Roraback v. Motion Picture Machine Operators Union of Minneapolis
| Decision Date | 02 August 1918 |
| Docket Number | 20,685 |
| Citation | 168 N.W. 766,140 Minn. 481 |
| Parties | EARLE H. RORABACK v. MOTION PICTURE MACHINE OPERATORS UNION OF MINNEAPOLIS AND OTHERS |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Hennepin county against Motion Picture Machine Operators Union of Minneapolis, Local 219 International Alliance of Theatrical State Employees of the United States and Canada, an unincorporated association, the officers and members thereof, also Trades and Labor Assembly of Minneapolis and Hennepin county, an unincorporated association composed of delegates from the various unions of the building trades and other labor union societies, and the officers and delegates to such assembly, to recover $1,200 damages and to enjoin defendants and their respective agents from combining to restrain or obstruct the trade and patronage of plaintiff's theatre, from stationing pickets in the neighborhood of the theatre with or bearing a placard or transparency having on it "This Theatre Unfair to Organized Labor," or words of similar import, and from doing other acts the natural result of which would tend to injure the patronage of plaintiff's business. From an order, Dickinson, J., denying his motion for a temporary injunction, plaintiff appealed. Affirmed.
Injury to another's business.
1. Men either singly or in combination, may use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose, although the means adopted may cause injury to another; but they may not intentionally injure or destroy the business of another to accomplish an unlawful purpose.
Injury to another's business -- violation of Constitution.
2. The Constitution guarantees to everyone the right to work in his own business, and any attempt to deprive him of that right is unlawful.
Injunction against "bannering."
3. "Bannering" plaintiff's place of business as unfair to organized labor and thereby deterring the public from patronizing him, if done for the purpose of compelling him not to work as an operative himself in his own business, is unlawful and may be enjoined.
Denial of injunction.
4. As the facts are not free from doubt, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to issue a temporary injunction.
Nathan A. Chase, for appellant.
Fifield & Finney, for respondents.
The defendants are the Motion Picture Machine Operators Union of Minneapolis, known as Local 219, and composed of motion picture machine operators; the Trades and Labor Assembly of Minneapolis composed of representatives from a large number of labor unions of Minneapolis of which Local 219 is one; and a large number of individuals who are officers or members of one or the other, or both, of these associations.
Plaintiff has operated a motion picture theatre, known first as the Orient and later as the New National Theatre, in the city of Minneapolis from May 1, 1916, until the present time. He employed members of Local 219 to operate his machines until September 10, 1916. Since that date he claims to have operated the machines himself unassisted. Several conferences took place between plaintiff and representatives of the defendants concerning the re-employment of union operators but no agreement was reached. In December, 1916, the Trades and Labor Assembly declared plaintiff's theater "Unfair to organized labor;" and thereupon, and repeatedly thereafter, defendants published in the Labor Review, their official paper, that the New National Theatre was "Unfair to organized labor." In February, 1917, defendants caused a banner bearing the words "Unfair to organized labor" to be carried back and forth in the street in front of the theatre, and at the time of the hearing were still "bannering" the theatre in that manner. In May, 1917, plaintiff brought this action for an injunction, and, upon the complaint supported by affidavits, applied for a temporary injunction pendente lite. Defendants answered, and, upon the answer supported by affidavits, opposed the issuance of the temporary injunction. The court declined to issue it and plaintiff appealed.
Defendants admit the acts above mentioned and also an intention to continue them, and insist that they have the legal right to do so. Plaintiff alleges that prior to the commission of such acts he had built up and enjoyed a large and lucrative business. He also alleges that these acts deter the public from patronizing his theatre to such an extent that his business has been greatly injured and will be ruined if they are continued, and that he has no adequate remedy at law.
The undisputed facts, some of which are mentioned above, show plainly that the purpose of defendants is to injure and perhaps destroy plaintiff's business unless he accedes to their demands, and that the course adopted is having the effect intended, and that plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law.
No person or combination of persons has the right maliciously to injure or destroy the business of another by acts which serve no legitimate purpose of his own. Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 599, 131 Am. St. 446, 16 Ann. Cas. 807; Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 38 S.Ct. 65, 62 L.Ed. Ann. Cas. 1918B, 461. As said in Ertz v. Produce Exchange of Minneapolis, 79 Minn. 140, 81 N.W. 737, 48 L.R.A. 90, 79 Am. St. 433: "One man singly, or any number of men jointly, having no legitimate interests to protect, may not lawfully ruin the business of another by maliciously inducing his patrons and third parties not to deal with him." Defendants may use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose, although the means adopted may incidentally cause injury to plaintiff, but they may not intentionally injure or destroy plaintiff's business to accomplish an unlawful purpose. Gray v. Building Trades Council, 91 Minn. 171, 97 N.W. 663, 1118, 63 L.R.A. 753, 103 Am. St. 477, 1 Ann. Cas. 172; Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 38 S.Ct. 65, 62 L.Ed. , Ann. Cas. 1918B, 461; Erdman v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. St. 79, 56 A. 327, 63 L.R.A. 534, 99 Am. St. 783; Connors v. Connolly, 86 Conn. 641, 86 A. 600, 45 L.R. A. (N.S.) 564; March v. Bricklayers & P. Union, 79 Conn. 7, 63 A. 291, 4 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1198, 118 Am. St. 127, 6 Ann. Cas. 848; Brennan v. United Hatters, 73 N.J. Law, 729, 9 L.R.A. 254, 118 Am. St. 727, 9 Ann. Cas. 698; Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co. 28 C.C.A. 99, 83 F. 912; Klingel's Pharmacy v. Sharp & Dohme, 104 Md. 218, 64 A. 1029, 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 976, 118 Am. St. 399, 9 Ann. Cas. 1184.
Defendants cite and rely upon the case of Steffes v. Motion Picture M. Oper. U. of Minneapolis, 136 Minn. 200, 161 N.W. 524, as authorizing them to do the things complained of, and the showing which they make indicates that they intended to, and probably did, confine their acts to those which were recognized in that case as permissible for the purpose and under the circumstances there disclosed. In that case the purpose sought to be accomplished was found to be a lawful one, and to bring the present case within the doctrine of that case, the purpose sought to be accomplished in the present case must also be a lawful purpose.
Plaintiff is not a member of the operators' union and cannot become a member because the constitution of the union provides that no owner, or part owner, or manager, of a place of amusement shall be admitted to membership. It also provides that any member who shall become owner, part owner, or manager of a place of amusement must either withdraw or be expelled. Plaintiff opens his theatre at about 10 o'clock in the forenoon and closes it at about 11 o'clock at night. He insists upon working as an operator of his motion picture machines for one-half the time each day in order to save expense. Defendants insist that only members of the union shall work as operators of the machines, and, as plaintiff is not a member of the union and cannot become a member of it, that he shall not work as an operator although qualified to do so. Plaintiff asserts that the only controversy between himself and the defendants is as to whether he shall be permitted to perform the work of an operator himself in his own theatre, and that the action taken by defendants is solely for the purpose of compelling him to cease working as such operator. He claims that he is not and never has been unfair to union labor; that he has always employed union labor and none other; that he employed union operators until he began work as an operator himself that before beginning work himself he endeavored to make an arrangement to work half the time each day himself and to employ union operators upon union terms for the remainder of the time, but that the members of the union refused...
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