Rogers v. Williard

• Decision Date: 28 June 1920
• Docket Number: 82
• Parties: ROGERS v. WILLIARD
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

223 S.W. 15

144 Ark. 587

ROGERS v. WILLIARD

No. 82

Supreme Court of Arkansas

June 28, 1920

Appeal from Sebastian Circuit Court, Fort Smith District; John Brizzolara, Judge; reversed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

U. S Rogers and Edna Rogers brought suit against C. S. Williard to recover damages because of the miscarriage of Edna Rogers as the result of the alleged negligence and wrongful acts of the defendant. Their complaint alleges a state of facts substantially as follows:

During the year 1919, U.S. Rogers and Edna Rogers lived on the farm of Edwin McDole and cultivated a part of it as his tenants. C. S. Williard lived on an adjoining farm. On the 22d day of April, 1919, Edna Rogers was about eight months advanced in pregnancy, and her condition was known to the defendant Williard. On that day Williard unlawfully entered on the premises occupied by U.S. and Edna Rogers, and wilfully and wantonly engaged in a quarrel with Edwin McDole. While in the presence of Edna Rogers and while knowing her condition Williard wilfully and wantonly and maliciously challenged Edwin McDole to fight and drew and flourished a pistol threatening to shoot McDole. On account of the fright produced by his actions Edna Rogers received such a shock as to cause her to faint and to bring on a threatened miscarriage. She was attended by her physician for a week and suffered mental and physical pain constantly. At the end of the week she gave premature birth to a child, and said child had died in her womb prior to its delivery. Her mental and physical suffering was caused by the wilful, wanton and malicious conduct of Williard by drawing and flourishing his pistol and threatening to fight McDole while a trespasser on the premises and in the presence of Edna Rogers.

The court sustained a demurrer to the complaint and the plaintiffs declined to plead further. Their complaint was dismissed, and from the judgment rendered the plaintiffs have duly prosecuted an appeal to this court.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded.

A. A. McDonald, for appellant.

While this court has held that mere fright unattended by personal injury or other elements of damage will not warrant a recovery. 67 Ark. 23; 84 Id. 42; 94 Id. 489. Yet the right to recover for bodily pain and suffering resulting from fright caused by a wilful wrong is clearly established in this State. See 66 S.W. 661; 94 Ark. 489; Am. Ann. Cases 1913 E, p. 500; 97 Am. St. 509; 45 L. R. A. 87; 42 Am. Rep. 388; 97 Am. St. 509; 70 Ark. 136; 66 S.W. 661; 94 Ark. 489; 127 S.W. 707. See also 48 A.D. 572; 12 A. & E. Ann. Cases 745.

Jas. Seaborn Holt, for appellee.

The court properly sustained the demurrer to the complaint. No recovery can be had for damages for bodily pain and suffering resulting from fright unaccom-companied by physical injury or bodily impact. 69 Ark. 402; 45 So. 675; 15 S.E. 901; 51 N.E. 657; 47 Id. 694; 76 Id. 792; 85 N.W. 618; 112 S.W. 600; 147 Id. 742; 47 N.E. 88; 81 N.W. 335; 9 So. 823; 49 A. 450; 45 N.E. 354; 5 S.C. 134; 85 N.E. 499; 23 A. 340; 61 Id. 1022; 73 Id. 4; 25 S.W. 419; 84 Ark. 42; 69 Id. 402; 118 Id. 153; 8 R. C. L., § 80, p. 525; 151 P. 591; 150 P. 1926; 148 Id. 100; 238 F. 14; 12 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 742. Unless this court desires to reverse its former rulings, it should affirm the ruling of the court below.

OPINION

HART, J. (after stating the facts).

The right to recover damages for bodily pain and suffering resulting from fright without actual physical violence has been the subject of frequent adjudications by the courts of last resort of the various States, and the decisions are conflicting and to a great extent confusing.

In the case of the St. L., I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Bragg, 69 Ark. 402, this court held that damages could not be recovered at law for mental pain and anguish unaccompanied by physical injury and caused by unintentional negligence. The court said that where the law allows no recovery for the mental anguish or fright it would seem logically to follow that no recovery could be had for the consequences or results of the fright since such consequences merely show the degree of the fright and the extent of the damages. To sustain the decision, the court cites the cases of Mitchell v. Rochester Railway Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 34 L. R. A. 781, 45 N.E. 354, and Spade v. Lynn & Boston Rd. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 38 L. R. A. 512, 47 N.E. 88.

In discussing the first mentioned case in the subsequent case of Preiser v. Wielandt, 48 A.D. 569, 62 N.Y.S. 890, the court said that the doctrine there stated applies only to actions based on negligence, and not to cases of wilful tort. The court said that the rule does not include wanton wrong, nor apply to the acts of a trespasser. There the court had under consideration the case of a wilful and violent trespass upon the plaintiff's house. The court said, that the defendants knew the condition of the plaintiff's wife and the risk to her which was involved in their contemplated act. The court further said that if the death of the plaintiff's wife could be clearly and directly traced to the wilful trespass of the defendants, as a natural and necessary consequence which they might or should have reasonably anticipated, the defendants would be liable, even though there was no actual blow struck by them.

The decision in Mitchell v. Rochester Railway Co., supra, was followed in Spade v. Lynn & Boston Rd. Co., supra, and the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that there could be no recovery for bodily injury caused by fright and mental disturbance in a case of unintentional negligence on the part of the defendant. The reason for the rule given was that it would be unreasonable to hold persons who are merely negligent bound to anticipate and guard against fright and the consequences of fright, and that this would open a wide door for unjust claims, which could not successfully be met. Continuing, the court said:

"It is hardly necessary to add that this decision does not reach those classes of action where an intention to cause mental distress or to hurt the feelings is shown, or is reasonably to be inferred, as, for example, in cases of seduction, slander, malicious prosecution, or arrest, and some others. Nor do we include cases of acts done with gross carelessness or recklessness, showing utter indifference to such consequences, when they must have been in the actor's mind. Lombard v. Lennox, and Fillebrown v. Hoar, already cited; Meagher v. Driscoll, 99 Mass. 281, 96 Am. Dec. 759. In the present case no such considerations entered into the rulings, or were presented by the facts."

In Drum v. Miller (N. C.), 65 L.R.A. 890, 102 Am. St. Rep. 528, the court distinguishing negligence from wilful torts said:

"In the case of wilful or intentional wrongdoing, we have an act intended to do harm, and harm done by it, and the inference of liability from such an act may seem a plain matter under the general rule of liability, and, assuming that no just cause of exception to it is present, 'it is clear law that the wrongdoer is liable to make good the consequences, and it is likewise obvious to common sense that he ought to be. He went about to do harm, and, having begun an act of wrongful mischief, he can not stop the risk at his pleasure, nor confine it to the precise objects he laid out, but must abide it fully and to the end.' The principle is commonly expressed in the maxim that a man is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his acts."

It will be observed that in the case of a wilful tort the wrongdoer is responsible for the direct and proximate consequences of his act, without regard to his intention to produce the particular injury. May v. Western Union Tel. Co. (N. C.), 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 912, a...