Rodriguez v. Maharaj

• Decision Date: 11 February 2021
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:20-cv-04666-FLW-ZNQ
• Parties: MELINA RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff, v. RUDOLPH R. MAHARAJ, KEVIN ASADI, and SLYVIA KALINOWSKI, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

MELINA RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiff, v. RUDOLPH R. MAHARAJ, KEVIN ASADI, and SLYVIA KALINOWSKI, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:20-cv-04666-FLW-ZNQ

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

February 11, 2021

*NOT FOR PUBLICATION*

OPINION

WOLFSON, Chief Judge:

This matter arises out of a landlord-tenant dispute. Pro se Plaintiff Melina Rodriguez, a former tenant at 128 John Street, South Amboy, New Jersey, has sued her former landlord Slyvia Kalinowski and Kalinowski's attorneys, Rudolph R. Maharaj and Kevin Asadi (collectively, "Defendants"), for violating the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practice Act ("FDCPA") and the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act ("NJCFA"). Specifically, Rodriguez alleges that Defendants unlawfully attempted to collect a $4,900 state court judgment relating to an eviction. Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim.¹ For the following reasons, Defendants' motion is GRANTED and Rodriguez's claims are DISMISSED as to all Defendants.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

For the purposes of this motion, the Court recounts only the facts relevant to the parties' present dispute.² Rodriguez entered into a one-year rental agreement with Kalinowski on July 1, 2019, for the duplex located at 128 John Street in South Amboy, New Jersey. See Compl., at 3. The tenancy "started out fine," Def. Mot., Ex. 3 (state court decision and order), but the parties' relationship soon became contentious over a heat issue. See id.

On October 31, 2019, Kalinowski filed a complaint to evict Rodriguez in Superior Court, Middlesex County, New Jersey, id., Ex. 1; Compl., at 4, alleging that Rodriguez owed $1,650 in unpaid rent, a $50 late fee, $1,500 in attorneys' fees pursuant to a provision in the lease, and any further amount outstanding at the time of trial. Def. Br., Ex. 3. After a hearing on January 17, 2020, the state court ordered Rodriguez to pay $4,900, and formally entered judgment on January 21, 2020, when Rodriguez did not deposit that amount to prevent eviction. Id. The court then rejected Rodriguez's application for a stay pending appeal, id., and the appellate division later dismissed the appeal for failure to prosecute. Id., Ex. 4 (dismissal order).

Before trial in state court, on December 20, 2019, Rodriguez and her employer, through counsel, filed a federal action seeking $361,250 in damages for conversion after Kalinowskipurportedly changed the locks at 128 John Street. See Rodriguez, et al. v. Locks Spa, et al., No. 3:19-21728 (Dec. 20, 2019). Magistrate Judge Arpert issued a Report and Recommendation dismissing the Complaint without prejudice for failure to comply with "three separate Orders of this Court as well as for failure to prosecute this action." Id., ECF No. 9. I adopted the Report in full on June 11, 2020. Id., ECF No. 11. Rodriguez then initiated the instant action, pro se, on July 7, 2020, and amended her eight-page Complaint the next day.

The Court discerns two theories of liability in the Amended Complaint.³ First, Defendants allegedly violated the FDCPA by attempting to collect the $4,900 state-court judgment through "'unknown caller' phone calls urging [Rodriguez] to 'pay her debt of $4,900.00 to her landlord and get her things.'" Compl., at 5-6. Second, Kalinowski allegedly violated the NJCFA by "renting a duplex apartment without a certificate of occupancy." Id. at 7. Defendants argue in their dismissal motion that they are not liable under either statute as a matter of law,⁴ that Rodriguez has not pledplausible factual allegations in any event, and that New Jersey's entire controversy doctrine bars all claims.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss an action if a plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Id. When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). A complaint survives a motion to dismiss if it contains sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

To determine whether a complaint is plausible, a court conducts a three-part analysis. Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010). First, the court must "tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675). Second, the court must identify allegations that, "because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 131 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). For example, "[a] pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause ofaction will not do," Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, nor am I compelled to accept "unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007)). Third, "where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief." Santiago, 629 F.3d at 131 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680). This is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

Finally, because Rodriguez has filed her Complaint pro se, I must construe it liberally and in the interests of doing substantial justice. See, e.g., Higgs v. AG of the United States, 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011) ("The obligation to liberally construe a pro se litigant's pleadings is well-established."); Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) ("Courts are to construe complaints so as to do substantial justice, keeping in mind that pro se complaints in particular should be construed liberally."); Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d. Cir. 2003) ("apply[ing] the applicable law, irrespective of whether the pro se litigant has mentioned it by name," on a motion to dismiss) (citations omitted). Even so, I am not required to credit "bald assertions" or "legal conclusions" simply because Rodriguez is proceeding pro se. See Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). A pro se complaint may just as readily be dismissed if the allegations it sets forth cannot be construed to supply facts supporting a claim for relief. See Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2d 371, 373 (3d Cir. 1981); Grohs v. Yatauro, 984 F. Supp. 3d 273, 282 (D.N.J. 2013).

III. DISCUSSION

The gist of Defendants' dismissal motion is that Rodriguez asserts theories of liability—i.e., the FDCPA and NJCFA—which simply do not apply to Defendants' conduct. See Def. Br., at4-6. Specifically, Defendants argue, the FDCPA is inapplicable because they are not debt collectors and did not seek payment of the $4,900 judgment, much less in a way that violates a provision of the FDCPA, and Rodriguez has not demonstrated that the NJCFA applies to these circumstances. Id. at 8. Defendants add that New Jersey's entire controversy doctrine bars Rodriguez's claims. Id.

A. The FDCA Claim⁵

Congress enacted the FDCPA in 1997 to remedy abusive debt-collection practices. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a); Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 453 (3d Cir. 2006). The FDCPA prohibits intentionally harassing, oppressive, or abusive conduct, 15 U.S.C. § 1692d, false, deceptive, or misleading representations, id. § 1692e, and unfair or unconscionable means. Id. § 1692f. The Act creates a private cause of action against debt collectors who violate its provisions. Id. § 1692k. To survive dismissal on an FDCPA claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that "(1) she is a consumer, (2) the defendant is a debt collector, (3) the defendant's challenged practice involves an attempt to collect a 'debt' as the Act defines it, and (4) the defendant has violated a provision of the FDCPA in attempting to collect the debt." Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing, 765 F.3d 299, 303 (3d Cir. 2014); Jensen v. Pressler & Pressler, 791 F.3d 413, 417 (3d Cir. 2015).

Rodriguez is a consumer, 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3) (defining consumer as "any natural person obligated to pay any debt"), and a judgment such as the one obtained by Kalinowski is a debt under the FDCPA. Id. § 1692a(5) (defining debt as "any obligation to pay money arising out of a transaction"). Even if not reduced to judgment, various courts have held that back rent constitutes a debt for the purposes of the FDCPA. See, e.g., Romea v. Heiberger & Associates, 163 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1998) (Calabresi, J.); Livingstone v. Haddon Point Manager, LLC, No. 19-13412, 2020 WL 902218, at *5-6 (D.N.J. Feb. 25, 2020) (applying the Third Circuit's "three-prong test" in St. Pierre v. Retrieval-Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc., 898 F.3d 351, 360-61 (3d Cir. 2018)). Rodriguez's FDCPA claim therefore turns on whether Defendants are debt collectors under the Act and whether they attempted to collect the $4,900 judgment in a manner prohibited by it.

Rodriguez alleges in her Amended Complaint that someone called her instructing her to pay the $4,900 judgment, and on that basis alone, the caller is a debt collector. She does not plead any other facts relevant to the FDCPA. Notwithstanding Rodriguez's failure to allege the identity of the caller, which alone dooms her claim, Defendants argue that none of them is a debt collector as a matter of law. Under the FDCPA, a debt collector is "any person . . . who regularly collects or attempts to collect . . . debts owed or due . . . to another." 15...