Rodriguez v. Waak
| Decision Date | 21 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | NO. 01-17-00755-CV,01-17-00755-CV |
| Parties | Raul Amparo Zuniga RODRIGUEZ and Ana Maria Ortiz Martinez, Individually and as Personal Representatives, and Heirs of the Estate of Raul Amparo Zuniga Ortiz Jr., and Juana Guadalupe Martinez, as Next Friend of Sebastian Zuniga and Wendy Zuniga, Heirs of the Estate of Raul Amparo Zuniga Ortiz Jr., Appellants v. Conway WAAK Jr. and Marlene Waak, d/b/a Carmine Charolais Ranch, and Carmine Charolais Ranch, Appellees |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
John M. Padilla, Padilla & Rodriguez, L.L.P., 5433 Westheimer, Suite 825, Houston, Texas 77056, J. Moises Cedillos, Cedillos Law Firm PLLC, 3801 Kirby Drive, Suite 510, Houston, Texas 77098, Richard P. Hogan, Jr., Jennifer Bruch Hogan, James C. Marrow, Hogan & Hogan, 711 Louisiana, Suite 500, Houston, Texas 77002, for Appellants.
Nicholas J. Lanza, Stewart K. Schmella, LANZA LAW FIRM, PC, 4950 Bissonnet, Houston, TX 77401, for Appellees.
Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Keyes, and Higley.
Raul Amparo Zuniga Rodriguez, Ana Maria Ortiz Martinez, and Juana Guadalupe Martinez (the Zunigas) filed suit against Conway Waak, Jr. and Marlene Waak, asserting claims arising from the death of Raul Amparo Zuniga Ortiz, Jr. (Zuniga). The Waaks sought summary judgment, arguing that the Zunigas' claims were governed by the Farm Animal Activities Act (FAAA or the Act).2 The trial court granted summary judgment in full, holding the Zunigas' claims were barred by the Act. In three issues on appeal, the Zunigas argue that the Act does not bar their claims.
We reverse and remand.
The Waaks own a ranch in Fayette County, Texas. They breed, raise, and sell purebred Charolais and Braford cattle on the ranch. Both have worked with cattle their entire lives.
Zuniga began working for the Waaks in 2005. He moved onto the ranch and began working for the Waaks full time in 2007 or 2008. His responsibilities involved feeding, moving, and monitoring the cattle. He frequently performed those duties alone.
Zuniga died on October 2, 2013. The day before he died, the Waaks instructed Zuniga to move some cattle to a different pasture. Conway Waak asked Zuniga if he needed help. Zuniga said he did not. There were about twenty cattle to be moved, including one calf and one bull. The bull had been with the cows to breed for about two to three months. On October 2, Zuniga began to move the cows to a different pasture. Zuniga had moved all of the cows except for the bull, the calf, and the calf’s mother before he was eventually found dead from severe blunt-force impact wounds
determined to have been caused by the bull.
The Waaks did not carry workers' compensation insurance for their employees. The Zunigas brought suit against the Waaks to recover damages for Zuniga’s personal injuries and death. In their live petition, the Zunigas asserted wrongful death and survival claims. Specifically, the family asserted that the Waaks were negligent by failing to provide proper safety equipment and failing to adequately warn Zuniga of dangers existing on the premises, among other things.
The Waaks eventually filed a partial motion for traditional summary judgment. In it, the Waaks argued that the FAAA—which provides liability protection for injuries arising out of certain farm activities in the form of a waiver of liability—applied to Zuniga as an employee of the ranch and thereby governed the Zunigas' claims and waived the Waaks' liability to the Zunigas. The Waaks recognized in the motion that the Act has exceptions to the waiver of liability. They asked the court to grant summary judgment on the Zunigas' claims except to the extent that the claims fell within the exceptions to the FAAA.
In their summary judgment motion, the Waaks acknowledged Dodge v. Durdin , 187 S.W.3d 523 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.), a case from this Court which held that the Equine Act, the predecessor to the FAAA, did not apply to employees. The Waaks urged the trial court not to adopt the reasoning of the case, critiquing the justifications this Court used to reach our holding. They argued that Zuniga was an independent contractor and, as such, a "participant" engaged in a farm animal activity under the FAAA when he died, and thus their liability for claims for his injuries was waived.
The Zunigas responded to the motion. They argued that Zuniga was an employee of the Waaks. As a result, they urged the trial court to apply the reasoning from this Court in Dodge and to rule that, like the Equine Act, the FAAA does not apply to their claims and does not waive the Waaks' liability for Zuniga’s injuries. They are, instead, that Zuniga was a "farm and ranch employee" for whom the Waaks were required to maintain workers compensation insurance and did not, subjecting them to the Zunigas' common law claims.
The trial court ruled that the Zunigas' claims were governed by the FAAA and that the Act waived the Waaks' liability to the Zunigas. It granted complete summary judgment in favor of the Waaks on their claims. The Zunigas appealed.
A summary-judgment movant must conclusively establish its right to judgment as a matter of law. See MMP, Ltd. v. Jones , 710 S.W.2d 59, 60 (Tex. 1986). Because summary judgment is a question of law, we review a trial court’s summary judgment decision de novo. See Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding , 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009).
To prevail on a traditional summary-judgment motion asserted under Rule 166a(c), a movant must prove that there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See TEX. R. CIV. P . 166a(c) ; Little v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice , 148 S.W.3d 374, 381 (Tex. 2004). A matter is conclusively established if reasonable people could not differ as to the conclusion to be drawn from the evidence. See City of Keller v. Wilson , 168 S.W.3d 802, 816 (Tex. 2005).
A party moving for traditional summary judgment on a claim for which it does not bear the burden of proof must either (1) disprove at least one element of the plaintiff’s cause of action or (2) plead and conclusively establish each essential element of an affirmative defense to rebut the plaintiff’s cause. See Am. Tobacco Co., Inc. v. Grinnell , 951 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tex. 1997). If the movant meets its burden, the burden then shifts to the non-movant to raise a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. See Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Siegler , 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. 1995).
In their first issue, the Zunigas argue that the trial court erred by determining that their claims were waived by the FAAA’s waiver of liability. In their second issue, they argue that Zuniga was not a "participant" in a farm animal activity as that term is defined within the Act, but an employee of the Waaks, and therefore, under Dodge and other law, the Act does not bar their claims. In their third issue, they argue that they raised at least a fact issue as to whether the Waaks were exempt from the application of the Texas Workers' Compensation Act and were, therefore, required to maintain workers' compensation insurance for their employees and did not. The first two issues concern the proper construction of the FAAA and our interpretation of its predecessor, the Equine Act, in Dodge . The third concerns the construction of the Workers' Compensation Act and its application to this case. All three issues require us to construe the applicable statutes.
Statutory interpretation is subject to de novo review. Lippincott v. Whisenhunt , 462 S.W.3d 507, 509 (Tex. 2015). Statutory language must be analyzed in its context, considering both the specific sections at issue and the statute as a whole. Castleman v. Internet Money Ltd. , 546 S.W.3d 684, 688 (Tex. 2018). "If a statute is worded clearly, we must honor its plain language, unless that interpretation would lead to absurd results." Combs v. Health Care Servs. Corp. , 401 S.W.3d 623, 629 (Tex. 2013). We interpret a statute by applying the plain meaning of the words used in the statute. See Lippincott , 462 S.W.3d at 509. "We read statutes contextually to give effect to every word, clause, and sentence, because every word or phrase is presumed to have been intentionally used with a meaning and a purpose." Fort Worth Transp. Auth. v. Rodriguez , 547 S.W.3d 830, 838 (Tex. 2018). We rely solely on the plain meaning of the words used "unless a different meaning is supplied by legislative definition or is apparent from the context, or the plain meaning leads to absurd results." Id. ; Tex. Lottery Comm'n v. First State Bank of DeQueen , 325 S.W.3d 628, 635 (Tex. 2010) ; accord Tanya L. McCabe Tr. v. Ranger Energy LLC , 531 S.W.3d 783, 794 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). "When a statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, it is inappropriate to resort to rules of construction or extrinsic aids to construe the language." City of Rockwall v. Hughes , 246 S.W.3d 621, 626 (Tex. 2008) ; accord Molinet v. Kimbrell , 356 S.W.3d 407, 414 (Tex. 2011).
Jones v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. , 745 S.W.2d 901, 902 (Tex. 1988) (internal citations omitted); see also City of Rockwall , 246 S.W.3d at 629 ; Lee v. City of Houston , 807 S.W.2d 290, 294–95 (Tex. 1991) (). However, "[w]hile ‘it is not for courts to undertake to make laws "better" by reading language into them,’ we must make logical...
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Waak v. Rodriguez
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