Rooney v. Town of Groton

Decision Date23 September 2008
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 06-11715-MLW.
Citation577 F.Supp.2d 513
PartiesJohn ROONEY, Plaintiff, v. TOWN OF GROTON and The Groton Board of Selectmen, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

Paul F. Kelly, Stephanie R. Pratt, Segal Roitman LLP, Boston, MA, for Plaintiff.

Darren R. Klein, Brian M. Maser, Michele E. Randazzo, Kopelman & Paige, PC, Boston, MA, for Defendants.

MARK L. WOLF, Chief Judge.

ORDER ENTERED. Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that: 1. The Report and Recommendation on the Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 51) is ADOPTED in its entirety. 2. The Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 31) is ALLOWED with respect to counts 1 and II of the complaint. 3. Counts III through IX of the complaint are REMANDED to the Middlesex Superior Court.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS TOWN OF GROTON AND THE GROTON BOARD OF SELECTMEN'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (# 31)

COLLINGS, United States Magistrate Judge.

I. Introduction

The issue of federal law which this case presents is whether plaintiff Lieutenant John Rooney ("Rooney" or "the plaintiff"), a police officer with the Town of Groton, Massachusetts ("Groton"), is exempt from the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") because his duties are primarily "executive" or "administrative." Subsumed in that issue is the effect on the analysis of the so-called "first responder" provision which has been added to the regulations. Because the Court finds that on the undisputed material facts the plaintiff is exempt because he works in an "executive" and/or "administrative" position and that he is not a "first responder," he is not entitled to overtime compensation. The Court, therefore, shall recommend that summary judgment be entered against him on the federal claims and that the case be remanded to the Superior Court for adjudication of the claims under state law.

II. Procedural Background

On August 28, 2006, the plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants Town of Groton and the Groton Board of Selectmen ("the Board of Selectmen") (collectively, "the Town" or "the defendants") in the Superior Court Department of the Trial Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts alleging that the Town has failed to pay him overtime compensation, among other allegations. (# 1) The Town subsequently removed this action to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446.(# 1) This Court has original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, over claims I and II of the plaintiffs complaint—alleged violations of the FLSA. On October 2, 2006, Groton and the Board of Selectmen filed an answer to the complaint.1 (# 2)

On January 29, 2008, after the parties completed discovery, Groton and the Board of Selectmen filed a joint motion for summary judgment (# 31) with an accompanying statement of material facts including twenty-four (24) exhibits (# 37), a memorandum in support (# 38), an affidavit of counsel (# 33) and an affidavit of the former Chief of Police (# 39). Rooney subsequently filed an opposition to the dispositive motion on March 19, 20082 (# 42) together with an accompanying memorandum in support (# 43) and an affidavit including seven (7) exhibits. (# 44) The Town filed a reply to the plaintiffs opposition and a motion to strike certain portions of Rooney's opposition (# 47), together with affidavits (## 48, 49) on April 17, 2008.3 On April 28, 2008, Rooney filed an opposition to the Town's motion to strike. (# 50) The Town's motion to strike was denied on May 8, 2008.

At this juncture, the record is complete and the motion for summary judgment stands ready to be decided.

III. General Factual Background

In large measure, the historical facts are uncontested. Rooney disputes only nine (9) of the Town's one hundred thirty-three (133) statements of fact4, and they shall be duly noted, as relevant, in the following recitation.

Since April 2001, Rooney has been an employee of the Town. (# 1 ¶ 7; # 2 ¶ 7; # 37 ¶ 4) The plaintiff was first a Patrolman in Groton and then in September 2002, he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant by the Board of Selectmen.5 (# 1 ¶ ¶ 7, 10; # 2 ¶ ¶ 7, 10; # 37 ¶5)

The Groton Police Department is organized in a paramilitary structure. (# 37 ¶ 6; # 37, Exh. 46 at 15:4) Robert Mulhern ("Mulhern") served as Groton's Chief of Police ("the Chief") from August 2000 until October 1, 2007, essentially encompassing the time period pertinent to Rooney's allegations. (# 37 ¶ 2) Under the Chief, in order of rank and authority, are the positions of Captain, Lieutenant, Sergeant, full-time Patrolman, and part-time Patrolman. (# 37 ¶ 8)

A. Rooney's Promotion

In August of 2000, Mulhern appointed Jack Saball ("Saball") to the position of Captain, a newly created position designed to bolster the administrative staff. (# 37¶ ¶ 9-10) Prior to his appointment to Captain, Saball had served as a Lieutenant since 1990. (# 37 ¶ 11) As a Lieutenant and a Captain, Saball functioned as Second-in-Command with primary responsibility for administrative work such as supervision of subordinate officers, oversight and quality control of the Police Department's computer systems, internal investigations, training assignments, and reviewing incident reports and criminal reports. (# 37¶ ¶ 12-14) Subsequent to Saball's appointment, Mulhern promoted Jack Balonis ("Balonis") to Saball's Lieutenant position. (# 37 ¶ 15) As a Lieutenant, Balonis oversaw operational aspects of the Police Department. (# 37 ¶ 16) Both Saball and Balonis retired in August 2002. (# 37 ¶ ¶ 17-18)

In August 2002, Mulhern offered then Patrolman Rooney the open Lieutenant's position, which he eventually accepted. (# 37 ¶¶ 19-247) The Captain's position has been vacant since Saball's retirement. (# 37 ¶ 17) Rooney was the only Lieutenant in the Police Department from the time of his appointment to the position through September 2007. (# 37¶ ¶ 27-28)

B. Rooney's Salary

At the time the summary judgment papers were filed, Rooney's salary was $69,000 per year. (# 37 ¶ 31) As of July 1, 2007, a top-step Sergeant and Patrolman were paid $61,089.19 and $53,121.03 per year, respectively. (# 37 ¶ 32) The plaintiff receives the same health insurance and sick time benefits as the Patrolmen. (# 1 ¶¶ 39-40; # 2 ¶¶ 39-40) Rooney is eligible to receive the same educational incentive, vacation, longevity, earned leave, and holiday pay as the Patrolmen. (# 1 ¶¶ 42-46; # 2 ¶¶ 42-46)

The plaintiff receives 1/26 of his annual salary on a bi-weekly basis for each pay period. (# 37 ¶ 34) He claims to have been compensated for two instances of overtime on September 16, 2006 (eleven hours of overtime for work at a community celebration) and on September 19, 2006 (six hours of overtime for work at the Groton elections) since he assumed his current position. (# 44 ¶ 24, Exh. 6, Exh. 7) The compensation for the work at the Groton elections is documented on one of the pay stubs to which Rooney refers in his Affidavit, but is not clear from the other pay stub whether the plaintiff was compensated for the former work. (# 44, Exh. 6, Exh. 7)

C. Rooney's Working Hours

Since November 2002—three months after the time Rooney was promoted to Lieutenant—until the present time, the plaintiff has worked five (5) days per week, Monday through Friday—otherwise known as a "five and two" schedule8. (# 1 ¶ 11; # 2 ¶ 11; # 37, Exh. 3 at 122; # 44 ¶ 6) Unlike Rooney, the Patrolmen and Sergeants worked according to a four on, two off schedule. (# 1 ¶ 48; # 2 ¶ 48; # 37 ¶ 126, Exh. 16, Article XV, § 1) If the plaintiff does not arrive at work at the start of his 8:00 a.m. shift, his vacancy is not back-filled by a Patrolman or Sergeant; as Lieutenant, he is generally free from supervision by the Chief. (# 37 ¶¶ 93-94)

Groton is a signatory to a collective bargaining agreement ("agreement") with the Groton Police Patrolmen's Association ("Union"). (# 37 ¶ 121) The Union represents Patrolmen and Sergeants for purposes of collective bargaining. (# 37 ¶ 121) As specified in the agreement, the four on two off work schedule is organized such that the Patrolmen and Sergeants work four days in a row and then have two days off. (# 1 ¶ 479; # 37 ¶ 126, Exh. 16, Art. XV, § 5) The agreement sets forth that "[e]mployees in an administrative capacity may be exempted [from a four and two schedule] by the Chief of Police," but those employees are still "entitled to the benefits of the four (4) and two (2) scheduling." (# 37 ¶ 128, Exh. 16, Art. XV, § 15) Thus, "[e]mployees who are assigned to an administrative position five (5) and two (2) schedule shall be granted one additional day off per calendar month to be used within that month and five (5) additional days to be used throughout the year, at the discretion of the Chief of Police." (# 37 ¶ 128, Exh. 16, Art. XV, § 5) Rooney has worked a five (5) and two (2) schedule with weekends off since his promotion. (# 37 ¶ 130) Due to the difference in his schedule as compared to the Patrolmen and Sergeants's schedules, the plaintiff has worked seventeen (17) extra days every year since 2002. (# 1 ¶ 50; # 2 ¶ 50) Rooney alleges that he has not been compensated for the additional seventeen (17) days whereas Groton and the Board of Selectmen "agree that the Plaintiff has worked 17 extra days a year but denies that the Plaintiff has not received additional compensation." (# 1 ¶ 50; # 2 ¶ 50)10

IV. Summary Judgment Standard of Review

The purpose of summary judgment "`is to pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings and assay the parties' proof in order to determine whether trial is actually required.'" Rojas-Ithier v. Sociedad Espanola de Auxilio Mutuo v. Beneficiencia de Puerto Rico, 394 F.3d 40, 42 (1st Cir.2005) (quoting Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 794 (1st Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1030, 113 S.Ct. 1845, 123 L.Ed.2d 470 (1993)); see also Garside v. Osco...

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