Rook v. Holbrook, CASE NO. C18-0233-JCC

• Decision Date: 21 January 2020
• Docket Number: CASE NO. C18-0233-JCC
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington
• Parties: GUY ADAM ROOK, Petitioner, v. DONALD HOLBROOK, Respondent.

GUY ADAM ROOK, Petitioner, v. DONALD HOLBROOK, Respondent.

CASE NO. C18-0233-JCC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE

January 21, 2020

THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner's objections (Dkt. No. 52) to the report and recommendation of the Honorable Brian A. Tsuchida, United States Magistrate Judge (Dkt. No. 47). Having thoroughly considered the parties' briefing and the relevant record, the Court finds oral argument unnecessary and hereby OVERRULES Petitioner's objections, ADOPTS the report and recommendation, and DENIES Petitioner's petition for a writ of habeas corpus for the reasons explained herein.

I. BACKGROUND

Judge Tsuchida's report and recommendation set forth the underlying facts of this case and the Court will not repeat them here. (See id. at 4-7.) The report and recommendation rejected Petitioner's argument that his life-without-parole ("LWOP") sentence for a third-strike driving offense with a mens rea of recklessness is grossly disproportionate in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. (Id. at 14-32.) Petitioner's counsel has filed objections to the report and recommendation, asking that the Court find that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not apply to his Eighth Amendment claim and grant him habeas relief. (Dkt. No. 52 at 1.) The Court addresses each of Petitioner's objections to the report and recommendation in turn.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

A district court reviews de novo those portions of a report and recommendation to which a party objects. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). Objections are required to enable the district court to "focus attention on those issues—factual and legal—that are at the heart of the parties' dispute." Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147 (1985). General objections, or summaries of arguments previously presented, have the same effect as no objection at all, since the court's attention is not focused on any specific issues for review. See United States v. Midgette, 478 F.3d 616, 622 (4th Cir. 2007).

B. Adjudication of Eighth Amendment Claim on the Merits

Petitioner asserts that the Washington State Court of Appeals did not adjudicate his federal Eighth Amendment claim on the merits and therefore its decision is not entitled to deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). (Dkt. No. 52 at 2-9.)

"An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). "A judgment is normally said to have been rendered 'on the merits' only if it was 'delivered after the court . . . heard and evaluated the evidence and the parties' substantive arguments.'" Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 302 (2013) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1199 (9th ed. 2009)). But when "a line of state precedent is viewed as fully incorporating a related federal constitutional right . . . a state appellate court may regard its discussion of the state precedent as sufficient to cover a claim based on the related federal right." Id. at 298-99 (collecting exemplary cases).

A brief examination of Washington's repeat offender statute, the federal and Washington constitutional provisions at issue, and relevant Washington caselaw is warranted. Under Washington's Persistent Offender Accountability Act ("POAA"), a "persistent offender" must receive an LWOP sentence. Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.570. The POAA defines "persistent offender" as a person who, having been convicted of two "most serious offenses" or their out-of-state equivalents on two prior occasions, commits a third "most serious offense." Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.030(38). "Most serious offense" is in turn defined as any class A felony or enumerated class B felonies that are violent, sexual, or dangerous. Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.030(33).¹

The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution bars "cruel and unusual punishments." U.S. Const. amend. VIII. Article I, section 14 of the Washington State Constitution bars "cruel punishment." Wash. Const. art. I, § 14. In analyzing challenges to LWOP sentences imposed pursuant to the POAA, Washington courts have consistently "held that [article I, section 14 of the Washington State Constitution] is more protective than the Eighth Amendment." State v. Witherspoon, 329 P.3d 888, 894 (Wash. 2014) (citing State v. Rivers, 921 P.2d 495, 502 (Wash. 1996)); see State v. Moretti, 446 P.3d 609, 613-14 (Wash. 2019) (reviewing Washington caselaw and stating that "if it is not cruel under article I, section 14 . . . then it is necessarily not cruel and unusual under the Eight Amendment"); State v. Bassett, 428 P.3d 343, 347-49 (Wash. 2018) (conducting Gunwall analysis and concluding that article I, section 14 is more protective than the Eight Amendment in the context of juvenile sentencing); State v. Ramos, 387 P.3d 650, 667 (Wash. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 467 (2017). Washington courts have accordingly declined to analyze Eighth Amendment claims brought inparallel with article I, section 14 claims against an LWOP sentence imposed pursuant to the POAA. See, e.g., Moretti, 446 P.3d at 613 ("Because we have previously held that article I, section 14 offers more protection than the federal constitution in the context of sentencing both recidivists and juveniles, we do not address the petitioners' argument that [an LWOP sentence imposed pursuant to the POAA] is cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment.").

In ruling on Petitioner's constitutional claims, the state court concluded that "[t]he state constitutional prescription against 'cruel punishment' affords greater protection than its federal counterpart. Thus, if the state constitutional provision was not violated, neither is the federal provision." State v. Rook, 2013 WL 3227563, slip op. at 6 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013) (footnotes omitted) (citing State v. Fain, 617 P.2d 720, 723 (Wash. 1980); State v. Morin, 995 P.2d 113, 115-16 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000)). Petitioner takes issue with the state court's analysis on a number of grounds, which the Court addresses in turn.

First, Petitioner argues that the state court could not have adjudicated the merits of his Eighth Amendment claim because it did not cite federal caselaw or compare the federal and state constitutional provisions and instead decided the issue "as a matter of binding state court precedent." (Dkt. No. 52 at 3-4.) But, as discussed above, Washington courts faced with paired Eighth Amendment and article I, section 14 challenges to LWOP sentences imposed pursuant to the POAA have consistently declined to analyze the Eighth Amendment claims. See, e.g., Moretti, 446 P.3d at 613-14. And in doing so, they generally do not extensively analyze the differences in the constitutional provisions themselves or cite federal caselaw examining this issue. See id.; see also State v. Roberts, 14 P.3d 713, 733 & n.11 (Wash. 2000) ("As we apply established principles of state constitutional jurisprudence [regarding the protectiveness of article I, section 14 and the Eighth Amendment] here, a Gunwall analysis is not required"); but see Bassett, 428 P.3d 343, 347-49 (Wash. 2018) (conducting Gunwall analysis and concluding that article I, section 14 is more protective than the Eight Amendment in the context of juvenile sentencing). Therefore, while Petitioner takes issue with the perfunctory nature of the statecourt's analysis, he has not established that the state court did not adjudicate the merits of his Eighth Amendment claim on this ground.²

Petitioner next argues that the state court did not adjudicate the merits of his Eighth Amendment claim because article I, section 14 is not inherently more protective than the Eighth Amendment and because Washington courts have not been incorporating developments in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence such that a ruling on an article I, section 14 claim necessarily resolves an Eighth Amendment challenge. (Dkt. No. 52 at 5-7.) Neither argument has merit. When faced with an adult offender's paired Eighth Amendment and article I, section 14 challenges to an LWOP sentence imposed pursuant to the POAA (as in Petitioner's case), Washington courts have compared the language of the two constitutional provisions and have consistently concluded that article I, section 14 grants more protection. See, e.g., Witherspoon, 329 P.3d at 894 (citing Rivers, 921 P.2d at 502) ("The Eighth Amendment bars cruel and unusual punishment while article I, section 14 bars cruel punishment. This court has held that the constitutional provision is more protective than the Eighth Amendment in this context.").

Petitioner cites Justice Sheryl Gordon McCloud's dissenting opinion in State v. Witherspoon, 329 P.3d 888, 901 n.6 (Wash. 2014), for the proposition that Washington courts have refused "as a matter of precedent, to consider LWOP sentences to be any more severe than life-with-parole sentences" in spite of the Supreme Court's decision in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). (Dkt. No. 52 at 6-7) (citing Rivers, 921 P.2d at 503; Witherspoon, 329 P.3d at 895)). But the Witherspoon majority analyzed both Graham and the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Miller v. Alabama, 123 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), and rejected the petitioner's contentionthat those decisions dictated that LWOP sentences imposed on adult offenders pursuant to the POAA violated the Eighth Amendment. See Witherspoon, 329 P.3d at 895-96; see also Miller v. Alabama, 123 S. Ct. 2455, 2458 (2012) (noting that Graham "concluded that the [Eighth] Amendment prohibits a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for a juvenile convicted of a nonhomicide offense"). Thus, contrary to Petitioner's assertion, Washington courts have been sensitive to developments in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence but have still held that an adjudication of an adult offender's ...