Root v. Toney

• Citation: 841 N.W.2d 83
• Decision Date: 17 December 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–0122.,12–0122.
• Parties: Teri ROOT, Appellee, v. Talton TONEY, Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

841 N.W.2d 83

Teri ROOT, Appellee,

v.Talton TONEY, Appellant.

No. 12–0122.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Dec. 13, 2013.

As Corrected Dec. 17, 2013.

Thomas A. Hurd of Glazebrook, Moe, Johnston & Hurd LLP, Des Moines, for appellant.

Michelle R. Mackel–Wiederanders of Iowa Legal Aid, Des Moines, for appellee.

WATERMAN, Justice.

This appeal presents two issues of first impression: (1) whether our court's order closing the clerk of court's public window at 2:30 p.m. triggered Iowa Code section 4.1(34) (2011) to allow a one-day extension of the deadline to file a notice of appeal, and (2) whether a person fleeing domestic abuse who relocates to live in a new county satisfies the residency requirement for venue under Iowa Code section 236.3(1) in an action for a domestic abuse protective order.

Plaintiff fled her marital home in Decatur County to escape her abusive husband, taking their children with her. She found a safe house 250 miles away in Howard County, near her parents' residence, and filed for an order of protection within two days of her arrival. The defendant husband moved to transfer venue from Howard County to Decatur County. The district court denied his motion and entered the protective order. The husband filed his notice of appeal thirty-one days later. The Howard County clerk's public window had closed at 2:30 p.m. the day before, pursuant to a cost-saving order of our court that reduced the normal hours the clerks' offices were open to the public.

We apply Iowa Code section 4.1(34) to hold this appeal was timely filed, and we rescind our court's December 2, 2009 supervisory order that stated this Code section was inapplicable under such circumstances. Our court has constitutional and statutory authority over the judicial branch, including the power to set the office hours of the clerks of court. However, we may not reduce the time allowed to file a notice of appeal without legislative authorization.

On the merits, we hold plaintiff satisfied the residency requirement for venue under Iowa Code section 236.3(1) to obtain a domestic abuse protective order when she relocated to live in a new county to escape abuse and obtain the support of her family living nearby. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, we affirm the venue ruling and protective order entered by the district court in Howard County.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Teri Root and Talton Toney were married in April 2009 and lived together in a farmhouse in Decatur County near the Missouri border. They have three children together, and Teri has two more children. On October 7, 2011, with three of the children watching, Talton put a belt around Teri's neck and choked her. Teri immediately phoned the Crisis Intervention Center, which in turn called the police. The police came to the couple's home. Talton was arrested after he admitted to police that he choked Teri. Both the police and Teri's domestic abuse victim advocate advised Teri to leave the family home, which was owned by Talton and his parents. Talton's parents came to the house that evening, took Teri's house keys and cell phone, and told her to “get the hell out.” Teri took the children and drove 250 miles northeast to Howard County, just across the border from her hometown of Preston, Minnesota. Teri testified she wanted to be close to her parents so that she would have their support during her separation from Talton and their assistance caring for her five children.

Teri found a temporary safe house upon her arrival in Howard County through the local domestic abuse center. Teri visited the emergency room in Howard County the next day, where she received care for her neck injury. On October 10, Teri filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse with the Iowa District Court for Howard County, stating, “I am scared for my safety. [Talton] has threatened to find and kill me if I ever took [the] kids and left.” Teri described the October 7 incident and additional abuse, alleging Talton had on other occasions thrown objects at her, choked her until she lost consciousness, dragged her by her hair, and twisted her arms behind her back to the point she “was afraid they would break.” Teri began looking for work in Howard County and, on October 14, rented a home there.

On November 11, Talton filed a motion to dismiss or transfer venue to Decatur County pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.808 (governing actions filed in the wrong county). He argued Teri did not reside in Howard County because she had only been present there for three days before she filed her petition. The day before she filed her petition, she completed an intake form at the Howard County hospital that listed her employer in Decatur County and her mailing address in Preston, Minnesota. Talton noted her frequent trips to Preston. He alleged her residence for venue purposes remained in Decatur County, where their marital dissolution action and his criminal charges were pending. Talton argued the Howard County venue would be “unnecessarily costly, duplicative, and extremely prejudicial.” He noted the 250–mile driving distance and that several witnesses to the alleged domestic abuse lived in Decatur County.

The district court held an evidentiary hearing on November 28. Teri testified she was renting a home in Howard County and living there. The district court denied Talton's motion to transfer venue in a written ruling filed December 5. The court found that Teri “is residing in Howard County” and that venue for the domestic abuse action was therefore proper in Howard County, as well as in Decatur County where Talton resides. The court found Talton “[did] not face an unreasonable burden of defending [the] action in Howard County” to litigate the limited issue of whether domestic abuse occurred. The district court observed that one of the parties would have to travel ten hours roundtrip whether the domestic abuse action was heard in Howard County or Decatur County. The court noted a transfer to Decatur County would delay the scheduled hearing for a permanent domestic abuse protective order.

Teri's action went to trial in Howard County on December 19, at which time the district court entered judgment in her favor and issued a final domestic abuse protective order. Talton filed and served notice of his appeal by mail on January 19, 2012, thirty-one days after the judgment. Our court sua sponte gave the parties an opportunity to file statements addressing whether the notice of appeal was timely. Both parties responded. Teri contended the notice of appeal was untimely. Talton argued it was timely under Iowa Code section 4.1(34), which in his view extended the deadline by one day because the Howard County clerk's office closed at 2:30 p.m. on the thirtieth day. A three-justice panel of our court ordered that the timeliness issue should be submitted with the appeal.

II. Scope of Review.

This appeal presents two issues. First, we need to determine our jurisdiction to hear this appeal, which turns on the timeliness of Talton's notice of appeal, filed thirty-one days after the judgment. This presents a question of law for our court to decide on the interpretation of section 4.1(34), a matter never considered by the district court.

Second, we must decide whether the district court erred by ruling that Teri resided in Howard County to support venue under Iowa Code section 236.3(1). The parties agree that we are to review the district court's ruling on the legal requirements for venue for correction of errors at law. See Richards v. Anderson Erickson Dairy Co., 699 N.W.2d 676, 679 (Iowa 2005); see also Froman v. Keokuk Health Sys., Inc., 755 N.W.2d 528, 529 (Iowa 2008) (reviewing interpretation of venue statute for errors at law).

III. Timeliness of the Appeal.

We first address the question of whether Talton's appeal is timely. See City of Des Moines v. City Dev. Bd., 633 N.W.2d 305, 309 (Iowa 2001) (noting court is to address jurisdictional issue of timeliness of appeal before reaching merits). “It is axiomatic that compliance with our rules relating to time for appeal are mandatory and jurisdictional.” In re Marriage of Mantz, 266 N.W.2d 758, 759 (Iowa 1978). “Where an appellant is late in filing, by as little as one day, we are without jurisdiction to consider the appeal.” Id.; see alsoIowa R.App. P. 6.101(1)( b ) (“A notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days ... of the final order or judgment.”); Explore Info. Servs. v. Ct. Info. Sys., 636 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Iowa 2001) (noting we must “dismiss a case not meeting [appellate] deadlines even if the parties do not raise the issue”).

Talton argues the thirty-day filing deadline in rule 6.101(1)( b ) was extended by one day because the Howard County Clerk of Court Office closed at 2:30 p.m. on the thirtieth day. He relies on Iowa Code section 4.1(34). Teri argues that Talton's appeal is untimely under Iowa Court Rule 22.40 as explained in our December 2, 2009 supervisory order directing that “section 4.1(34) is not triggered to extend any deadlines” under this circumstance. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Supervisory Order, In the Matter of Court Closure Days and Public Hours of Clerk of Court Offices ¶ 2 (Dec. 2, 2009) [hereinafter Court Closure Days].

This issue implicates the separation of powers between the three coequal branches of government under our state constitution. Article V, section 4 of the Iowa Constitution expressly empowers our court to exercise “supervisory and administrative control over all inferior judicial tribunals throughout the state.” ¹ This obviously includes the power to set the hours of operation of the clerks of court. But, we have interpreted the same constitutional provision to allow the legislature to “set terms and conditions for appeal.” W. Int'l & Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 396 N.W.2d 359, 364 (Iowa 1986). We recognize the legislature's limited role in our appellate process includes the power to prescribe by statute the...