Rothweiler v. Winton Motorcar Co.

• Decision Date: 11 July 1916
• Docket Number: 13473.
• Citation: 92 Wash. 215,158 P. 737
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: ROTHWEILER et al. v. WINTON MOTORCAR CO. et al.

158 P. 737

92 Wash. 215

ROTHWEILER et al. v. WINTON MOTORCAR CO. et al.

No. 13473.

Supreme Court of Washington

July 11, 1916

Department 1. Appeal from Superior Court, King County; J. T. Ronald Judge.

Action by H. N. Rothweiler and another, copartners doing business as Rothweiler & Co., against the Winton Motorcar Company and others. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants, except Paul Neal and Willis Smith, appeal. Affirmed.

J. J. Geary, of Seattle, for appellants.

E. L Skeel, W. M. Whintney, Spence & Denham, and R. M. Jones, all of Seattle, for respondents.

CHADWICK J.

Appellant Winton Motorcar Company made certain repairs and furnished new tires for an automobile owned by the Waterhouse Sands Company, but held under a conditional sales contract by one Willis Smith. The machine was covered by a chattel mortgage made by a former owner in favor of the respondents. Appellant filed a lien upon the automobile which it asserts in this action. Thereafter Smith stored the machine with the Franklin Wicks Company.

It also asserts a possessory lien for storage and repairs.

Addressing ourselves first to the lien for repairs, we come at once to a consideration of the statute:

'Sec. 1154 [Rem. & Bal. Code]. Every person, firm or corporation who has expended labor, skill or material on any chattel, at the request of its owner, or authorized agent of the owner, shall have a lien upon such chattels for the contract price for such expenditure, or in the absence of such contract price, for the reasonable worth of such expenditure, for a period of one year from and after such expenditure, notwithstanding the fact that such chattel be surrendered to the owner thereof; provided however, that no such lien shall continue after the delivery of such chattel to its owner as against the rights of third persons who may have acquired an interest in, or the title to, such chattel in good faith, for value, and without actual knowledge of the lien.'

'Sec. 1156 [Rem. & Bal. Code]. Every person who is in possession of a chattel, under an agreement for the purchase thereof, whether the title thereto be in him, or his vendor, shall, for the purposes of this act, be deemed the owner thereof, and the lien of the person expending material, labor or skill thereon shall be superior to and preferred to the rights of the person holding the title thereto, or any lien thereon, antedating the time of expenditure of the labor, skill or material thereon by a lien claimant, to the extent that such expenditure has enhanced the value of such chattel.'

We have italicized the words which appellants insist are apt to support their liens and to give them priority over the mortgage lien of respondents. It is contended that the words 'any lien thereon' are broad enough to include a chattel mortgage. They are broad enough, but we cannot satisfy the law by selecting words that might justify a holding that is desired. The rules of statutory construction demand that we consider words in the light of the whole statute and of other statutes affecting the subject-matter of our inquiry.

It was the rule at common law that one who performed labor, lent skill, or furnished material for the building or repair of a chattel had a lien upon the thing to which he had contributed his labor, skill, or material. But the existence of the common-law lien depended upon possession. Not only the lien, but the right to assert it, vanished when the chattel was surrendered to another. Under modern business conditions this rule became harsh and inadaptable. The Legislature sought to cure the mischief, and accordingly passed the act of 1905. Its purpose is plainly disclosed by the word 'perpetuate,' which occurs in the title.

'An

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