Rodriguez Narvaez v. Nazario

• Decision Date: 31 October 1989
• Docket Number: No. 89-1111,89-1111
• Citation: 895 F.2d 38
• Parties: Alicia RODRIGUEZ NARVAEZ, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Ariel NAZARIO, etc., et al., Defendants, Appellees. . Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 38

895 F.2d 38

Alicia RODRIGUEZ NARVAEZ, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. Ariel NAZARIO, etc., et al., Defendants, Appellees.

No. 89-1111.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard Oct. 31, 1989.

Decided Feb. 5, 1990.

Frank Rodriguez Garcia, with whom, Francisco J. Rodriguez Juarbe, was on brief, for plaintiff, appellant.

Vanessa Ramirez, Asst. Sol. Gen., with whom Jorge E. Perez Diaz, Sol. Gen. and Norma Cotti Cruz, Deputy Sol. Gen., Dept. of Justice, were on brief, for defendants, appellees.

Before TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge, COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge, and PEREZ-GIMENEZ, ^* District Judge.

PEREZ-GIMENEZ, District Judge.

In the tradition of the long line of political discrimination cases arising from the federal trial courts of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, plaintiff-appellant Alicia Rodriguez Narvaez instituted this civil rights action against officials of the Island's Housing Department for a mid-quadrennium transfer which she perceived to be motivated on political grounds. Both parties then loosed a series of motions centering on the issue of the timeliness of the complaint and the District Court ultimately dismissed the action as being time-barred. It is from this dismissal that plaintiff now appeals in a Lazarus-like effort to resurrect her claim. A careful review of appellant's arguments, however, leaves us unpersuaded, and we therefore affirm.

I

Although this appeal ultimately hinges on a determination of a couple of mixed questions of fact and law, the facts germane to this controversy are, for the most part, not in dispute. We summarize them in compendiary fashion, then survey the applicable law.

A

Plaintiff-appellant was hired by the Urban Renewal and Housing Corporation of Puerto Rico (CRUV) for a career position as a legal secretary on or about the year 1972. During the next 15 years or so she was promoted several times within both the CRUV and Housing Department of Puerto Rico. In the dawning days of 1986, however, the winds of change began to blow. On January 21, 1986, Rodriguez Narvaez was notified by codefendant-appellee Jose L. Purcell--then Deputy Secretary of Legal Affairs of the Housing Department--that she would be transferred to the Litigation Division of the Housing Department. The transfer was considered by plaintiff to be a demotion.

Though somewhat slow in reacting, appellant eventually let the fact be known that she had not taken her "demotion" lightly. On September 1, 1986, she sent a letter through her attorney to codefendant-appellee Ariel Nazario--then Secretary of the Housing Department--requesting reinstatement to her previous position in the office of the Deputy Secretary for Legal Affairs. The letter, among other things, alleged that the transfer was the result of political discrimination and failed to comport with the Public Service Personnel Act of Puerto Rico. The letter also closed with a veiled threat, as it stated that it (the letter) was "a step which I deem proper before initiating any legal proceedings under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983."

On October 24, 1986, the Secretary answered appellant's letter. Outside counsel had been assigned to investigate Rodriguez Narvaez's transfer, the letter read, and any political wrongdoing was vigorously denied. In a move which more than anything else provided appellant with the strongest argument she would be able to present on her behalf, the letter stated that he "ha[d] given instructions to counsel [codefendant-appellee] Purcell to reinstate Mrs. Rodriguez to her usual place of work and to continue assigning her duties becoming her position."

In the latter days of October, 1986, appellant met with Purcell and an agreement was reached regarding her reinstatement. Days became nights and nights became days, however, and there was no positive action on defendants' part, so Rodriguez Narvaez wrote a second letter, this time addressed to Purcell, requesting only her reinstatement. The letter was dated March 12, 1987, and a copy of it was sent to Secretary Nazario.

On August 1, 1987, codefendant Pablo J. Santiago was appointed to replace Purcell. Appellant immediately made Santiago aware of her reinstatement dispute. Whatever negotiations took place this time around, it appears, were carried out strictly on verbal terms. After a couple of months of roundabouts, however, Santiago informed appellant that "pressure from above" prevented him from reinstating her.

Appellant filed her Section 1983 complaint on October 5, 1987, seeking damages for violation of her civil rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, as well as injunctive relief by way of reinstatement. After some preliminary skirmishing, on January 28, 1988, defendant-appellees filed a Fed.R.Civ.P.Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss on statute of limitation grounds. Oppositions and replies followed, discovery was completed, and the case was set for trial on May 6, 1988. On April 25, 1988, however, the District Court entered an Order vacating the trial setting. On December 6, 1988, the Court entered its Opinion and Order dismissing the action on statute of limitation grounds, 703 F.Supp. 3. This appeal ensued.

B

The parties agree, as they must, over the law to be applied to the instant case. Section 1988 ¹ of the Civil Rights Acts directs courts to resort to a three-step process in order to determine the rules of decision applicable to civil rights claims:

First, courts are to look to the laws of the United States "so far as such laws are suitable to carry [the civil and criminal civil rights statutes] into effect." If no suitable federal rule exists, courts undertake the second step by considering application of state "common law, as modified and changed by the Constitution and statutes" of the forum State. A third step asserts the predominance of the federal interest: courts are to apply state law only if it is not "inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States."

Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 47-48, 104 S.Ct. 2924, 2928, 82 L.Ed.2d 36 (1983) (quoting 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988). Civil rights actions are characterized by the fact that Sec. 1983 does not contain a specific statute of limitations, "a void which is commonplace in federal statutory law." Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483, 100 S.Ct. 1790, 1794, 64 L.Ed.2d 440 (1983). Consequently, courts have been encouraged to "borrow" ² the state statute of limitations which is "most appropriate," Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 1721, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975), or "most analogous," Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 488, 100 S.Ct. at 1797; Rivera Fernandez v. Chardon, 648 F.2d 765 (1st Cir.1981); Ramirez de Arellano v. Alvarez de Choudens, 575 F.2d 315 (1st Cir.1978), to the particular Section 1983 claim, as long as that statute is not inconsistent with federal law and policy. ³ See generally, Owens v. Okure, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 573, 576, 102 L.Ed.2d 594 (1989).

The search for the "most analogous" state limitations period predictably produced numerous and contrasting results. ⁴ In Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 272, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1945, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1984), the Supreme Court offered to put an end to this confusion by adopting a "simple, broad characterization of all Sec. 1983 claims." After noting that the question of characterization is a matter of federal, not state law, ⁵ an examination of the statute's legislative history and of the vast array of actions now embraced by it led the Court to conclude that "[h]ad the 42d Congress expressly focused on the issue decided today, ... it would have characterized Sec. 1983 as conferring a general remedy for injuries to personal rights." Id., 471 U.S. at 278, 105 S.Ct. at 1948. See also Small v. Inhabitants of City of Belfast, 796 F.2d 544 (1st Cir.1986), and Altair Corp. v. Pesquera de Busquets, 769 F.2d 30 (1st Cir.1985). Therefore, the most analogous state limitations period will generally be the one reserved for personal torts. ⁶

The borrowing, we suggest, did not stop there. In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. at 464, 95 S.Ct. at 1722, the Supreme Court observed that periods of limitation had to be viewed in the context of the provisions that suspend them from running since the chronological length of a period is generally intertwined with the circumstances providing for tolling, revival, and other questions of application. The Court added that "[i]n borrowing a state period of limitation for application to a federal cause of action, a federal court is relying on the State's wisdom in setting a limit, and exceptions thereto, on the prosecution of a closely analogous claim." 421 U.S. at 464, 95 S.Ct. at 1722. Hence, it is clear that for the resolution of this case resort must be had not only to the limitations period for personal injury actions in Puerto Rico but also to the tolling rules provided by its laws. Ramirez Morales v. Rosa Viera, 815 F.2d 2, 4 (1st Cir.1987). They constitute, if we may borrow the phrase, "binding rules of law." Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 484, 100 S.Ct. at 1795.

Our survey must thus proceed along two distinct, albeit related, roads. Along the first of them, however, we need not travel far. Ever since the days of the Spanish-American war it has been the law of Puerto Rico that the limitations period for tort actions, or "obligations arising from fault or negligence," is the one year limitations period provided by Article 1868(2) of the Civil Code, P.R.Laws Ann. tit. 31, Sec. 5298(2). De Leon Otero v. Rubero, 820 F.2d 18, 19 (1st Cir.1987); Ramirez Morales v. Rosa Viera, 815 F.2d, at 4; Altair Corp. v. Pesquera de Busquets, 769 F.2d, at 31; Rivera Fernandez v. Chardon, 648 F.2d, at 766; Ramirez de Arellano v. Alvarez de Choudens, 575 F.2d, at 318; Hernandez del Valle v. Santa Aponte, 575 F.2d 321 (1st Cir.1978); Graffals Gonzalez v. Garcia Santiago, 550 F.2d 687, 688 (1st Cir.1977). See also Diaz...