), aff'd, 259 Co......
  • White Sands Beach Ass'n, Inc. v. Bombaci
    • United States
    • Connecticut Superior Court
    • 15 Diciembre 2006
    ...overruled. The cited case was an action by a quasi-municipal corporation to collect four years of back taxes from the defendant. Id., at 394, 190 A. 264. A special defense was interposed, claiming that the defendant's real property was not included within the survey describing the territori......
  • Comm'r of Pubilc Safety v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n—concurrence
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • 28 Junio 2011
    ...analysis pursuant to § 1-2z, given the long tradition of the openness of grand lists.7 See, e.g., Rocky Hill Inc. District v. Hartford Rayon Corp., 122 Conn. 392, 403, 190 A. 264 (1937); Davis v. Freedom of Information Commission, 47 Conn. Sup. 309, 310, 790 A.2d 1188 (2001), aff'd, 259 Con......
  • Wysocki v. Town of Ellington
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • 22 Julio 2008
    ...conclusions, are exclusively in his interest." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Rocky Hill Inc. District v. Hartford Rayon Corp., 122 Conn. 392, 403, 190 A. 264 (1937). Applying these principles in the present case, we conclude that the notice required by § 12-111 is a ......
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