Ross v. Denver Dept. of Health and Hospitals, 93CA0014

• Decision Date: 07 April 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93CA0014,93CA0014
• Citation: 883 P.2d 516
• Parties: 18 Employee Benefits Cas. 1434 Mary K. ROSS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DENVER DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HOSPITALS; Thomas Moe, in his capacity as Manager and Chief Executive Officer of the Denver Department of Health and Hospitals; the City and County of Denver, a municipal corporation; Wellington Webb, in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Denver; the Denver Career Service Board; Robert Braun, Dianne Nino, Connie Bragg, Howard Rosenberg and Alfred Wood, in their capacities as members of the Denver Career Service Board; and Margot Jones, in her capacity as a Hearing Officer for the Denver Career Service Authority, Defendants-Appellants. . I
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

Page 516

883 P.2d 516

18 Employee Benefits Cas. 1434

Mary K. ROSS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DENVER DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HOSPITALS; Thomas Moe, in his capacity as Manager and Chief Executive Officer of the

Denver Department of Health and Hospitals; the City and

County of Denver, a municipal corporation; Wellington Webb,

in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Denver; the Denver

Career Service Board; Robert Braun, Dianne Nino, Connie

Bragg, Howard Rosenberg and Alfred Wood, in their capacities

as members of the Denver Career Service Board; and Margot

Jones, in her capacity as a Hearing Officer for the Denver

Career Service Authority, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 93CA0014.

Colorado Court of Appeals,

Div. I.

April 7, 1994.

Rehearing Denied May 12, 1994.

Certiorari Denied Nov. 7, 1994.

Hawley & VanderWerf, P.C., Lino S. Lipinsky de Orlov, Denver, American Civil Liberties Union of Colorado, David H. Miller, Denver, American Civil Liberties Foundation, William B. Rubenstein, Ruth E. Harlow, New York City, for plaintiff-appellee.

Daniel E. Muse, City Atty., J. Wallace Wortham, Jr., Asst. City Atty., Denver, for defendants-appellants.

Opinion by Judge KAPELKE.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the district court reversing the determination of the Denver Career Service Board (Board) that plaintiff, Mary K. Ross, was not entitled to receive family sick leave benefits to care for her same-sex domestic partner. We reverse and remand with directions.

Ross was formerly employed as a social worker by the Department of Health and Hospitals (Department). In December 1991, she requested family sick leave benefits for the three days she took off work to care for her domestic partner. The Department denied Ross' request because the domestic partner was not a member of Ross' immediate family, as defined by the Career Service Authority Rules (the Rules).

Ross appealed the Department's denial of her request for sick leave to the Career Service Authority. A hearings officer found that the definition of "immediate family" contained in the Rules resulted in Ross' being discriminated against on the basis of her sexual orientation in violation of the Career Service Authority's anti-discrimination rule. Based on that finding, the hearings officer ordered the Department to grant Ross' request for family sick leave benefits.

The Department appealed the hearings officer's decision to the Board, which reversed the hearings officer's decision because it was based on an erroneous interpretation of the Rules.

Ross filed a complaint in the district court seeking review of the Board's decision pursuant to C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) as well as declaratory relief. The district court reversed the Board's decision and reinstated the order of the hearings officer.

I.

Defendants contend that the district court erred in ruling that the Department's denial of sick leave benefits violated Career Service Authority (C.S.A.) Rule 19-10(c). We agree.

The eligibility for sick leave benefits to take care of other persons is prescribed in C.S.A. Rule 11-32, which provides, in pertinent part, that "sick leave may be used ... for necessary care and attendance during sickness ... of a member of the employee's immediate family."

The term "immediate family" is defined in C.S.A. Rule 1 as follows:

Husband, wife, son, daughter, mother, father, grandmother, grandfather, brother, sister, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, mother-in-law, father-in law, brother-in-law, sister in law.

As Ross acknowledges, a same-sex partner does not fall within the agency's definition of "immediate family." Nevertheless, before both the hearings officer and the district court, Ross successfully argued that the family definition in C.S.A. Rule 1 has been superseded and, in effect, invalidated by the agency's promulgation of C.S.A. Rule 19-10(c), which provides as follows:

The following administrative actions relating to personnel matters shall be subject to appeal: .... c) Discriminatory actions: any action of any officer or employee resulting in alleged discrimination because of race, color, creed, national origin, sex, age, political affiliation, or sexual orientation.

Thus, the dispositive issues are whether C.S.A. Rule 19-10(c) superseded the definition of "immediate family," and whether the denial of sick leave benefits to Ross was an action resulting in discrimination because of her sexual orientation.

At the outset, we note that the standard of review in a C.R.C.P. Rule 106(a)(4) proceeding is limited to a determination of whether the administrative agency or officer exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion. Ross v. Fire & Police Pension Ass'n, 713 P.2d 1304 (Colo.1986).

An administrative board's findings may be express or implied. The absence of specific findings is not fatal to an administrative board's decision if there is support in the record for the decision, and it adequately apprises a reviewing court of the basis for the ruling. See Burns v. Board of Assessment Appeals, 820 P.2d 1175 (Colo.App.1991); Hudspeth v. Board of County Commissioners, 667 P.2d 775 (Colo.App.1983). The Board's decision here, although it contains only two findings, nevertheless adequately apprises us that it is based on the Board's interpretation of the Rules and their application to the evidence in the record.

As a general principle, courts defer to the interpretation of an administrative rule or regulation by the agency charged with its administration. Hargett v. Director, Division of Labor, 854 P.2d 1316 (Colo.App.1992); see also Van Pelt v. State Board for Community Colleges & Occupational Education, 195 Colo. 316, 577 P.2d 765 (1978). Under the charter of the City and County of Denver, it is the Board which both promulgates and administers the Career Service Authority Rules and whose interpretation is therefore entitled to deference. Denver City Charter C 5.25(3) and (6). The Board itself apparently concluded that the adoption of C.S.A. Rule 19-10(c) relating to nondiscrimination by reason of sexual orientation was not intended to supersede or nullify the definition of "immediate family" as contained in C.S.A. Rule 19-10(c).

The mere fact that Rule 19-10(c) was promulgated later than the C.S.A. Rule 1 definition does not, of course, mandate a conclusion that it had a superseding effect with respect to determining who is to be deemed an "immediate family" member for the purposes of sick leave. Ross has cited no legislative history to demonstrate that this was the intent of the Board.

When interpreting two statutory or regulatory sections, we must attempt to harmonize them in order to give effect to their purposes. See Ragsdale Bros. Roofing, Inc. v. United Bank, 744 P.2d 750 (Colo.App.1987); Ortega v. Industrial Commission, 682 P.2d 511 (Colo.App.1984). If possible, the provisions should be reconciled to uphold the validity of both. Cooley v. Big Horn Harvestore Systems, 813 P.2d 736 (Colo.1991).

Furthermore, administrative rules and regulations are presumed valid and will not be struck down on review unless the challenging party has demonstrated that the rule or regulation is invalid beyond a reasonable doubt. Civil Rights Commission v. Travelers Insurance Co., 759 P.2d 1358 (Colo.1988); Barr Lake Village Metropolitan District v. Colorado Water Quality Control Commission, 835 P.2d 613 (Colo.App.1992). Ross has not met this burden.

There is no evidence that Ross' employer singled her out and treated her differently than it would have treated a similarly situated heterosexual employee. Nor is there any evidence that the Department's decision to deny Ross' request for sick leave was motivated by discriminatory animus. Accordingly, the Board properly based its decision on an interpretation of the rule itself.

We conclude that the Board's interpretation of its rules was reasonable and that the regulatory definition of "immediate family" does not impermissibly discriminate against Ross by reason of her sexual orientation. The definition in the rule applies equally to heterosexual and homosexual employees and thus does not discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.

A homosexual employee is not precluded from enjoying family sick leave benefits. He or she may take family sick leave to care for a son, daughter, mother, father, grandmother, grandfather, brother, sister, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, mother-in-law, father-in-law, brother-in-law, or sister-in-law.

The only portion of the definition of "immediate family" that arguably affects homosexuals differently is the language allowing an employee to take family sick leave to care for a husband or wife. This portion of the rule does not differentiate between heterosexual and homosexual employees but rather between married and unmarried employees.

Ross was not denied family sick leave benefits to care for her same-sex partner because she is homosexual. An unmarried heterosexual employee also would not be permitted to take family sick leave benefits to care for his or her unmarried opposite-sex partner. Thus, the rule does not treat homosexual employees and similarly situated heterosexual employees differently. See Hinman v. Department of Personnel Administration, 167 Cal.App.3d 516, 213 Cal.Rptr. 410 (1985); Phillips v. Wisconsin Personnel Commission, 167 Wis.2d 205, 482 N.W.2d 121 (1992).

In Hinman v. Department of Personnel Administration, supra, the plaintiff was a homosexual employee who challenged an administrative denial of dental benefits to his same-sex partner. His contention, like Ross' here, was that the state's definition of "family member" for determining eligibility for dental benefits improperly failed to include same-sex partners and that the denial of benefits ran athwart of the California Constitution and an executive order prohibiting employment discrimination based on sexual orientation in state government. We find the court's analysis both persuasive and apposite to the situation here:

Rather than...