Rott v. Rott
Decision Date | 21 January 2020 |
Docket Number | No. 347609,347609 |
Parties | Doreen ROTT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Arthur ROTT, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Stewart Law PLLC (by Melissa P. Stewart ) for plaintiff.
The Hanover Law Group (by Ronald C. Paul, Bloomfield Hills) for defendant.
Before: K. F. Kelly, P.J., and Borrello and Servitto, JJ.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the trial court order, entered on remand from this Court,1 granting defendant summary disposition in this action sounding in negligence and premises liability. We affirm.
This case has already been before this Court, and the facts were provided in the previous opinion as follows:
in her left knee, which required restorative surgery. [Rott v. Rott , unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued December 18, 2018 (Docket No. 336240), pp. 1–2.]
The trial court originally determined that the recreational land use act (RUA), MCL 324.73301, applied to this matter, stating, "[Zip lining] in this instance is an outdoor recreational activity as defined in the [RUA] and ... Plaintiff's specific purpose for being on the land at the time of the accident, was for the purpose of using the [zip line]." However, the trial court determined that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether plaintiff's injuries were caused by defendant's gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct, thereby precluding application of the RUA. Defendant appealed by leave granted the trial court's denial of his motion for summary disposition, and this Court upheld the denial under MCR 2.116(C)(8) but remanded to the trial court for entry of summary disposition in defendant's favor under MCR 2.116(C)(10) because there was no genuine issue of material fact that defendant's conduct did not amount to gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct. Rott , unpub. op. at 4–6.
Plaintiff now appeals the order entered on remand granting defendant summary disposition, arguing that the RUA does not apply because she was not on defendant's property for the purpose of zip lining and that zip lining is not the same kind, class, character, or nature of the activities enumerated in the act. We disagree.
This Court reviews de novo a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary disposition. Bennett v. Russell , 322 Mich. App. 638, 642, 913 N.W.2d 364 (2018).
A trial court deciding a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) considers "the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties ...." [ Id. (citations omitted).]
Matters of statutory interpretation are also reviewed de novo. Barclae v. Zarb , 300 Mich. App. 455, 466, 834 N.W.2d 100 (2013). Whether the RUA applies to a given set of facts is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. Neal v. Wilkes , 470 Mich. 661, 664, 685 N.W.2d 648 (2004).
The RUA provided, in relevant part:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, a cause of action shall not arise for injuries to a person who is on the land of another without paying to the owner, tenant, or lessee of the land a valuable consideration for the purpose of fishing, hunting, trapping, camping, hiking, sightseeing, motorcycling, snowmobiling, or any other outdoor recreational use or trail use, with or without permission, against the owner, tenant, or lessee of the land unless the injuries were caused by the gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct of the owner, tenant, or lessee. [ MCL 324.73301(1).][2 ]
The RUA "was designed to restrict suits by persons coming upon the property of another for [recreational] purposes, and to declare the limited liability of owners of property within this state." Ballard v. Ypsilanti Twp. , 457 Mich. 564, 577, 577 N.W.2d 890 (1998) (quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted; alteration in original). The Michigan Supreme Court characterized the RUA as "a liability-limiting" enactment. Id. It reduces the exposure to litigation with the goal of "encourag[ing] landowners to open their property to others for recreation." Id.
As an initial matter, defendant argues that this Court already "tacitly approved" the application of the RUA to these facts in its previous opinion in Docket No. 336240. Indeed, in its previous opinion in this matter, this Court stated:
Plaintiff accepted the inherent risk associated with riding a self-installed zip line on her brother's property. Absent gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct on the part of defendant, plaintiff cannot recover for damages resulting from the zip line. [Rott , unpub. op. at 4.]
We determined that defendant's conduct was not grossly negligent or willful or wanton misconduct and that defendant was, therefore, entitled to summary disposition. Id. at 101–02.
The law-of-the-case doctrine provides that "if an appellate court has passed on a legal question and remanded the case for further proceedings, the legal questions thus determined by the appellate court will not be differently determined on a subsequent appeal in the same case where the facts remain materially the same." Grievance Administrator v. Lopatin , 462 Mich. 235, 259, 612 N.W.2d 120 (2000) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The doctrine only applies "to issues actually decided, either implicitly or explicitly, in the prior appeal." Brownlow v. McCall Enterprises, Inc. , 315 Mich. App. 103, 118, 888 N.W.2d 295 (2016) (quotation marks and citations omitted). This Court implicitly decided in the previous opinion that the RUA applied to the facts of the case, and plaintiff's arguments on appeal stemming from whether the RUA applies are therefore subject to the law-of-the-case doctrine. Although this determination resolves plaintiff's arguments on appeal, we will nonetheless briefly address the issues raised.
Plaintiff first argues that the RUA does not apply because she was not on defendant's property "for the purpose" of zip lining, but rather for a family gathering. We disagree.
"The goal of statutory interpretation is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature." Barclae , 300 Mich. App. at 466, 834 N.W.2d 100. The first step in this process is to review the statutory language. Spectrum Health Hosps. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Mich. , 492 Mich. 503, 515, 821 N.W.2d 117 (2012). "Unless statutorily defined, every word or phrase of a statute should be accorded its plain and ordinary meaning, taking into account the context in which the words are used." Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). "If the statutory language is unambiguous, then the Legislature's intent is clear and judicial construction is neither necessary nor permitted." Barclae , 300 Mich. App. at 466-467, 834 N.W.2d 100. Under the last-antecedent rule of statutory construction, "a modifying or restrictive word or clause contained in a statute is confined solely to the immediately preceding clause or last antecedent, unless something in the statute requires a different interpretation." Hardaway v. Wayne Cnty. , 494 Mich. 423, 427, 835 N.W.2d 336 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Plaintiff argues that the statute should be read so that a cause of action only arises for injuries to a person who has entered another's land "for the purpose of" the statutorily enumerated activities or any other outdoor recreational use. (Underlining omitted.) However, the statute actually reads that a cause of action does not arise for injuries to a person "on the land of another without paying ... a valuable consideration for the purpose of " the enumerated activities or any other outdoor recreational use. MCL 324.73301(1) (emphasis added). Under the plain and unambiguous language of the statute and the last-antecedent rule the word "for" in the statute modifies "a valuable consideration." Hardaway , 494 Mich. at 427, 835 N.W.2d 336. Therefore, the statute applies if a person does not pay the owner of the land a valuable consideration for the purpose of the recreational activity. MCL 324.73301(1). Defendant testified that neither he nor his wife collected money from anyone to ride the zip line. A plain reading of the statute does not lend itself to plaintiff's interpretation that the statute requires a person to be on the property for the purpose of the recreational activity for the statute to apply. Plaintiff's assertions that she was harassed by defendant into riding the zip line are irrelevant.
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